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This thesis consists of three experimental studies on the delegation of decision-making author-
ity in organizations. Delegation of decision-making authority to lower levels of management 
enables organizations to benefit from specialized knowledge and information of lower level 
managers and intends to improve the decision-making process in organizations. However, by 
delegating decision-making authority to lower levels of management organizations also in-
crease their reliance on managers to make decisions in the best interest of the organization. 
Prior research demonstrates that conflicts between decentralized divisions or judgmental biases 
of managers can undermine the decision-making process and, hence, organizational efficiency. 
Consequently, the delegation of decision-making authority may ultimately not lead to improved 
decision-making. In contrast, it may even give rise to new inefficiencies that require limitations 
on the decision-making authority granted to managers or the intervention of top-level manage-
ment. It is, however, often difficult to determine to what extent limitations on the decision-
making authority or top management interventions are required without unnecessarily under-
mining managers’ flexibility to use their knowledge and information and without undermining 
their responsibility to make good decisions. Optimally trading off potential benefits against 
potential costs of delegating and limiting decision-making authority is thus an important source 
of increasing organizational efficiency.  
Essay 1 focuses on the delegation of decisions regarding the internal transfer of goods and 
services in decentralized organizations. Specifically, Essay 1 investigates how the efficiency of 
negotiated transfer pricing is affected when corporate headquarters may intervene and become 
involved in transfer price negotiations between division managers, particularly after negotia-
tions failed. Decentralized organizations often delegate the decisions about the transfer of in-
ternal goods and services to division managers by allowing them to negotiate transfer prices 
autonomously. In case of information asymmetries between divisions and corporate headquar-
ters, organizational decision-making may be improved by delegating transfer decisions to better 
informed division managers. However, even when division managers are granted autonomy in 
transfer decisions, prior literature provides evidence that headquarters often do not abstain from 
becoming involved in transfer price negotiations. While the intention of headquarters’ involve-
ment is to overcome inefficiencies arising from conflicts between decentralized managers, ex-
perimental findings in Essay 1 suggest that such involvement has the unintended consequences 
of further reducing both, agreement frequency and the coordination efficiency of negotiated 
transfer pricing. Reduced agreement occurs because decentralized managers feel less responsi-
ble for the negotiation outcome when headquarters can become involved. Reduced efficiency 
results because misattribution and overconfidence lead headquarters to attribute negotiation 
failure to the wrong cause and to discount or ignore information from the negotiations. Essay 1 
thus informs about a cost of headquarters becoming involved and resuming decision-making 
authority for once delegated decisions. 
Essay 2 and 3 focus on the delegation of compensation decisions in organizations. Specifically, 
Essay 2 studies how the extent of superior discretion over the allocation of a bonus pool affects 
the output of a team when employees—besides exerting productive effort—can engage in un-
productive influence activities. Granting superiors of a team high discretion in bonus allocations 
allows them to use non-verifiable information and personal observations in order to mitigate 
free-rider incentives in teams. Prior research, however, also suggests that discretion may give 
rise to unproductive influence activities of employees. That is, instead of contributing to team 
output, employees may waste valuable working time trying to bias the superior’s bonus decision 
in their favor. The question, therefore, is whether organizations should limit superiors’ discre-
tion extent in order to mitigate the detrimental effects of influence activities in teams. Standard 
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economic theory presumes that limiting the extent of discretion undermines the efficiency of 
discretionary bonus pools as it harms superiors’ flexibility to use their personal observations in 
bonus decisions. Experimental findings in Essay 2, however, suggest that implementing limi-
tations on the discretion extent over bonus allocations is important and can lead to increased 
team output because superiors do not sufficiently account for influence activities in their bonus 
decisions. Furthermore, Essay 2 examines under what conditions limitations on the extent of 
discretion may become more important in an environment with influence activities. Findings 
suggest that the positive effect of limiting the discretion extent is more pronounced in a work-
place environment where employees can more directly monitor the behavior and activities of 
their peers. The reason is that influence activities of peers are more salient under a high degree 
of monitoring and thereby affect behavior and fairness perceptions of employees more strongly. 
The study, thus, identifies the degree of mutual monitoring in teams as an important factor 
influencing the efficacy of superior discretion over bonus decisions. 
Similar to Essay 2, the experiment described in Essay 3 addresses the question of the extent of 
superior discretion over bonus allocations. The experiment in the previous study demonstrates 
the importance of limiting superiors’ extent of discretion over bonus allocations in order to 
mitigate influence activities and to induce individual effort in teams. In the previous setting, 
limitations on the discretion extent are implemented by the organization while superiors of a 
team are not involved in the decision. However, organizations often let superiors of a team 
implement and communicate important specifics of a bonus plan. Correspondingly, organiza-
tions may establish guidelines that require superiors to specify and announce the discretion 
extent rather than limiting the extent of discretion by design. Experimental findings in Essay 3 
suggest that superiors can use such announcements to control the expectations and behavior of 
their subordinates more effectively and, ultimately, to mitigate influence activities in teams. 
Announcement thereby helps to increase the link between individual effort and reward. Specif-
ically, the findings suggests that announcement is effective in motivating effort and team output 
when the degree of mutual monitoring in teams is high. The experiment in Essay 3 thus provides 
further insights into how the efficacy of discretionary bonus pools can be improved when em-
ployees can engage in activities to distort the superiors’ personal information in their favor. 
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ESSAY 1 
The Unintended Consequences of Headquarters’ Involvement in decentralized Transfer 
Price Negotiations: Experimental Evidence 
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This study investigates how headquarters involvement affects the efficient coordination of in-
ternal transfers in decentralized transfer price negotiations. Prior research explores decentral-
ized managers who negotiate transfer prices autonomously. However, evidence suggests that 
headquarters can become involved in transfer price negotiations, particularly after negotiation 
failure. While the intention of headquarters involvement is to overcome inefficiencies arising 
from decentralized managers’ inability to agree on a transfer price, we suggest that such in-
volvement is likely to have the unintended consequences of further reducing both agreement 
frequency and the coordination efficiency of negotiated transfer pricing. Reduced agreement is 
likely to occur because decentralized managers are likely to feel less responsible for the nego-
tiation outcome and may be overly optimistic about headquarters’ decision. Reduced efficiency 
is likely to result because misattribution and overconfidence are likely to make headquarters 
attribute negotiation failure to the wrong cause and to discount or ignore information from the 
negotiation. In an experiment, we manipulate whether headquarters involvement is absent ver-
sus present. Nested within headquarters involvement present, we manipulate the degree of 
headquarters involvement as either “weak” or “strong”. Consistent with our predictions, we 
find that headquarters involvement reduces the frequency of negotiation agreement and the 
coordination efficiency of transfer pricing. Additionally, we find that efficiency is reduced even 
more when headquarters involvement is strong rather than weak. We contribute to the research 
on negotiated transfer pricing by providing evidence about headquarters’ biased perceptions 
of negotiation impasse and the unintended consequences of its involvement.  
 
Keywords: Transfer price, negotiations, delegation, autonomy   
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[T]he group president of the Computer Group explained how divisions in his group pur-
chased semiconductors from divisions in two other groups: Prices for these semiconductors 
are derived by negotiation, essentially on an arm’s-length basis between the selling division 
and the buying division, with a little push here and there from us [the group general manag-
ers] if necessary. 
Eccles and White (1988, p. 42) 
Determination of transfer-price: […] Each MPC [Mini Profit Center] has independent 
discretion in their negotiations. […] Nevertheless, when no settlement is reached through in-
dependent negotiation, their boss will intervene and arbitrate a final determination.  
Monden (2012, p. 470, about the transfer pricing system at Kyocera) 
 
1 Introduction 
One of the major functions of transfer pricing in firms is to assure efficient coordination 
of internal transfers between decentralized divisions when headquarters—due to information 
asymmetries—cannot efficiently coordinate these transfers itself (Hirshleifer 1956, Zimmer-
man 2014).1 However, when determining transfer prices, external prices from competitive, 
well-functioning markets that would solve such coordination problems optimally (e.g., Abdel-
Khalik and Lusk 1974) rarely exist for internally traded goods (Merchant and Van der Stede 
2003, Borkowski 1990). Thus, transfer prices can be either set centrally by headquarters or 
negotiated between decentralized divisions (Horngren, Datar and Rajan 2012).  
Prior research focuses either on autonomous transfer price negotiations between decen-
tralized managers (e.g., Luft and Libby 1997; Kachelmeier and Towry 2002) or on transfer 
prices centrally set by headquarters (e.g., Avila and Ronen 1999; Bouwens and Steens 2016). 
However, as illustrated by our introductory statements and suggested in the literature (e.g., 
Drury 2004; Hansen and Mowen 2006), transfer price negotiations may not be fully autono-
mous, as headquarters can become involved in transfer pricing, particularly after negotiations 
have failed. This study investigates the effects of such involvement on the efficient coordination 
of internal transfers. Specifically, we investigate how headquarters involvement affects the 
                                                 
1 For ease of exposition, we use female pronouns for the seller, male pronouns for the buyer and neutral pro-
nouns for headquarters in the following. 
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agreement frequency of transfer price negotiations and the efficiency of internal transfers (here-
after, coordination efficiency), defined as the difference between actual and optimal firm profit. 
Headquarters involvement is likely to have the intended consequence of solving ineffi-
cient negotiation impasses, thereby increasing the efficiency of internal transfers. The intention 
to improve the outcome of autonomous transfer price negotiations is justified as prior evidence 
indicates that managers’ biased fairness perceptions can lead to negotiation failure even if trans-
fers would be profitable (Kachelmeier and Towry 2002; Arnold, Gillenkirch and Hannan 2016). 
We predict, however, that headquarters involvement is likely to have the unintended conse-
quences of further reducing both agreement frequency and coordination efficiency.  
Agreement frequency is likely to decrease for two non-mutually exclusive reasons. First, 
either buyer or seller or both may feel that headquarters involvement will result in an outcome 
that is more favorable than a negotiated outcome and, therefore, may be reluctant to make con-
cessions during negotiations (Starke and Notz 1981; Farber and Bazerman 1987). Second, head-
quarters involvement is likely to reduce decentralized managers’ perceived responsibility for 
the negotiation outcome (Magenau 1983; Neale and Bazerman 1983).  
Coordination efficiency of internal transfers is likely to decrease because the fundamental 
attribution error (Ross 1977) may lead headquarters to over-attribute negotiation failure to the 
managers’ unwillingness to agree on a transfer price rather than the unprofitability of the transfer. 
Further, due to overconfidence, headquarters is likely to discount or ignore information from 
the negotiation with respect to the profitability of the transfer and to overestimate its own deci-
sion-making abilities. As a consequence, headquarters is likely to systematically make ineffi-
cient decisions when it becomes involved after negotiation failure.  
Consistent with our predictions about the consequences of headquarters involvement, a 
recent survey finds that division managers’ perceived effectiveness of transfer pricing and au-
tonomy are positively associated (Chen, Chen, Pan and Wang 2015). However, as the results 
are based on a cross-sectional sample and relate to managers’ perceptions, it remains unclear 
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whether effectiveness and autonomy are simply artifacts of environmental circumstances or 
whether autonomy itself leads to more efficiency. Our study predicts and finds the latter. 
We test our hypotheses in an experimental setting in which a coordination problem exists. 
The seller, representing the production division, produces the intermediate good and sells it to 
the buyer, representing the sales division. The buyer processes the good further and sells the 
final good externally. A coordination problem exists because transfers are profitable on aver-
age, but instances exist in which the production costs exceed the final selling price. In these cases, 
exchange of the good would result in a loss to the firm. Prior to production, buyers and sellers 
negotiate over the transfer price of the intermediate good that has either no external market or a 
market that lacks competitive prices.2 If buyer and seller reach agreement on a transfer price, 
the transfer takes place at that price. If they fail to reach agreement, headquarters may become 
involved.  
We use a setting that is likely descriptive of coordination problems in corporate practice. 
Specifically, the coordination problem exists owing to information asymmetries in the firm (e.g., 
Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Dikolli and Vaysman 2006; Dorestani 2007). Sellers have private 
information about the production cost of the good while buyers have private information about 
the price that can be realized when selling the final good externally to the final customer (here-
after, final selling price). Headquarters has less information about both production costs and the 
final selling price but receives information about the parties’ negotiation and offers made 
therein before it potentially becomes involved. The existence of local, private information is 
likely to be common in practice (e.g., Dikolli and Vaysman 2006) and can include, for example, 
knowledge about product design tradeoffs or current and available technologies for the produc-
tion division and knowledge about customer demand and product market dynamics or addi-
tional processing costs for the buying division. In transfer price negotiation settings in practice, 
                                                 
2 There may be no market due to the intermediate good being sufficiently differentiated from substitutes.  It 
could also be the case that the market may not have a sufficient number of buyers and sellers to have competi-
tively determined prices (Abdel-Khalik and Lusk 1974).  
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like in our experiment, headquarters likely gathers some additional information about these 
parameters before becoming involved, particularly about buyers’ and sellers’ offers in the ne-
gotiation. However, this information is likely worse than that of decentralized divisions, imply-
ing that some information asymmetries likely persist even after acquiring the additional infor-
mation (Amershi and Cheng 1990; Holmström and Tirole 1991; Wagenhofer 1994; Dikolli and 
Vaysman 2006).  
Since headquarters’ degree of involvement is a continuum in practice, as illustrated by 
our introductory examples, our experiment uses a nested design in which we compare one end 
of the continuum in which headquarters involvement is absent (no involvement – NI) to two 
conditions along the continuum in which involvement is present. In the NI condition, headquar-
ters is a passive observer of the negotiation outcome. Nested within headquarters involvement 
present, we implement two degrees of headquarters involvement along the continuum that we 
label “weak involvement (WI)” and “strong involvement (SI)”. Under WI, headquarters may 
suggest a transfer price, but both division managers must accept the suggested transfer price for 
the transfer to take place. Under SI, headquarters assumes full authority in the event of failed 
negotiations and determines whether the transfer is made or not and, if so, the price at which 
divisions must trade.  
Consistent with our predictions, we find that headquarters involvement significantly re-
duces agreement frequency in negotiations, but negotiation agreement does not differ between 
WI and SI. Moreover, we also find that headquarters involvement significantly reduces coordi-
nation efficiency, and the reduction in efficiency is even greater when involvement is strong 
rather than weak. Additional analyses reveal that headquarters attributes negotiation failure too 
often to managers’ bargaining capabilities rather than the possibility of unprofitable trade, con-
sistent with a fundamental attribution error. Further, even though the additional information 
headquarters receives about negotiation offers is informative about the profitability of the trans-
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fer, due to overconfidence, headquarters does not effectively use this information. As a conse-
quence, under SI, headquarters becomes involved too often and is unable to distinguish between 
profitable and unprofitable transfers. Under WI, headquarters often makes transfer price sug-
gestions that are not beneficial for both divisions, leading to the rejection of profitable transfers. 
Our findings have important implications for both theory and practice. From a theoretical 
perspective, our study contributes to the stream of research investigating frictions in transfer 
price negotiations and their causes (e.g., Luft and Libby 1997; Kachelmeier and Towry 2002; 
Arnold et al. 2016). Whereas prior research focuses primarily on decentralized managers and 
effects of their fairness preferences on negotiation failure, we provide evidence about head-
quarters’ biased perceptions as a source of coordination inefficiencies. Additionally, we inform 
theory about the effects of misattribution and overconfidence as an important factor in delegated 
versus centralized decision making in firms. As organizations do not seem to delegate decisions 
optimally (e.g., Coats and Rankin 2016; Gallo 2012), it is important to understand the reasons 
for this phenomenon. By providing evidence for suboptimal central decision-making and its 
causes in a transfer pricing setting, our study helps to build this stream of research.  
From a practical perspective, our study informs organizations about a cost of becoming 
involved in decentralized transfer price negotiations. If firms organize their activities in a de-
centralized way and delegate tasks to better informed managers, risks of interference by head-
quarters include underestimating the value of  committing to treating divisions autonomously  
and overestimating its own decision making abilities (e.g., Wruck and Jensen 1994; Pfeffer, 
Cialdini, Hanna and Knopoff 1998). This is particularly important when headquarters not only 
interferes by making suggestions or giving advice, but resumes decision authority for once del-
egated tasks. Our results suggest that firms could benefit by granting full autonomy to divisions 
in their decentralized transfer price negotiation. Such a course of action would motivate divi-
sions to acquire and use their private information more efficiently, resulting in greater firm 
profit. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting, re-
views relevant literature and presents our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experimental de-
sign. Section 4 presents the results of the experiment. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Hypotheses 
Setting  
We explore how headquarters involvement affects the frequency of buyer and seller 
agreement and coordination efficiency of internal transfers defined as the difference between 
actual and optimal firm profit. Division managers work in an environment where their compen-
sation is based on division profits and where the right to negotiate transfer prices is delegated 
to them. Rather than negotiating both price and quantity, we simplify the setting by holding 
quantity constant, so that divisions only negotiate over price. To further simplify the negotiation 
environment, there is no competitive external market for the intermediate good.  
We analyze a coordination problem under information asymmetry as it likely exists in 
practice (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Dikolli and Vaysman 2006).3 The actual production cost 
of the good is private information of the production division and the final selling price of the 
good is private information of the sales division. Transfer price negotiations should help man-
agers coordinate on a mutually beneficial price when exchange is profitable and encourage them 
not to trade the good when the exchange is unprofitable.4 Headquarters has inferior information 
about production costs and final selling price than the decentralized divisions (Dejong et al. 
1989; Ghosh 2000). We operationalize this asymmetric information as headquarters knowing 
the distributions of production costs and final selling prices but not knowing the actual cost or 
                                                 
3 As we explained above, there are likely to be multiple sources of information asymmetry between divisions and 
headquarters and between different divisions in practice and buyer and seller are unlikely to be able to communi-
cate their information credibly to headquarters. To increase experimental control, we abstract from such multiple 
sources and limit information asymmetry to the key variables determining the profitability of the transfer. 
4 In some prior studies on transfer price negotiations, information asymmetry is eliminated for experimental con-
trol purposes (e.g., Arnold et al. 2016; Kachelmeier and Towry 2002; Luft and Libby 1997). However, in our 
study, like in other transfer price experiments, information asymmetry represents a prerequisite for the coordina-
tion problem (Ghosh 2000; Chalos and Haka 1990; Dejong et al. 1989).  
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price before buyer and seller start to negotiate. Prior to becoming involved and making transfer 
price decisions, headquarters, however, receives information about negotiation offers that likely 
conveys additional information about the profitability of the transfer. Thus, this information 
reduces headquarters’ information asymmetry about transfer profitability, albeit not fully.5  
We study three treatments in a nested experimental design in which headquarters involve-
ment in the transfer pricing process is either present or absent. Nested within headquarters in-
volvement present, involvement can be either weak (WI) or strong (SI). In the case of no head-
quarters involvement (NI), headquarters is a passive observer of the outcome of the negotiation. 
In the WI condition, when negotiations fail, headquarters may suggest a transfer price. If both 
managers accept the suggested transfer price, then the good is transferred at that price. If either 
manager rejects the suggested price, the transfer does not take place. In the SI condition, when 
negotiations fail, headquarters assumes the decision authority and decides whether to impose a 
binding transfer price for the sale of the good between divisions.  
Headquarters involvement has some similarities to having an arbitrator or mediator whose 
role is to either suggest or impose an outcome when negotiation fails. Consequently, some be-
havioral regularities from this research apply in our setting. Headquarters involvement in trans-
fer price negotiations however differs from mediation and arbitration in some important ways. 
First, arbitration and mediation are typically initiated by the negotiators who also determine the 
mediator/arbitrator’s role and, prior to negotiations, whether her decision will be binding or not 
(Farber and Bazerman 1987). In contrast, in an organizational setting, headquarters has the au-
thority to decide whether it becomes involved and whether its decisions are binding, and estab-
lishes other negotiation parameters. Second, mediators and arbitrators usually have no monetary 
                                                 
5 As evidenced in the results section, the information from negotiation offers is indeed informative about profita-
bility. We abstract from any direct communication from seller and buyer to headquarters after the negotiation for 
two main reasons: First, such communication is unlikely to be credible as, otherwise, decentralized transfer price 
negotiations would not be necessary. Thus, even with such direct communication, headquarters is still unlikely to 
be informed about the exact costs and price. Second, such additional communication usually leads to rather com-
plex anticipation effects. Thus, excluding such direct communication increases experimental control. 
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stake in the negotiation outcome while headquarters is the residual claimant of the transfer de-
cision. Finally, while in mediation and arbitration research, negotiation agreement usually ei-
ther has to be found or can only be positive for both parties (e.g., Notz and Starke 1978; Bazer-
man and Neale 1982; Magenau 1983; Bazerman et al. 1992), the overarching goal of transfer 
pricing is to achieve coordination, i.e., to make the transfer when it is profitable and to not make 
the transfer when it is unprofitable (e.g., Hirshleifer 1956). 
Hypotheses  
Agreement Frequency 
There are several reasons why headquarters involvement in the setting of transfer prices 
may reduce the likelihood that the divisions reach an initial agreement during negotiations. 
First, if either buyer or seller or both feel that headquarters involvement will result in an out-
come that is more favorable than a negotiated outcome, they may make more extreme demands 
and be more reluctant to make concessions during negotiations (Starke and Notz 1981, Ma-
genau 1983, Farber and Bazerman 1987). Second, when there is a possibility that headquarters 
will determine the transfer price, managers may feel less responsibility for the final outcome 
(Bigoness 1976, Notz and Starke 1978, Starke and Notz 1981, Neale and Bazerman 1983). 
Reduced feelings of responsibility for the outcome of transfer price negotiations are likely to 
decrease managers’ efforts to reach agreement during negotiations. These arguments are con-
sistent with the evidence from studies on arbitration and mediation demonstrating that antici-
pation of third-party intervention has a “chilling” or “narcotic” effect on the bargaining process 
(Wirtz 1963, Starke and Notz 1981, Magenau 1983, Neale and Bazerman 1983). 
Finally, there is an informational/strategic reason why the anticipation of headquarters 
involvement may reduce the frequency of initial agreement during negotiations. In the event 
that headquarters chooses to intervene when negotiations fail, they acquire information regard-
ing the state of the negotiation impasse prior to making a transfer price decision. Hence, making 
concessions during negotiations is risky in the sense that it provides headquarters information 
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regarding production costs and final selling prices. This may encourage managers to make more 
extreme initial offers and make fewer concessions during negotiations in an attempt to influence 
the final transfer price in their favor. These arguments lead to our first hypothesis.   
H1a: Headquarters involvement in negotiated transfer pricing reduces the frequency of Initial 
agreement between divisions during negotiations. 
 
Under both weak and strong headquarters involvement, when making concessions during 
negotiations, division managers must weigh the costs and benefits of reaching an agreement 
and failing to reach an agreement. Since headquarters acquires information regarding the state 
of the negotiation before its decision, offers and counteroffers can be used both as an attempt 
to reach agreement and as a way to influence a suggested or imposed transfer price if an agree-
ment is not reached. Under WI, a manager can always reject a transfer price that results in a 
loss. Under SI, it is possible that an imposed transfer price creates a loss for one or both divi-
sions. Compared to WI, this makes failure to reach an agreement riskier under SI. Ceteris pa-
ribus, this may lead to more agreement during negotiations under SI.  
However, it is possible that managers may be more motivated to influence headquarters’ 
choice of transfer prices under SI since headquarters can impose a price that buyers and sellers 
are unable to reject. This could lead managers to make less concessions during negotiations 
under SI. For instance, arbitration research shows that when participants agree ex ante to allow 
an arbitrator to choose an outcome in the event of failed negotiations, negotiators tend to be 
biased in their views that the arbitrator chooses an outcome in their favor. Extant research 
demonstrates that such bias leads to less agreement during negotiations (Carnevale and Pruitt 
1992).  
In summary, some arguments suggest stronger motivations for division managers to reach 
agreement under SI compared to WI whereas other arguments suggest less willingness to make 
concessions or accept offers under SI than under WI. Therefore, we leave this issue as an em-
pirical question and state Hypothesis H1b in its null form:  
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H1b: There is no difference in the frequency of initial agreement under weak headquarters 
involvement and strong headquarters involvement.  
 
Coordination Efficiency of Transfer Pricing 
Next, we argue that headquarters involvement in transfer price negotiations reduces the 
efficiency of internal transfers. As discussed above, we expect headquarters involvement to 
reduce the frequency that divisions reach agreement during negotiations. A reduction in the 
frequency of negotiation agreement and the reliance on headquarters, however, can have nega-
tive effects on efficiency because, even after acquiring information from the negotiation, head-
quarters generally does not possess exact information about the current costs and prices 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Dikolli and Vaysman 2006; Dorestani 2007; Zimmerman 2014). 
Thus, headquarters’ suggested or imposed transfer prices are unlikely to consistently maximize 
firm profit. Under SI, headquarters could require the transfer of unprofitable goods or prevent 
the transfer of profitable goods. Under WI, unprofitable transfers may be avoided, but if the 
suggested transfer price results in either division incurring a loss, it will be rejected regardless 
of whether it is profitable for the firm. This reduces efficiency when the transfer would result 
in a profit for the firm.  
Headquarters’ biased assessment of the negotiation outcome is likely to exacerbate this 
negative effect of information asymmetry in two ways: First, when negotiation fails, headquar-
ters does not know if the failure is due to the cost exceeding the price or if it is attributable to 
the managers’ bargaining behavior. Prior research indicates that in such a case, individuals are 
prone to a “fundamental attribution error” (Ross 1977) as they tend to over-attribute others’ 
actions to their dispositions rather than situational constraints (e.g., Dunning, Griffin, Mi-
lojkovic and Ross 1990). Similarly, in negotiations, individuals tend to overestimate others’ 
tendency to use devious tactics and strategies (Ross and Ward 1995). As a consequence, head-
quarters likely underestimates managers’ willingness to reach an agreement and likely over-
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attributes negotiation failure to the managers’ bargaining tactics. Therefore, it becomes in-
volved too often.  
Second, individuals generally exhibit overconfidence and tend to overestimate their abili-
ties (e.g., Moore and Healy 2008).6 Headquarters’ overconfidence in their ability to make prof-
itable transfer price decisions may further foster their involvement in the negotiations (e.g., Billett 
and Qian 2008; Malmendier and Tate 2005). Moreover, it will likely lead headquarters to dis-
count information from the negotiation and overweigh their own initial judgments when making 
transfer price decisions (e.g., See, Morrison, Rothman and Soll 2011; Block and Harper 1991). 
These arguments suggest that information asymmetries paired with headquarters’ cognitive bi-
ases are likely to lead to inefficient transfer prices and transfer decisions and, consequently, 
decrease the coordination efficiency of transfer price negotiations. We state this prediction for-
mally as H2a:  
H2a: Headquarters involvement in negotiated transfer pricing reduces the coordination effi-
ciency of internal transfers.  
 
It is, however, unclear whether this effect is stronger under weak or under strong involve-
ment. If headquarters decides to make an unprofitable transfer under strong involvement, divi-
sion managers cannot reject this transfer, therefore increasing inefficiency relative to weak in-
volvement. Alternatively, in contrast to weak involvement, profitable transfers cannot fail under 
strong involvement because the suggested transfer price results in a loss for one of the divisions 
or because one of the division managers perceives the transfer price as unfair. If this effect 
prevails, coordination efficiency would be greater under strong involvement. Consequently, we 
state H2b as a null hypothesis: 
H2b: There is no difference in the coordination efficiency of internal transfers under weak 
headquarters involvement and strong headquarters involvement.   
                                                 
6 Studies in economics and psychology show that people tend to be overconfident in their beliefs and judgements 
in a variety of contexts (Russo and Schoemaker 1992, Camerer and Lovallo 1999) leading DeBondt and Thaler 




Overview and Design 
The experimental task involves a production manager (seller), a sales manager (buyer) 
and headquarters.7 Buyer-seller dyads negotiate over the price of an intermediate good prior to 
production.8 If agreement is reached, the seller transfers the good to the buyer who sells it ex-
ternally to the final customer. If buyers and sellers do not reach agreement, headquarters may 
become involved in the transfer of the good. The experimental setting reflects a coordination 
problem: Because production costs can vary between 1 and 500 and the final selling price can 
vary between 100 and 600, the transfer of the good can either be profitable (if final selling price 
≥ production costs) or non-profitable (if final selling price < production costs). 
We use a nested experimental design in which we vary headquarters involvement in the 
transfer pricing process—present versus absent. Nested within headquarters involvement pre-
sent, we manipulate the degree of headquarters involvement—weak involvement (WI) versus 
strong involvement (SI). This design results in three experimental conditions depicted in Figure 
1. A third (within participants) factor is period, as the experiment lasts six periods.  
 
Figure 1: Experimental Design and Number of Participants 
Headquarters involvement absent 
(NI) 





n = 54  n = 54 n = 54 
Note: n = number of participants. 
 
Each period, buyer and seller are re-matched such that they are not matched with the same 
counterpart more than once. Headquarters is also randomly re-matched to buyer and seller dy-
                                                 
7 We obtained all permission to conduct this behavior research from the University’s Institutional Review Board.  
8 In the experiment, the terms sales manager and production manager were used. For consistent exposition, we 
will continue to use the labels buyers and sellers. 
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ads. Participants are informed of this procedure. Our primary dependent variables are the fre-
quency of negotiation agreement (H1a and H1b) and the coordination efficiency of internal trans-
fers (H2a and H2b).  
In the headquarters involvement absent (NI) condition, while there is an experimental 
participant in the role of headquarters, headquarters is not permitted to take any action. Thus, 
in this condition, headquarters does not influence the negotiation or the transfer of the good 
between the two managers. In contrast, in the two headquarters involvement present conditions, 
headquarters can decide to take actions when negotiations have failed. On the continuum of 
headquarters involvement that likely exists in practice, the two conditions represent two differ-
ent degrees of the bindingness of the involvement. In the WI condition, when headquarters is 
informed of failed negotiations, it may suggest a transfer price to the two managers. The sug-
gested price can be any whole number between the minimum production cost ($1) and the max-
imum final selling price ($600). If both managers accept the suggested transfer price, the good 
is transferred at that price. If either manager rejects the suggested price, the transfer does not 
take place. Note that headquarters is not required to suggest a transfer price. In the SI condition, 
after negotiation failure, headquarters assumes decision authority and determines whether the 
transfer is made or not and, if so, the price at which divisions must trade.  As in the WI condi-
tion, headquarters is free to decide about becoming involved and is not required to do so.  
We did not require headquarters to suggest or set a transfer price in the SI and WI condi-
tions in order to enable the same solution in the SI and WI conditions as in the NI condition. In 
the NI condition, buyer and seller always have an incentive to agree on a mutually beneficial 
transfer price when trade is efficient because it increases buyer and seller profit and not to trade 
the good when trade is inefficient because it would decrease buyer and seller profit. If managers 
expect headquarters to not become involved in the SI and WI conditions, the situation for buyer 
and seller would be identical to the NI condition and, consequently, they would have incentives 
to always reach agreement when the transfer of the good is profitable. However, as outlined 
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above, headquarters is unlikely to abstain from becoming involved once the negotiation fails. 
We employ a setting that likely reflects information structures underlying coordination 
problems in corporate practice. The coordination problem arises due to information asymme-
tries that are generic to intra-firm relations. We operationalize information asymmetry as fol-
lows: Prior to negotiations, the seller learns the actual cost and the buyer learns the actual selling 
price. To minimize carry-over effects between periods, we also keep up the information asym-
metry with respect to the actual cost and price after the negotiation. Headquarters learns about the 
actual firm profit in the case of agreement, but never learns the actual cost or actual selling price. 
This operationalization reflects that in practice, asymmetric information exists both between dif-
ferent decentralized units and between decentralized units and headquarters and that factors like, 
e.g., noise and earnings management usually prevent other parties from inferring the exact infor-
mation ex post (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Dikolli and Vaysman 2006; Dorestani 2007).  
The information headquarters receives regarding the negotiations between buyer and 
seller is the same in all three conditions and was common knowledge among buyers, sellers and 
headquarters prior to any negotiations. When the negotiation succeeds, headquarters is in-
formed of the agreed upon transfer price and that the good is transferred. When the negotiation 
fails, headquarters acquires additional information about buyer and seller offers from the nego-
tiation, as it is likely the case in practice as well. We operationalize the information acquisition 
by informing headquarters of the last offer each manager made in the course of the negotiation. 
Providing information only about the last offers to headquarters instead of the history of negoti-
ations reduces complexity for headquarters and, thus, increases experimental control.9 However, 
as described below, we simultaneously ensure that sellers and buyers cannot change their offers 
strategically at the end of the negotiation. Headquarters would have also been informed if either 
the buyer or seller had not made any offer, but there is no such case in the experiment. This 
                                                 
9 The availability of only partial information about the negotiation is also likely to have external validity, as it is 
unlikely that headquarters follows all decentralized transfer price negotiations very closely in practice. 
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information about final buyer and seller offers carries additional information about the profita-
bility of the transfer, as we will demonstrate in the results section. Thus, it reduces headquartes’ 
information asymmetry about the profitability of the transfer before its decision, albeit not fully.  
We did not implement any direct communication from buyer or seller to headquarters 
after failed negotiations for two main reasons: First, such communication is unlikely to be cred-
ible.  Frictions that make credible communication infeasible include, for example, headquar-
ters’ difficulty in observing or verifying predictions of final selling prices or production costs. 
Even at the end of a period, due to noise and incentives for buyer and seller to strategically 
allocate costs in their divisions, headquarters is unlikely to be able to observe or infer the true 
relevant costs and selling price predictions. Second, such additional communication usually 
leads to rather complex anticipation effects and potential costs. Thus, excluding direct commu-
nication increases experimental control. Together, like the information structure we imple-
mented, any direct communication would only partially reduce headquarters’ information 
asymmetry before making the decision but simultaneously would make the setting much more 
complex.  
Experimental task 
Each period, buyers and sellers have three minutes (180 seconds) to negotiate the transfer 
price for a good. Either manager can break off the negotiation at any time. We do not include 
any monetary negotiation costs for the participants. This design feature represents a conserva-
tive design choice with respect to negotiation break offs and negotiation failures.  
Each period, negotiation starts with the buyer making the first offer. The buyer’s first 
offer can be any amount from the minimum production cost of 1 to the maximum final selling 
price of 600. The seller can either accept the initial offer or make any counteroffer between 1 and 
600. Until an offer is accepted or a manager ends the negotiation process, negotiations proceed 
with the two managers making alternating offers. Importantly, when making a new offer, the 
buyer is not allowed to make an offer that is less than his previous offer. Likewise, when the 
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seller makes a new offer, it cannot be greater than her previous offer. We implement this design 
choice because, as explained above, buyers and sellers know that headquarters receives infor-
mation about buyers’ and sellers’ last offers in the negotiation and they should not be able to 
strategically change their offers towards the end of the negotiation. However, either manager 
can always make the same offer as the previous offer. Similarly, either manager can end the 
negotiation at any time. Managers are not required to make an initial offer if they choose not to 
negotiate. Participants’ computer screens include a timer so that they can track the time remain-
ing for negotiations.  
The cost of the intermediate good is uniformly distributed on {1, 2,…, 500} and the selling 
price of the final good is uniformly distributed on {100, 101,…, 600}. Cost and price distributions 
are common information to buyers, sellers and headquarters. From these distributions, the theo-
retical frequency of a profitable transfer is 68 percent.10 Participants are informed that the firm 
wants managers to make decisions resulting in maximum profit for the firm and that, as an incen-
tive to do so, division managers are paid based on their division profits and headquarters is paid 
based on firm profit.  
At the end of the period, the computer displays whether the transfer is made or not. If the 
transfer is made, the computer also displays to all participants the transfer price. Regardless of 
the outcome, the division managers are informed about their respective division profits and the 
headquarters’ manager is informed about the firm profit. Then the next period begins. 
Compensation 
In every period, buyers, sellers and headquarters receive a fixed wage of 30 points. Ad-
ditionally, buyers and sellers receive 20 percent of their respective division profits and head-
quarters receives 10 percent of the firm’s profit. Buyers’ and sellers’ share in their respective 
                                                 
10 Prior to the experimental sessions, we randomly generated six sequences of six costs (one for each period) for 
the sellers and six sequences of six prices (one for each period) for the buyers. To facilitate comparisons across con-
ditions, the same six cost and six price sequences are used in each session. The mean cost across all six periods 
was 245.11 and the mean price was 354.61. The actual frequency of profitable transfers in the experiment is 69.4 
percent. 
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division profits are twice as high as headquarters’ share in the firm profit because on average, 
division profit equals half of the firm profit. Division profits and firm profit are determined by 
whether the transfer is made, and if so, the negotiated transfer price. So, when the intermediate 
good is transferred, payoffs are summarized as follows: 
Buyer’s compensation = 30 + 20%  (Final Selling Price – Transfer Price) 
Seller’s compensation = 30 + 20%  (Transfer Price – Production Cost) 
Headquarters’ compensation = 30 + 10%  (Final Selling Price – Production Cost) 
If the transfer does not take place, both division profits and firm profit equal zero and 
each manager receives only the fixed wage of 30 points. The compensation of all parties was 
common knowledge to participants. To guarantee independence of the periods and to avoid 
wealth effects, one period in the experiment was randomly selected as the payment period. In 
case the division or firm profit is negative, the negative variable part of the compensation is 
deducted from the fixed wage of 30 but the maximum loss is restricted to 30. Participants’ cash 
earnings are determined by converting their experimental points from the randomly selected 
period into cash at the rate of $0.50 per point. Participants are also paid a $5 participation fee. 
On average, they earned $25 from the experiment.11 
Participants and Procedures 
A total of 162 undergraduate students from a large public US university participated in 
the experiment. We conducted three sessions for each condition with 18 participants in each 
session. Each student participated in only one session. The mean age of the participants is 20.4 
years and 46 percent of participants are female.  
At the start of each session, participants were provided with written instructions and were 
informed of their randomly assigned role as buyer, seller or headquarters. Instructions were 
                                                 
11 The fixed wage and the participation fee were intended, in part, to mitigate the chance of negative earnings. 
Given the experimental parameters, it was still possible for participants to have negative earnings. We observe 
only 7 out of 972 cases in which participants had negative earnings periods.  
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read aloud by one of the experimenters. To ensure that all participants understood the experi-
ment, they were required to complete a pre-experiment quiz, and the experiment did not begin 
until all of them had answered all questions correctly. Then, the six periods of the experiment 
started. As explained above, buyers, sellers and headquarters were randomly re-matched each 
period. Participants were separated by partitions and interacted anonymously through a computer 
network. The experiment was programmed with z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007). At the 
conclusion of the six periods, participants completed a post-experiment questionnaire. They 
received their cash payments and were dismissed. Experimental sessions lasted approximately 
80 minutes.  
Measures 
Our primary dependent variable to test H1a and H1b is the frequency of agreement, 
FREQAGREE, between buyer and seller. FREQAGREE is an indicator variable that is equal 
to 1 when the two parties reach agreement during the negotiation and 0 when negotiations fail. 
Our dependent variable for H2a and H2b is the efficiency of internal transfers made in 
the firm. We use two measures to capture our theoretical construct. First, we use the frequency 
of efficient internal transfers, FREQEFF.  FREQEFF is an indicator variable equal to 1 when 
the transfer decision is efficient and equal to 0 when the transfer decision is inefficient. The 
decision is efficient when it results in a profitable trade (final selling price ≥ production cost) 
and when it results in avoiding an unprofitable trade (final selling price < production cost). The 
transfer decision is inefficient when an unprofitable transfer is made and a profitable trade is 
not made. 
Additionally, we analyze the efficiency loss to the firm, EFFLOSS. EFFLOSS measures 
the difference between actual and optimal firm profit. That means, EFFLOSS is equal to zero 
when the transfer decision is efficient. In contrast, when the transfer would be profitable but no 
transfer is made, EFFLOSS equals the value of the internal trade (final selling price – produc-
tion costs) as this profit was not realized. Similarly, if the transfer is unprofitable but was made, 
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EFFLOSS equals the loss for the firm implied by this transfer (production costs – final selling 
price). Thus, EFFLOSS also captures the magnitude of inefficient transfer decisions. 
To understand why headquarters involvement may decrease the efficiency of internal 
transfers, it is also important to understand how headquarters react in the case of negotiation 
failure and how successful they are in their decisions. Thus, for the two involvement conditions, 
we calculate the frequency with which headquarters becomes involved after negotiation failure, 
FREQINVOLVE. Additionally, to measure the efficiency of involvement, we also calculate the 
frequencies of transfers after negotiation failure both in the case of profitable transfers 
(FREQTRANS_VAL) and in the case on non-profitable transfers (FREQTRANS_NONVAL). 
4 Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our primary dependent variables. First, 
it shows that the buyers and sellers reach agreement less often when headquarters is potentially 
involved in the negotiation. The frequency of agreement, FREQAGREE, decreases from 67.59 
percent in the no headquarters involvement condition to 47.22 percent in the headquarters in-
volvement present conditions, consistent with less agreement under headquarters involvement 
predicted in H1a. Additionally, Table 1 shows that within headquarters involvement present 
conditions, the differences in FREQAGREE between the WI and the SI conditions are small 
(WI: 50.00 percent vs. SI: 44.44 percent). Obviously, the degree of headquarters involvement 
does not seem to strongly affect agreement in transfer price negotiations. Consequently, the null 
hypothesis H1b is unlikely to be rejected.  
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Table 1: Mean, Standard Deviation and (Number of Observations) for Key Measures  















Panel A: Agreement and Efficiency Measures 
FREQAGREE .6759  .4722 .5000 .4444 
 .4702  .5004 .5023 .4992 
 (108)  (216) (108) (108) 
FREQEFF .8519  .7407 .7963 .6852 
 .3569  .4392 .4046 .4666 
 (108)  (216) (108) (108) 
EFFLOSS 18.01  34.48 25.07 43.89 
 53.65  69.85 60.64 77.12 
 (108)  (216) (108) (108) 
Panel B: Headquarters involvement after negotiation failure 
FREQINVOLVE N/A  .7895 .9814 .6167 
 N/A  .4095 .1361 .4903 
 N/A  (114) (54) (60) 
FREQTRANS_VAL N/A  .5517 .5000 .6000 
 N/A  .5017 .5092 .4983 
 N/A  (58) (28) (30) 
FREQTRANS_NONVAL N/A  .3571 .0385 .6333 
 N/A  .4835 .1961 .4901 
 N/A  (56) (26) (30) 
Notes: Every cell displays the mean, standard deviation and (number of observations) for the corresponding meas-
ure.  
FREQAGREE is the frequency of negotiation agreement.  
FREQEFF is the frequency of efficient internal transfers. A transfer decision is efficient when the transfer was 
made in the case of a profitable transfer (final selling price ≥ production cost) or when the transfer was not made 
in the case of a non-profitable transfer (final selling price < production cost). 
EFFLOSS measures by how much the current firm profit deviates from the optimal firm profit. 
FREQINVOLVE is the frequency of headquarters involvement after negotiation failure. 
FREQTRANS_VAL is the frequency of transfers after negotiation failure in the case of profitable transfers.  




Turning to the coordination efficiency of internal transfers, Table 1 shows that, consistent 
with H2a, efficiency decreases in the headquarters involvement present conditions. The fre-
quency of efficient coordination, FREQEFF, decreases from 85.19 percent when involvement 
is absent to 74.07 percent when headquarters involvement is present. Further, mean efficiency 
loss, EFFLOSS, increases from 18.01 with no headquarters involvement is to 34.48 when in-
volvement is present. These findings provide evidence in favor of H2a.  
When comparing coordination efficiency in the two headquarters involvement present con-
ditions, Table 1 shows that efficiency is lower when headquarters involvement is strong than 
when it is weak. First, FREQEFF decreases from 79.63 percent when involvement is weak (WI) 
to 68.52 percent when involvement is strong (SI). Second, EFFLOSS increases from 25.07 in 
the WI condition to 43.89 in the SI condition. Both findings contradict the null hypothesis H2b.  
Panel B of Table 1 also provides initial evidence about the sources of inefficiencies in the 
headquarters involvement present conditions. First, it shows that headquarters becomes in-
volved and makes transfer price suggestions in the majority of the cases after negotiation fail-
ure. In the WI condition, headquarters makes a transfer price suggestion in all but one case 
(FREQINVOLVE = 98.14 percent). In the SI condition, it determines a transfer price (com-
bined with a transfer of the good) in 61.67 percent of the cases. This finding is consistent with 
our underlying reasoning for H1a that headquarters is unlikely to abstain from becoming in-
volved in the case of negotiation failure. Panel B also provides evidence of the reasons why 
efficiency is lower in the SI than in the WI condition. While in the case of profitable transfers, 
the frequency of transfers in both conditions is similar (FREQTRANS_VAL, WI = 50.00 per-
cent vs. SI = 60.00 percent) the frequency of transfers is much lower in the WI than in the SI 
condition when transfers are unprofitable (FREQTRANS_NONVAL, WI = 3.85 percent vs. SI 
= 63.33 percent). Thus, in the SI condition, headquarters seems to overestimate their decision 
quality in the cases of negotiation failure but—as illustrated by similar values for 
FREQTRANS_VAL (60.00 percent) and FREQTRANS_NONVAL (63.33 percent)—are in fact 
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unable to distinguish between profitable and unprofitable transfers. In contrast, in the WI condi-
tion, headquarters involvement is less risky as buyer and seller can still reject the suggested 
transfer price. But, simultaneously, when negotiation fails, transfers that would be profitable 
for the firm occur with a frequency of only 50 percent (FREQEFF_VAL = 50 percent), indicat-
ing problems of making mutually beneficial transfer price suggestions.  
Hypotheses Tests 
For our hypotheses tests, we use mean observations per participant over all periods. That 
is, instead of treating multiple observations per participant as independent observations, we 
calculate means for the relevant variables for each participant and use this observation. This 
procedure yields 18 observations per condition.  
H1a predicts that agreement frequency is lower when headquarters can become involved. 
H1b is stated in its null form and predicts no effect of the degree of headquarters involvement 
on agreement frequency. As we implemented a nested design, we test H1a and H1b jointly in a 
nested ANOVA. The dependent variable is FREQAGREE. The independent variables are in-
volvement and strong involvement nested in involvement. The results are reported in Panel A 
of Table 2.  
As displayed in Panel A of Table 2, the effect of headquarters involvement on the fre-
quency of negotiation agreement, FREQAGREE, is significantly negative (F = 17.27, p < 
0.001, two-tailed). This result supports H1a. In contrast, the table also shows that the degree of 
involvement (weak or strong) does not have a significant effect on FREQAGREE (F = 0.96, p 
= 0.331, two-tailed). Thus, we are unable to reject H1b. These results suggest that the main 
driver of negotiation failure in transfer price negotiations is headquarters involvement per se, 
but the degree of headquarters involvement only seems to have minor effects. 
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Table 2: Effects of Headquarters Involvement on the Frequency of Agreement,  
the Frequency of Efficient Trade and the Efficiency Loss 
Panel A: FREQAGREEa df MS F p 
Involvement 1 0.4979 17.27 <0.001*** 
Strong involvement │ Involvement 1 0.0278 0.96 0.331 
Error 51 0.0288   
Panel B: FREQEFFb df MS F p 
Involvement 1 0.1481 7.42 0.009*** 
Strong involvement │ Involvement 1 0.1111 5.56 0.022** 
Error 51 0.0200   
Panel C: EFFLOSSc df MS F p 
Involvement 1 3256.01 4.78 0.033** 
Strong involvement │ Involvement 1 3185.98 4.68 0.035** 
Error 51 680.66   
Notes: The table displays results of a nested ANOVA using mean observations over all periods as the unit of ob-
servation. All p-values are two-tailed. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
aFREQAGREE is the frequency of negotiation agreement.  
bFREQEFF is the frequency of efficient internal transfers. A transfer decision is efficient when the transfer was 
made in the case of a profitable transfer (final selling price ≥ production cost) or when the transfer was not made 
in the case of a non-profitable transfer (final selling price < production cost). 
cEFFLOSS measures by how much the current firm profit deviates from the optimal firm profit. 
 
H2a predicts that the coordination efficiency of internal transfers decreases with head-
quarters involvement. H2b is stated in its null form and predicts no difference in efficiency 
between strong and weak involvement. We test our hypotheses in two nested ANOVAs using 
the frequency of efficient trades, FREQEFF, and the efficiency loss, EFFLOSS, as the two 
alternative dependent variables to measure the (in-)efficiency of negotiation outcomes. Again, 
the factors are involvement and strong involvement nested in involvement. The results are re-
ported in Panels B (FREQEFF) and C (EFFLOSS) of Table 2. 
As reported in Panel B of Table 2, the effect of headquarters involvement on the fre-
quency of efficient trades, FREQEFF, is significant (F = 7.42, p = 0.009, two-tailed). Addition-
ally, the effect under SI is significantly stronger than under WI (F = 5.56, p = 0.022, two-tailed). 
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Similarly, Panel C reports that the effect of headquarters involvement on the efficiency loss, 
EFFLOSS, is significant (F = 4.78, p = 0.033, two-tailed) and that the effect on EFFLOSS is 
again stronger under SI than under WI (F = 4.68, p = 0.035, two-tailed). These results support 
H2a. Moreover, we reject the null hypothesis H2b in favor of a significantly negative effect of 
strong versus weak headquarters involvement on the coordination efficiency of internal trans-
fers.12 
Supplemental Analyses 
Responsibility for Negotiation Result  
In the development of H1a and H1b, we argued that headquarters involvement is likely 
to decrease managers’ perceived responsibility for the negotiation outcome. The post-experi-
ment questionnaire asked participants how responsible they felt with respect to (i) negotiation 
agreement and (ii) the transfer of the good (on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much)). Results show that perceived responsibility is significantly lower when headquarters in-
volvement is present than when it is absent (negotiation agreement: 4.74 vs. 5.44, Wilcoxon, p 
= 0.009; transfer of the good: 4.56 vs. 5.11, Wilcoxon, p = 0.026, both one-tailed). In contrast, 
perceived responsibility is not significantly different between the WI and SI conditions (nego-
tiation agreement: 4.86 vs. 4.61, Wilcoxon, p = 0.552; transfer of the good: 4.64 vs. 4.47, Wil-
coxon, p = 0.678). These results provide evidence for the theory underlying H1a and H1b and 
are consistent with our findings on FREQAGREE in the tests of H1a and H1b.  
  
                                                 
12 To test the robustness of our results, we also conducted regression analyses (EFFLOSS: Tobit regression, 
FREQAGREE and FREQEFF: Logit regressions) using disaggregated data rather than mean observations per 
participant. To control for multiple observations within participant we cluster the standard errors on the partici-
pant level. We also include a period variable to control for time effects. All statistical inferences with respect to 
our hypotheses tests remain the same. Additionally, we find a significantly positive time effect on negotiation 
efficiency. As the effect seems to be driven by low efficiency in period 1, we remove this period and rerun the 
regressions. This removes any significant time effect but, again, all statistical inferences regarding our hypothe-
ses remain the same. 
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Headquarters’ Weak Involvement and its Success  
In the theory development, we argued that, due to overconfidence and misattribution, 
headquarters is likely to make systematically incorrect decisions about involvement and sug-
gested transfer prices. We will first examine this conjecture for weak involvement. As reported 
above, we find that in the WI condition, the frequency of headquarters involvement after nego-
tiation failure (FREQINVOLVE) is 98 percent which is significantly higher than the frequency 
of profitable projects in the case of negotiation failure (52 percent, 2 = 46.07, p < 0.001). 
However, as buyer and seller can still reject the transfer price suggestion, involvement is not 
very risky in this condition. In fact, when the transfer is unprofitable, the transfer is made in 
only one out of 26 cases (FREQTRANS_NONVAL = 0.0385) in this condition.  
Analyzing the frequency of efficient transfers after negotiation failure when the transfer 
would be profitable for the firm (FREQTRANS_VAL), however, reveals that headquarters in-
volvement in the WI condition is also not without costs. FREQTRANS_VAL only amounts to 
50 percent, half of the optimum frequency of 100 percent. This low frequency is due to head-
quarters’ inability to suggest transfer prices that are mutually beneficial. Specifically, when the 
project is profitable for the firm, headquarters’ suggested transfer price is not beneficial for 
buyer or seller in 46.43 percent of the cases, and consequently, the good is not transferred.  
To provide direct evidence for our conjecture that headquarters’ overconfidence inhibits 
successful involvement, we construct a measure of overconfidence based on prior literature 
(e.g., Gloede and Menkhoff 2014; Oberlechner and Osner 2012). On the post-experiment ques-
tionnaire, we ask subjects to estimate their rank (from 1 to 18) if we ranked all participants in 
the session with respect to average points in all periods. Our overconfidence measure for each 
participant is the difference between his/her actual rank and the rank that he/she estimated. If 
participants are perfectly calibrated, i.e., neither over- nor under confident, this measure equals 
zero. If they indicate a better than their actual rank, this measure is positive, reflecting overcon-
fidence, and the more positive this measure, the higher is participants’ overconfidence about 
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their ability to make good judgments and decisions in the experiment (Dunning, Meyerowitz 
and Holzberg 1989). Consistent with prior evidence (e.g., Glaser and Weber 2007), participants 
exhibit a moderate, but significant level of overconfidence on average (1.33 > 0, t = 2.78, p = 
0.006, two-tailed). Headquarters’ overconfidence is, on average, not significantly different from 
managers’ overconfidence (1.36 vs. 1.30, t = 0.06, p = 0.953), suggesting that headquarters’ 
role alone did not lead them to overestimate their ranks more than the decentralized managers.13  
As prior research provides evidence that overconfidence can negatively influence deci-
sion quality due to biased information processing (e.g., Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001), we 
now explore whether more overconfident headquarters made worse transfer price suggestions. 
In a probit regression, we regress an indicator variable that is equal to one when the transfer 
price suggestion is beneficial to both buyer and seller and zero otherwise on our overconfidence 
measure. Additionally, we include the potential profit of the project (final selling price minus 
production costs) as a control variable to exclude the possibility that our findings are driven by 
a higher proportion of less profitable projects for more overconfident headquarters. 
(Untabulated) results show that the likelihood of mutually beneficial transfer price suggestions 
in the WI condition decreases in headquarters’ overconfidence ( = -0.182, p = 0.003, one-
tailed). 
This difficulty for headquarters in suggesting a mutually beneficial transfer price also 
becomes apparent when comparing the coordination efficiency of profitable transfers between 
the NI condition and the WI condition. Even though involvement is intended to realize profita-
ble transfers when negotiating parties cannot agree, testing the differences in efficiency 
measures in a regression analysis shows that efficiency is lower for both measures in the WI 
condition than in the NI condition and significantly so for FREQEFF (FREQEFF:  = -0.30, p 
                                                 
13 Note that differences between the groups cannot be due to estimated differences in general payoff between the 
groups because headquarters earned 10 percent of the firm profit (the sum of both division profit) whereas de-
centralized managers earned 20 percent of their respective division profit. 
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= 0.092, one-tailed; EFFLOSS:  = 63.33, p = 0.134, one-tailed). When splitting the transfers 
along the median into high and low profit transfers and re-running the regression analysis sep-
arately, we find (results untabulated) that efficiency is significantly lower in the WI condition 
than in the NI condition for low profit transfers (FREQEFF:  = -0.40, p = 0.071, one-tailed; 
EFFLOSS:  = 54.51, p = 0.068, one-tailed), but not significantly different for high profit trans-
fers (FREQEFF:  = -0.29, p = 0.262, one-tailed; EFFLOSS:  = 93.09, p = 0.318, one-tailed). 
Clearly, the smaller the potential profit (the closer cost is to price), the more difficult it is for 
headquarters to suggest transfer prices that are mutually beneficial.  
Headquarters’ Strong Involvement and its Success  
In this section, we explore the reasons for larger inefficiencies under SI than under WI. 
In the theory development, we argued that in the case of a profitable project, strong involvement 
could improve efficiency because it avoids the risk that headquarters makes transfer price sug-
gestions that are not mutually beneficial. In the case of unprofitable projects, however, strong 
involvement would lead to less efficiency as the decentralized manager could no longer reject 
it.  
Our data are consistent with these conjectures but illustrate that the latter effect is much 
larger than the former, making strong involvement less efficient. When the transfer is unprofit-
able, the transfer is made in only one out of 26 cases in the WI condition but in 19 out of 30 
cases in the SI condition (FREQTRANS_NONVAL: 0.04 vs. 0.63, 2 = 21.47, p < 0.001). 
Moreover, EFFLOSS is much larger in this case in the SI than in the WI condition (80.73 vs. 
4.50, t = 4.79, p < 0.001). In contrast, when the transfer is profitable, differences between the 
two conditions are small. The transfer is made in 14 of 28 cases in the WI condition but in 18 
out of 30 cases in the SI condition (FREQTRANS_VAL: 0.50 vs. 0.60). This difference is 
directionally consistent with higher efficiency in the SI condition when projects are profitable 
but not significant (2 = 0.59, p = 0.444). Likewise, EFFLOSS, is not significantly different 
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between the two conditions in this case (66.00 vs. 65.11, t = 0.035, p = 0.972). Thus, under 
strong involvement, headquarters suffer more from bad decisions when projects are unprofita-
ble but do not benefit from increased decision authority when projects are profitable.  
In our theory development, we also argued that headquarters likely attributes negotiation 
failure to incorrect causes and, due to overconfidence, discounts or ignores information from 
the negotiation, leading to inefficient transfer decisions. In fact, in the SI condition, headquarters 
becomes more frequently involved after negotiation failure than the transfer would be profitable  
(0.62 vs. 0.50, 2 = 1.66, p = 0.099). This result suggests systematic misattribution of negotia-
tion failure to buyers’ and sellers’ disposition rather than the situation (unprofitability of the 
project). The result that involvement is slightly less when transfers are profitable 
(FREQTRANS_VAL = 0.60) than when they are unprofitable (FREQTRANS_NONVAL = 
0.63) further illustrates headquarters’ difficulties in making transfer decisions. To further support 
our theory, we now investigate whether the additional information headquarters receives from 
buyer’s and seller’s negotiation offers is informative about the profitability of the transfer, 
whether headquarters reacted to this information and how headquarters’ overconfidence is re-
lated to this reaction. 
First, we analyze whether the likelihood of a profitable transfer increases as the difference 
between the final seller and buyer offers narrows. We regress an indicator variable VALUE 
(equal to 1 when the transfer is profitable and 0 when the transfer is unprofitable) on the differ-
ence between the last seller and buyer offers. We use a probit model and include period fixed 
effects to control for time effects. We cluster standard errors to account for multiple observa-
tions within participant. The results are included in Table 3 (Model 1). As reported in the table, 
we find a significantly negative effect of the difference between the last seller and buyer offers 
on VALUE ( = -0.0058, p = 0.001, two-tailed). Thus, the smaller the distance between the last 
offers, the greater was the likelihood of a profitable transfer, illustrating the informativeness of 
headquarters’ information about the negotiation offers.   
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Table 3: Information Content of Final Seller and Buyer Offers and Headquarters’ Use of it 
under Strong Involvement (SI) 
Coefficient 










Constant  1.0080 0.5948 0.6224 
 (0.3402)*** (0.3728) (0.3572)* 
Difference between last buyer and seller offers -0.0057 -0.0008 -0.0006 
 (0.0012)*** (0.0015) (0.0013) 
Overconfidence   -0.0695 
   (0.0665) 
Difference between last buyer and seller offers 
*Overconfidence 
  0.0006 
  (0.0003)** 
Period fixed effects Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.1974 0.0329 0.0974 
N 60 60 60 
Notes: N indicates the number of observations. The probit regressions use only observations from the strong in-
volvement (SI) condition in which negotiations failed. The regressions use standard errors clustered at the partic-
ipant level to control for multiple observations within participant and include period fixed effects to control for 
time effects (not reported). p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
VALUE is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the transfer is profitable and 0 when the transfer is non-profita-
ble. 
INVOLVE is an indicator variable equal to 1 when headquarters decided to become involved after negotiation 
failure and 0 when it decided not to become involved. 
Difference between last buyer and seller offers is the difference between the final offers made by buyer and 
seller during the negotiation in case the negotiation failed. 
Overconfidence equals a headquarters’ actual rank in the session with respect to the average number of points in 
all periods less his/her estimated rank in the session. 
 
Second, we investigate whether headquarters included this information into their decision 
to become involved and to make the transfer in the SI condition. Under strong involvement, the 
decision to become involved is equivalent to transferring the good and, thus, should only occur 
when the project is profitable. We test whether headquarters’ likelihood to become involved 
also decreases when the distance in final offers increases—as the first regression about the re-
lation between VALUE and this distance would suggest. Therefore, we regress an indicator 
variable INVOLVE (equal to 1 when headquarters became involved after negotiation failure 
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and 0 when it did not become involved) on the difference between the last offers. Results are 
included in Table 3 (Model 2). As shown in the table, we do not find any significant relationship 
between the two variables ( = -0.0008, p = 0.568, two-tailed). Thus, headquarters did not ef-
fectively include the information from the negotiation offers into their decisions about the trans-
fer.  
Finally, we explore how headquarters’ overconfidence determines the use of information 
and its decision to become involved. We regress INVOLVE on the distance between the final 
offers, headquarters’ overconfidence and the interaction of both variables. We expect more 
overconfident headquarters to make less use of information from the negotiation and, thus, to 
react less negatively to the increasing distance in final offers. Model (3) of Table 3 shows that, 
as expected, the interaction between both variables is significantly positive ( = 0.0006, p = 
0.018, one-tailed), reflecting less negative (or more positive) reactions to the distance in final 
offers when headquarters are more overconfident. For example, when the overconfidence meas-
ure becomes negative (e.g., -6), the reaction becomes significantly negative (-0.006 - 6 × 0.006 
= -0.0042, 2 = 2.70, p = 0.050, one-tailed). Vice versa, when the overconfidence measure 
becomes positive (e.g., +6), headquarters’ reaction to the distance in final offers becomes even 
significantly positive (-0.006 + 6 × 0.006 = 0.0030, 2 = 3.05, p = 0.040, one-tailed). Thus, 
highly overconfident headquarters not only use the signal less but even use it in the wrong 
direction.  
We now also test whether, as a consequence, coordination efficiency decreases in over-
confidence. Therefore, in the cases of negotiation failure, we regress FREQEFF and EFFLOSS 
on our overconfidence measure and the potential project profit to control for differences in 
transfer values. For both measures, we find a significantly negative effect of overconfidence on 
efficiency (FREQEFF:  = -0.0945, p = 0.016, one-tailed; EFFLOSS:  = 8.54, p = 0.073, one-
tailed). Together, these results provide evidence for our underlying theory. 
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5 Conclusion 
Our study investigates how headquarters involvement affects the efficient coordination 
of internal transfers in decentralized transfer price negotiations. Prior literature has mainly as-
sumed that decentralized managers negotiate transfer prices autonomously and focuses on ef-
fects of fairness preferences on transfer price negotiations (e.g., Luft and Libby 1997; Kachel-
meier and Towry 2002). We, however, focus on headquarters’ potential involvement when ne-
gotiations fail and their perceptions of negotiation failure. 
We investigate our research questions in an experiment. In our setting, buyers and sellers, 
representing decentralized division managers, negotiate over the price of an intermediate good 
without a competitive external market. The setting reflects a coordination problem that is due 
to information asymmetries inside the firm. Transfers are profitable on average, but there are 
instances in which the actual costs exceed the actual price of the good. It is desirable for the 
firm to transfer (not transfer) the good whenever it is profitable (unprofitable). If buyer and 
seller reach agreement on a transfer price, the transfer takes place at that price. If they fail to 
reach agreement, headquarters may become involved. 
We study three conditions in a nested design that are supposed to reflect points on the 
continuum of headquarters involvement in practice. As a baseline setting, we use a condition 
in which headquarters involvement is absent, i.e., headquarters is a passive observer of the ne-
gotiation outcome. We compare this condition to two conditions with headquarters involvement 
present but different degrees of involvement labeled “weak involvement (WI)” and “strong 
involvement (SI)”. Under WI, headquarters may suggest a transfer price to division managers, 
but both managers must accept the suggested transfer price for the transfer to take place. Under 
SI, headquarters assumes full authority in the event of failed negotiations and determines 
whether the transfer is made or not and, if so, the price at which divisions must trade.  
Consistent with our theory, we find that headquarters involvement reduces the frequency 
of agreement in negotiations, but negotiation agreement does not differ between weak and strong 
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involvement. Involvement also reduces the coordination efficiency of internal transfers, and the 
reduction is greater under strong than under weak involvement. Additional analyses reveal that 
headquarters attributes negotiation failure too often to managers’ bargaining capabilities rather 
than to the possibility that trade would be unprofitable, leading headquarters to become involved 
too often. Due to overconfidence, headquarters then does not effectively use the available in-
formation from the negotiation. Finally, under WI, headquarters often suggests transfer prices 
that are not mutually beneficial and, thus, lead to the rejection of profitable transfers. 
Our findings have important implications for both theory and practice. From a theoretical 
perspective, our study contributes to the stream of research investigating frictions in transfer 
price negotiations and their causes (e.g., Luft and Libby 1997; Kachelmeier and Towry 2002; 
Arnold et al. 2016) by informing it about the role and perceptions of headquarters as an im-
portant player in transfer pricing. Moreover, we add to the research on delegated versus cen-
tralized decision making in firms (e.g., Coats and Rankin 2016; Gallo 2012) by providing evi-
dence about the influence of overconfidence on suboptimal central decision-making.  
For practice, our study shows that, when divisions anticipate no interference in negotiated 
transfer pricing, they are motivated to use their private information more efficiently, resulting 
in greater firm profit. This result demonstrates that when firms are decentralized and delegate 
tasks to better informed managers, risks of headquarters’ interference include underestimating 
the value of committing to treating divisions autonomously and overestimating its own decision 
making abilities. These coordination inefficiencies would need to be taken into account in prac-
tice when firms weigh the costs and benefits of becoming involved in transfer price negotia-
tions.  
In our experiment, headquarters received information about negotiation offers as an ad-
ditional information source before making transfer price decisions or suggestions. In practice, 
headquarters may have other options available to them in the event of failed negotiations. These 
options may include the acquisition of information via an internal audit or by eliciting additional 
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reports from division. As we pointed out above, however, such actions would also impose a 
cost on the firm since an audit would require resources and divisions would have incentives to 
misrepresent their reports, making it unlikely that headquarters’ information asymmetry is fully 
offset. Additionally, anticipation of these actions, which represent a lack of commitment to 
autonomy, may further impede the ability of divisions to reach an agreement during negotia-
tions. Future research could address such alternative courses of action and their effect on firm 
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Thank you for participating in our study. All interactions will take place anonymously 
over a computer network. Therefore, we will never be able to link your name with any of your 
decisions or responses during this study. We promise to carry out this study in the manner de-
scribed in the instructions, with no deception of any form. 
 
As will be described in more detail below, your task in this study will be to negotiate 
with another participant. All negotiations will take place over a computer network so that you 
will not know the identity of the other participant. Because the outcomes of the negotiations 
will affect your earnings, it is important that you read the instructions carefully. After reading 
the instructions, you will take a short quiz to test your comprehension of the instructions.  No 
one will be able to continue until everyone has passed the quiz. 
 
If you have any questions while we are going over the instructions, or during the study, 
please raise your hand and we will answer your question in private. Please do not talk with 
anyone other than the administrator after this point. Also, please help us maintain control over 
this study by not discussing it with anyone who may be participating in future sessions. 
 





This study involves decision making in an organizational setting. You work for a firm 
that has two types of divisions: one that produces a product (“Production Division”) and one 
that sells the product on the marketplace (“Sales Division”). Additionally, the firm has a cen-
tral headquarters. You will either play the role of a manager of one of the two divisions or the 
role of the headquarters manager.  
 
The computer system has randomly assigned to you the role of a production division 
manager /sales division manager / headquarters manager. You will keep the same role 
through the whole study. 
 
The firm wants the managers to make decisions that will result in maximum profit for 
the firm. As an incentive to do so, the sales and production division manager will be evaluated 
and compensated according to their own division profits. The headquarters manager will be 




Consider the following situation: The production division produces a product that it 
“sells” to the sales division at a price called the transfer price. Importantly, the transfer price 
affects the profits of both the production division and the sales division. The sales division 
then sells the good at the market and receives the market price for it.  
 
[No involvement condition: The firm expects division managers to earn high division 
profits because high division profits contribute to high firm profits. As a result, the division 
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managers take responsibility for their division profits. As a transfer of the product from the 
production division to the sales division affects division profits, headquarters has fully dele-
gated the decision about the transfer to the division managers. This means that division man-
agers negotiate the conditions of the transfer. In their negotiations, the division managers ne-
gotiate a transfer price which the sales manager has to pay to the production manager in order 
to “buy” the product from the production division.] 
 
[Weak involvement condition: The firm expects division managers to earn high division 
profits because high division profits contribute to high firm profits. As a result, the division 
managers take responsibility for their division profits. As a transfer of the product from the 
production division to the sales division affects division profits, headquarters has delegated 
the decision about the transfer to the division managers as long as both divisions find an 
agreement. This means that division managers negotiate the conditions of the transfer. In their 
negotiations, the division managers negotiate a transfer price which the sales manager has to 
pay to the production manager in order to “buy” the product from the production division. In 
case the two divisions cannot agree on a transfer price during the negotiation, the headquar-
ters manager can make a suggestion about the transfer price the two divisions should use but 
cannot force the two divisions to accept the transfer price.] 
 
[Strong involvement condition: The firm expects division managers to earn high divi-
sion profits because high division profits contribute to high firm profits. As a result, the divi-
sion managers take responsibility for their division profits. As a transfer of the product from 
the production division to the sales division affects division profits, headquarters has dele-
gated the decision about the transfer to the division managers as long as both divisions find an 
agreement. This means that division managers negotiate the conditions of the transfer. In their 
negotiations, the division managers negotiate a transfer price which the sales manager has to 
pay to the production manager in order to “buy” the product from the production division. 
However, in case the two divisions cannot agree on a transfer price during the negotiation, 
headquarters takes over the decision authority and the headquarters manager decides whether 
the production division has to transfer the good to the sales division and determines the trans-
fer price that the sales division has to pay for the good.] 
 
This study has six periods. That is, you will negotiate  six times in total. You will keep 
the same role (either production manager or sales manager or headquarters manager) over all 
periods. After each period, you will be randomly assigned to a new division manager in a way 
that you will not negotiate twice with any division manager. In each round, you will also be 
randomly matched with a one of the six headquarters managers. 
 
Below, we describe how the transfer price affects division profits, the negotiation proce-
dures, and how you will be paid in this study. 
 
 
Profits from the transfer of the product 
 
Just as in the real world, production costs and market prices sometimes vary. In the pro-
duction division, costs vary between 1 and 500. This means that in every period, the costs of 
the good can take on every value between 1 and 500 with equal probability.  
 
Likewise, in the sales division, the market price varies between 100 and 600. This 
means that in every period, the market price when the sales division finally sells the good at 
the market can take on every value between 100 and 600 with equal probability.  
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As a consequence, there are situations where transferring the good from the production 
division to the sales division and then selling the product at the market is beneficial for the 
firm because the market price is higher than the production costs. For example, if the market 
price is 500 and the production costs are 100, the firm profit from transferring the good and 
selling it at the market would be 500 – 100 = 400.  
 
However, there can also be cases where the transfer of the good and selling of the good 
at the market is bad for the firm because the market price is lower than the production cost. 
For example, if the market price is 200 and the production costs are 400, the firm profit from 
transferring the good and selling it at the market would be 200 – 400 = -200. 
 
Before the negotiation starts in each period, the production manager will be informed 
about his/her production costs of the current period but will not know the current market price 
of the sales division. Instead, the production manager will only know that the market price 
can take on every value between 100 and 600 with equal probability.  
Likewise, the sales manager will be informed about his/her market price in each period 
before the negotiation starts but will not know the current costs of the production division. 
The sales manager will only know that the production costs can take on every value between 
1 and 500.  
Headquarters will never be informed about the exact production costs and the exact 
market price of the current period but will only know the potential values of the costs and the 
market price. 
 
Both the costs of the production division and the market price of the sales division are 




Transfer Price, Division Profits and Firm Profit 
 
 If the good is transferred between the production division and sales division: The production 
division transfers the good to the sales division and receives the negotiated transfer price. The 
production division bears the production costs of this period. The sales division sells the good at 
the market and receives the market price of this period. The sales division pays the transfer price 
to the production division. Consequently, if the good is transferred from the production division 
to the sales division, the division profits amount to: 
 
Production Division Profit= Transfer Price – Production Costs 
Sales Division Profit= Market Price – Transfer Price 
 
As you can see, the transfer price determines how the realized profit from the produc-
tion and the sale of the good is allocated to the two divisions. 
 
As you can also see, the production manager’s profit is higher, the higher the transfer 
price is. In contrast, the sales manager’s profit is higher, the lower the transfer price is. Nei-
ther of the managers know how large the division profit of the other manager is because the 
sales manager does not know the exact production cost of the production manager and the 
production manager does not know the exact market price of the sales manager. 
 
The firm profit always corresponds to the sum of the two division profits. Consequently, 
when the good is transferred the firm profit amounts to: 
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Firm Profit = Sales Division Profit+ Production Division Profit 
 = Market Price – Transfer Price + Transfer Price – Production Costs 
 = Market Price – Production Costs 
 
 
 If the good is not transferred between the production division and sales division: The good is 
not transferred from the production division to the sales division and is not sold at the market. In 
this case, there is no division profit for either division. Likewise, as the firm profit always corre-
sponds to the sum of the two division profits the firm profit is also zero when the good is not 
transferred: 
 
Production Division Profit= 0 
Sales Division Profit= 0 
Firm Profit = 0 
 
 
Negotiation Procedures  
 
The computer program will randomly pair a production manager and a sales manager at 
the beginning of each period. Negotiations are conducted over a computer network.  
 
In each period, the negotiation starts with the sales manager making the first offer and 
after this, the production manager and sales manager alternate in making offers or being able 
to accept the other party’s last offer. The sales manager’s first offer can be any whole number 
between the minimum production costs (1) and the maximum market price (600). The produc-
tion manager can then accept the offer or make a counteroffer. Likewise, the production man-
ager’s counteroffer can be any whole number between the minimum production costs (1) and 
the maximum market price (600). The sales manager can then accept or reject the production 
manager’s counteroffer and make a new offer him-/herself and so forth. 
 
Importantly, when making a new offer the sales manager is not allowed to make offers 
that are smaller than his/her previous offer. Thus, the sales manager’s new offer must be 
greater than or equal to his/her previous offer. Likewise, when making a new offer the pro-
duction manager’s offer must not be larger than his/her previous offers. That means, the pro-
duction manager’s new offer must be less than or equal to his/her last offer.  
 
[No involvement condition: During the negotiations, every manager can always accept 
the current offer of the counterpart. Additionally, every manager can break off the negotiation 
at any point. That means, the two division managers do not even have to make an initial offer 
if they do not want to negotiate. If one of the two division managers breaks off the negotia-
tion, the negotiations for this period fail and negotiations cannot be resumed once they have 
been broken off. Also, if no offer has been accepted by the end of time that is available for the 
negotiation, negotiations fail. If negotiations fail for either of the above reasons, the good will 
not be transferred to the sales division and not be sold at the market.] 
 
[Weak involvement condition: During the negotiations, every manager can always ac-
cept the current offer of the counterpart. Additionally, every manager can break off the nego-
tiation at any point. That means, the two division managers do not even have to make an ini-
tial offer if they do not want to negotiate. If one of the two division managers breaks off the 
negotiation, the negotiations for this period fail and negotiations cannot be resumed once they 
have been broken off. Also, if no offer has been accepted by the end of time that is available 
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for the negotiation, negotiations fail. If negotiations fail for either of the above reasons, head-
quarters can make a suggestion about the transfer price the two divisions should use.] 
 
[Strong involvement condition : During the negotiations, every manager can always ac-
cept the current offer of the counterpart. Additionally, every manager can break off the nego-
tiation at any point. That means, the two division managers do not even have to make an ini-
tial offer if they do not want to negotiate. If one of the two division managers breaks off the 
negotiation, the negotiations for this period fail and negotiations cannot be resumed once they 
have been broken off. Also, if no offer has been accepted by the end of time that is available 
for the negotiation, negotiations fail. If negotiations fail for either of the above reasons, head-
quarters takes over the decision authority and decides about the transfer of the good between 
the two divisions and about the transfer price.] 
 
In each period, the negotiation time is restricted to three minutes (180 seconds). During 
this time, sales managers and production managers can send as many offers back and forth as 
they want. The clock at the top right of the screen shows the remaining negotiation time in 




Headquarters’ information and decision about the transfer of the good 
 
[No involvement condition: After the negotiation is concluded, the headquarters man-
ager will be informed about the result of the negotiation (agreement and transfer price or ne-
gotiation failure). Additionally, if the negotiation failed the headquarters manager will be in-
formed about the last offer each party made in the course of the negotiation. In case the sales 
manager or the production manager did not make any offer in the negotiation, the headquar-
ters manager will also be informed about this. However, headquarters has no possibility to in-
fluence the negotiation or the transfer of the good between the two divisions.] 
 
[Weak involvement condition: After the negotiation is concluded, the headquarters 
manager will be informed about the result of the negotiation (agreement and transfer price or 
negotiation failure). Additionally, if the negotiation failed, the headquarters manager will be 
informed about the last offer each party made in the course of the negotiation. In case the 
sales manager or the production manager did not make any offer in the negotiation, the head-
quarters manager will also be informed about this. After receiving the information about both 
parties’ last offer the headquarters manager is free to make a suggestion about the transfer 
price the two divisions should use. This final suggestion can be any whole number between 
the minimum production costs (1) and the maximum market price (600). 
 
In case the headquarters manager makes a transfer price suggestion, both the sales man-
ager and the production manager are, however, entirely free to accept this proposal. That 
means, the headquarters manager cannot force the two managers to accept the proposed trans-
fer price. If any of the two managers reject the transfer price proposed by the headquarters 
manager the good will not be transferred to the sales division and not be sold at the market.] 
 
[Strong involvement condition : After the negotiation is concluded, the headquarters 
manager will be informed about the result of the negotiation (agreement and transfer price or 
negotiation failure). Additionally, if the negotiation failed, the headquarters manager will be 
informed about the last offer each party made in the course of the negotiation. In case the 
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sales manager or the production manager did not make any offer in the negotiation, the head-
quarters manager will also be informed about this. After receiving the information about both 
parties’ last offer, headquarters takes over the decision authority and the headquarters man-
ager decides whether the good should be transferred from the production division to the sales 
division. Moreover, when the headquarters manager decides that the good is transferred the 
headquarters manager also determines the transfer price that the sales division has to pay. 
This transfer price can be any whole number between the minimum production costs (1) and 
the maximum market price (600).  
 
Both the sales manager and the production manager have to accept the headquarters 
manager’s decision about the transfer price and the transfer of the good. Only when the head-
quarters manager decides not to transfer the good, the good will not be transferred between 
the two divisions and not be sold at the market.] 
 
 
End of Period Information 
 
At the end of each period, the production manager and the sales manager will be in-
formed about the negotiation outcome (negotiation agreement or failure, transfer price, and 
negotiation time). Moreover, every manager will also be informed about his/her respective di-
vision profit. However, neither manager will be informed about the other division’s profit in 
this period.  
 
Headquarters will also be informed about the negotiation outcome (negotiation agree-
ment or failure, transfer price, and negotiation time) and the firm profit. However, headquar-
ters will not be informed about the exact division profits of the production division and the 
sales division. That means, headquarters will not know the exact production costs and the ex-
act market price at the end of a period. 
 
 
Computing Your Pay 
 
In every period, both division managers and headquarters receive a fixed wage of 30 
points. Additionally, both division managers participate in their respective division profits and 
headquarters participates in the firm profit. 
 
The points earned by the production manager each period depend on the negotiation 
outcome in the following way:  
 
[No involvement condition: 
 If there is agreement in the negotiation, the production manager receives the fixed wage of 
30 points plus 20 percent of his/her division profit, which is equal to the transfer price mi-
nus the actual production costs. When the production division profit is negative the points 
will be deducted from the production manager’s fixed wage. 
 
 If there is no agreement in the negotiation, the profit of the production division is 0 and, 
therefore, the production manager only receives his/her fixed wage of 30 points.] 
 
[Weak involvement condition: 
 If there is agreement in the negotiation or if there is no agreement in the negotiation but 
headquarters’ suggested transfer price is accepted by both managers, the production man-
ager receives the fixed wage of 30 points plus 20 percent of his/her division profit. This 
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profit is equal to the transfer price minus the actual production costs. When the production 
division profit is negative the points will be deducted from the production manager’s fixed 
wage. 
 
 If there is no agreement in the negotiation and at least one of the two managers rejects the 
final transfer price suggestion from headquarters, the profit of the production division is 0 
and, therefore, the production manager only receives his/her fixed wage of 30 points.] 
 
[S Strong involvement condition : 
 If there is agreement in the negotiation or there is no agreement in the negotiation but 
headquarters decides that the transfer of the good from the production division to the sales 
division has to be made, the production manager receives the fixed wage of 30 points plus 
20 percent of his/her division profit. This profit is equal to the transfer price minus the ac-
tual production costs. When the production division profit is negative the points will be de-
ducted from the production manager’s fixed wage. 
 
 If there is no agreement in the negotiation and headquarters decides that the transfer of the 
good is not made, the profit of the production division is 0 and, therefore, the production 
manager only receives his/her fixed wage of 30 points.] 
 
 
The points earned by the sales manager in each period also depend on the negotiation 
outcome in the following way: 
 
[No involvement condition: 
 If there is agreement in the negotiation, the sales manager receives the fixed wage of 30 points 
plus 20 percent of his/her division profit, which is equal to the actual market price minus the 
transfer price. When the sales division profit is negative the points will be deducted from the 
sales manager’s fixed wage. 
 
 If there is no agreement in the negotiation, the profit of the sales division is 0 and, therefore, 
the sales manager only receives his/her fixed wage of 30 points.]  
 
[Weak involvement condition: 
 If there is agreement in the negotiation or if there is no agreement in the negotiation but 
headquarters’ suggested transfer price is accepted by both managers, the sales manager re-
ceives the fixed wage of 30 points plus 20 percent of his/her division profit. This profit is 
equal to the actual market price minus the transfer price. When the sales division profit is 
negative the points will be deducted from the sales manager’s fixed wage. 
 
 If there is no agreement in the negotiation and at least one of the two managers rejects the 
transfer price suggestion from headquarters, the profit of the sales division is 0 and, there-
fore, the sales manager only receives his/her fixed wage of 30 points.] 
 
[l Strong involvement condition : 
 If there is agreement in the negotiation or if there is no agreement in the negotiation but 
headquarters decides that the transfer of the good from the production division to the sales 
division has to be made, the sales manager receives the fixed wage of 30 points plus 20 
percent of his/her division profit. This profit is equal to the actual market price minus ne-
gotiated transfer price. When the sales division profit is negative the points will be de-
ducted from the sales manager’s fixed wage. 
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 If there is no agreement in the negotiation and headquarters decide that the transfer of the 
good is not made, the profit of the sales division is 0 and, therefore, the sales manager only 
receives his/her fixed wage of 30 points.] 
 
 
Finally, the points earned by the headquarters manager in each period also depend on 
the negotiation outcome and the transfer of the good in the following way: 
 
 If the good is transferred from the production division to the sales division, the headquarters 
manager receives the fixed wage of 30 points plus 10 percent of the firm profit, which is equal 
to the actual market price minus the actual production costs. When the firm profit is negative 
the points will be deducted from the headquarters manager’s fixed wage. 
 
 If the good is not transferred from the production division to the sales division, the firm profit 
is 0 and, therefore, the headquarters manager only receives his/her fixed wage of 8 points. 
 
 
At the end of the study, one of the six periods will be randomly drawn as the payment 
period, and the points you earned in this period will be converted to cash (at a rate of $1 for 
every 2 points earned). As a result, the higher the profit of the production division in the ran-
domly-determined payment period, the higher will be the production manager’s pay from this 
study. The higher the profit of the sales division in the randomly-determined payment period, 
the higher will be the sales manager’s pay from this study. Finally, the higher the firm profit 
in the randomly-determined payment period, the higher will be the headquarters manager’s 
pay from this study. 
The converted points from the randomly selected payment period will be added to your 
$5.00 participation fee. The resulting amount will be paid to you privately in cash at the end 
of today’s session. 
 
 
Additional Questions  
 
After completing the study, you will complete a questionnaire about how you made 
your decisions. Last, you will be asked to provide demographic information. Your responses 




Note: This will be administered via the computer. Participants have to answer each 
question correctly before they can continue to the next question. 
All answers will be accompanied by an explanation why the answer was right or wrong 
(to emphasize the corresponding instructions again). In case an answer was wrong, par-
ticipants will have to answer the question again. 
 
 








3. My role will remain constant throughout the experiment session.  That is, if I am a sales 
manager in Period 1, I will be a sales manager in all subsequent periods.  Likewise, if I am a 
production manager in Period 1, I will be a production manager in all subsequent periods. 





4. If the production manager and the sales manager did not reach an agreement in the negotia-
tion, the good cannot be transferred from the production division to the sales division and 




5. By transferring the good to the sales division, the production manager and the sales man-




[Only weak and strong involvement condition:] 
6. If the production manager and the sales manager do not reach agreement during the negoti-




7. If someone breaks off the negotiations before negotiation time runs out, both team manag-






8. Please choose the correct answer. 
Assume that the market price is 450, the production costs are 150 and the transfer price is 
250. How large are the production division profit, the sales division profit and the firm profit? 
a) Production division profit = 300, sales division profit = 300, firm profit = 300 points 
b) Production division profit = 100, sales division profit = 300, firm profit = 200 points 
c) Production division profit = 100, sales division profit = 200, firm profit = 300 points 
d) Production division profit = 150, sales division profit = 150, firm profit = 200 points 
 
9. Please choose the correct answer. 







10. Please choose the correct answer. 
Assume the transfer price is 400 and the production costs are 150. How large is the produc-






11. Please choose the correct answer. 
Assume the market price is 450 and the production costs are 150. How large is the headquar-






12. If production manager and sales manager cannot reach agreement during the negotiation 




13. Every new transfer price offer of the sales division manager must not be lower than 
his/her prior offer and every new transfer price offer of the production division manager must 




14. The production manager will be know the market price of the sales division in the current 
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Abstract 
This study experimentally investigates how the extent of superior discretion over the allocation 
of a bonus pool affects the output of a team when employees can engage in unproductive influ-
ence activities. Granting superiors high discretion allows them to use non-verifiable infor-
mation and observations in order to mitigate free-rider incentives in teams. Prior research, 
however, also suggests that discretion may give rise to unproductive influence activities of em-
ployees. The question, therefore, is whether organizations should limit superiors’ discretion 
extent in order to mitigate influence activities in teams. Conventional economic theory assumes 
that superiors optimally account for influence activities in bonus decisions if they have incen-
tives to do so. Limiting the discretion extent therefore harms superiors’ flexibility and may 
impair the efficiency of discretionary bonus pools. Relying on behavioral theory, however, I 
argue that superiors likely overweight their personal information in bonus decisions. This in-
creases incentives for employees to engage in influence activities under high discretion and 
detracts them from contributing to team output. I thus predict that limiting superiors’ discretion 
extent can actually increase team output, contrary to standard economic predictions. Further-
more, I predict and show that the degree of mutual monitoring between peers amplifies the 
positive effect of limiting superiors’ discretion extent. The reason is that influence activities of 
peers are more salient under a high degree of monitoring and thereby affect behavior and fair-
ness perceptions of employees more strongly. Limiting the discretion extent therefore becomes 
particularly important with higher degrees of mutual monitoring. This study contributes to the 
literature on discretionary bonus pools by providing evidence on the failure of superiors to 
sufficiently account for influence activities in bonus decisions and, thus, on the benefits of lim-
iting superiors’ discretion extent. 
 




Many organizations delegate bonus decisions to lower levels of management by granting 
superiors of a team some discretion to allocate a bonus pool among their subordinates (Baiman 
and Rajan 1995, Bailey, Hecht and Towry 2011). In team-based environments where objective 
performance measures are often available only on an aggregate level (e.g., team or branch), 
discretionary bonus pools allow superiors to use non-verifiable observations in order to mitigate 
free-riding incentives in teams (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1994; Murphy and Oyer 2003; 
Fisher, Maines, Peffer and Sprinkle 2005). However, prior research also stresses that increasing 
discretion in bonus or promotion decisions gives rise to costly influence activities (e.g., 
Milgrom and Roberts 1988; Prendergast and Topel 1993; Du, Tang and Young 2012). That is, 
instead of contributing to team output, employees may waste valuable working time trying to 
bias the superior’s bonus decision in their favor (e.g., Prendergast 1999; Inderst, Müller and 
Wärneryd 2007; Bol 2008). Specifically, employees may excessively focus on activities that 
increase their  visibility to superiors but do not contribute much to team output, for example, 
by participating in every meeting their superior is present even if it is irrelevant (e.g., Smith 
2013; Knight 2016). Likewise, employees may waste time self-promoting their efforts and 
achievements (e.g., Garfinkle 2011; Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer 2009). While 
these activities are aimed at influencing superiors’ information about individual performance, 
they likely also distract employees from exerting productive effort. Therefore, they are costly 
for an organization (Milgrom and Roberts 1992).  
Organizations could limit superiors’ discretion extent in order to mitigate incentives for 
unproductive influence activities in the first place. Yet, standard economic theory assumes that 
superiors will optimally account for influence activities in bonus decisions if they have eco-
nomic incentives to do so (e.g., Holmstrom 1989; Fairburn and Malcomson 2001). Conse-
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quently, limiting the extent of discretion in advance may unnecessarily harm superiors’ flexi-
bility to adopt an optimal bonus allocation strategy, and hence, may undermine the efficiency 
of discretionary bonus pools.  
However, in practice organizations vary greatly in the extent to which superiors are en-
dowed discretion to allocate bonus pools (Bailey et al. 2011). Some organizations allow their 
superiors full discretion. Others allow discretion over only a small portion with the remainder 
allocated equally among employees or based on predefined bureaucratic rules (e.g., Lawler and 
Cohen 1992; Bailey et al. 2011). For example, the 2011 proxy statement of Yahoo discloses 
that 30 percent of their bonus pool is allocated to employees at discretion and 70 percent based 
on corporate performance goals. The 2014 proxy statement of Jacobs Engineering Group re-
veals that about 50 percent of the bonus pool is allocated based on weighted salaries versus total 
weighted salaries of all participants and the remaining 50 percent at the discretion of the CEO. 
Given that the extent of discretion varies considerably in practice it is important to in-
crease our understanding of what factors influence the efficacy of superior discretion in organ-
izations. In this study, I investigate how the extent of superior discretion over bonus allocations 
affects team output when employees besides exerting productive effort can engage in unpro-
ductive influence activities. Moreover, I investigate whether this effect depends on an important 
organizational feature—the degree of mutual monitoring in teams. Relying on behavioral the-
ory, I first predict that in a setting with influence activities—contrary to standard economic 
predictions—limiting superiors’ extent of discretion in the allocation of a bonus pool can in-
crease team output. The intuition underlying this prediction is that individuals often have diffi-
culties to consciously control the impact of information on their subsequent decisions even if 
this information is irrelevant or distorted (Wilson and Brekke 1994; Chiander and Schweitzer 
2003). The mere exposure to information about individual performances may lead superiors to 
create beliefs that have consequential effects on their bonus allocations. As a result, superiors 
likely overweight their personal information in bonus decisions, which increases incentives for 
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employees to engage in influence activities (e.g., Ferris, Judge and Bowland 1994). Granting 
superiors high discretion thus likely shifts employees’ focus away from productive effort to 
unproductive influence activities. In addition, higher levels of influence activities reduce the 
accuracy of superiors’ information about individual contributions, which likely leads to more 
distortions in performance assessments and bonus allocations of superiors (e.g., Ferris and 
Judge 1991; Ferris et al. 1994). This, in turn, may negatively affect employees’ perceptions of 
distributive fairness (Voussem, Kramer and Schäffer 2016) and may lead employees to with-
hold effort (e.g., Cohen-Carash and Spector 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter and Ng 
2001). Limiting the discretion extent thus helps to prevent and mitigate the detrimental effects 
of influence activities in the first place. 
Further, I predict that a high degree of mutual monitoring in teams amplifies the effect of 
superiors’ discretion extent on team output. The degree of mutual monitoring refers to the abil-
ity of employees to observe their peers’ behavior and activities (Towry 2003; Hannan, Towry 
and Zhang 2013). With higher degrees of mutual monitoring, employees may directly observe 
their peers’ engagement in influence activities. As a result, influence activities of peers are 
likely to provoke stronger reactions under higher degrees of mutual monitoring. First, when 
employees observe their peers engaging in influence activities they may adopt such behavior 
more often in subsequent periods (e.g., Ferris et al. 1994). Second, higher degrees of mutual 
monitoring make distortions in the bonus allocation of superiors more salient for employees 
and may thereby undermine perceptions of distributive fairness more strongly (e.g., Pfeffer and 
Langton 1993; Bol, Kramer and Maas 2016). Limiting the discretion extent may thus become 
particularly important with high degrees of mutual monitoring between peers. 
I test my predictions in an experiment in which two employees and a superior interact as 
a team over eight periods. In each period, employees can contribute to team output by exerting 
productive effort and they can engage in influence activities. Influence activities do not con-
tribute to team output. However, they increase the employees’ individual performance signal 
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as observed by the superior. Employees are rewarded from a bonus pool that increases in team 
output. The superior’s task is it to allocate some portion of the bonus pool among employees. 
Before allocating the bonus pool, superiors receive a non-verifiable signal about the individual 
performance of each employee. The performance signal, however, does not only reflect em-
ployees’ effort but also their influence activities. Employees incur lower private costs for en-
gaging in influence activities than for exerting effort. Superiors thus have to take into account 
that increasing the weight on the performance signal in bonus allocations may not only motivate 
employees to increase their effort but also their engagement in influence activities. Superiors 
are compensated based on team output and, thus, have incentives to allocate the bonus pool so 
as to elicit high levels of effort over all periods.  
In this setting, I manipulate two factors (between subjects). First, I vary the extent to 
which superiors are endowed with discretion (low vs. high). Under a low (high) discretion ex-
tent superiors allocate 25 (75) percent of the bonus pool at their discretion while the remaining 
75 (25) percent is allocated evenly among employees. Second, I vary the degree of mutual 
monitoring in teams (low vs. high). Under a high degree of mutual monitoring employees can 
directly observe their peer’s level of effort and influence activities, while, under a low degree 
of mutual monitoring, they observe the same signal about their peer’s performance as the supe-
rior. 
The results of the experiment suggest that limiting the extent of superior discretion in 
bonus allocations increases team output due to decreased levels of influence activities. Moreo-
ver, the positive effect of limiting the discretion extent is amplified by the degree of monitoring 
in teams and is significant under a high degree of mutual monitoring only. Consistent with the 
underlying theory, additional analyses provide evidence that superiors do not adequately reduce 
the weight on the performance signals when the extent of discretion increases. As a result, in-
dividual performance signals have a stronger impact on individual bonus shares under high 
56 
discretion, which motivates employees to increase their engagement in influence activities. Fur-
ther analyses also reveal that, under a high degree of mutual monitoring, employees react more 
strongly to their peers’ previous influence activities by increasing their own engagement in such 
activities and by lowering their productive effort in subsequent periods. 
This study provides insights into the role of superiors’ discretion extent in motivating 
team output and in diminishing the cost of influence activities in organizations. Prior research 
investigates the effect of superior discretion in settings without costly influence activities (e.g., 
Fisher et al. 2005; Arnold, Hannan and Tafkov 2018; Arnold and Tafkov 2015). Specifically, 
Fisher et al. (2005) provide evidence suggesting that superior discretion motivates productive 
effort when superiors have information reflecting individual efforts in an unbiased manner. 
However, the results of my study suggest that these prior findings do not necessarily hold in a 
setting where influence activities are possible. My study thereby contributes to prior literature 
by highlighting the detrimental effects of influence activities under a high extent of superior 
discretion.  
More importantly, the results of the study show that limiting the extent of discretion can 
lead to higher team output, particularly in an environment in which employees can more easily 
monitor the activities of each other. The study, thus, identifies the degree of mutual monitoring 
in teams as an important factor influencing the efficacy of superior discretion in bonus deci-
sions. In addition, whereas prior research often emphasizes the role of mutual monitoring in 
inducing cooperation and effort in teams (e.g., Arya, Felling and Glover 1997; Towry 2003), 
my findings suggest that the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation can be un-
dermined when granting superiors high discretion over bonus allocations. 
Finally, from a practical perspective, the study informs organizations about the benefits 
of limiting the discretion extent. When delegating bonus decisions to lower levels of manage-
ment organizations should not solely rely on their superiors to adopt optimal bonus allocation 
strategies. Instead, limiting the extent to which superiors are endowed with discretion provides 
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a useful tool for organizations to mitigate costs of influence activities and, ultimately, to in-
crease the efficiency of discretionary bonus pools. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting, re-
views relevant literature, and presents the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experimental 
design. Section 4 presents the results of the experiment. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Hypotheses 
Setting  
I explore how the extent of superior discretion over bonus allocations affects the output 
of teams in a setting, in which employees can engage in costly influence activities. In this sec-
tion, I introduce a model of effort and influence activities. Further, I describe the optimal bonus 
allocation strategy and the optimal extent of discretion from a standard economic perspective 
(For a more technical description of the model see the Appendix). In the basic setting, two 
employees repeatedly work together in a team that is managed by a superior. In each working 
period, employees choose about their engagement in two activities—productive effort and un-
productive influence activities. By exerting effort employees contribute to team output. In con-
trast, influence activities are unproductive in the sense that they do not contribute to team out-
put. However, they increase an employee’s performance signal that is observed by the superior. 
Employees engaging in influence activities thus attempt to give their superior the impression 
of exerting high effort. For example, employees may excessively focus on visible tasks while 
neglecting other important tasks (Bol 2008). A computer support specialist at Ford, for exam-
ple, reported that he was able to increase his performance ranking by regularly e-mailing useless 
computing-related news articles to all members of his department, which increased his visibility 
to superiors (Besanko et al. 2009, p. 423). Likewise, employees may waste valuable work time 
and energy trying to promote their performances or ingratiate themselves with their superiors 
at the expense of more productive activities (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Prendergast and 
Topel 1993; Besanko et al. 2009).  
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Employees incur private costs for both, effort and influence activities. However, employ-
ees bear higher private costs from exerting effort than engaging in influence activities. The 
lower private costs of influence activities reflect that in practice employees may favor such 
activities over productive effort because they are less exhausting and time-consuming. Conse-
quently, it is less costly for an employee to increase his performance signal by engaging in 
influence activities rather than exerting effort in productive activities.  
Team output is determined by the sum of employees’ productive effort and a random 
component that is beyond employees’ control. The firm has a formal information system that 
objectively measures team output, but not individual effort of employees. Employees are com-
pensated from a bonus pool that is linearly increasing in team output. 
Superiors are granted some discretion to allocate the bonus pool after team output is re-
alized. Before allocating the bonus pool, superiors receive a non-verifiable signal about the 
individual performance of each employee. The superior’s signal, however, does not solely re-
flect an employee’s productive effort. That is, superiors cannot distinguish between productive 
effort and influence attempts of their employees. Therefore, both activities increase the individ-
ual performance signal as observed by the superior.  
Due to the presence of influence activities, superiors face a trade-off when deciding about 
how strongly to incorporate their private information in the allocation of the bonus pool. On the 
one extreme, they may completely ignore the private signal about individual performances and 
allocate the entire bonus pool equally among employees. Such an allocation strategy would 
eliminate all incentives for employees to engage in influence activities. Yet, by reducing the 
weight on individual performance signals, superiors also weaken the link between individual 
effort and reward and, thereby, provide opportunities for employees to free ride on the efforts 
of their peers. On the other extreme, superiors may fully incorporate their private information 
by allocating the entire bonus pool based on the performance signals. However, when placing 
more weight on performance signals superiors also increase incentives for employees to engage 
59 
in influence activities because it is less costly for them to improve their performance signal by 
engaging in influence activities rather than exerting effort. Superiors therefore face the chal-
lenge to optimally trade off the cost of free-riding against the cost of influence activities by 
placing a weight on their information in between these two extremes. 
An important feature of the setting is that superiors are aware that their private infor-
mation may be distorted by employees’ influence activities. Furthermore, they are rewarded 
based on team output. Superiors therefore have an incentive to allocate the bonus pool such as 
to motivate employees to exert high effort and to not engage in influence activities.  
For simplicity, I describe the optimal solution using the parameters from the actual ex-
periment. Relying on standard economic rationality assumptions, the setting has a unique bonus 
allocation strategy that maximizes team output. Optimally superiors allocate half of the bonus 
pool based on the observed performance signal while they allocate the remaining part of the 
bonus pool equally among employees (The derivation of the unique Nash equilibrium is pre-
sented in the Appendix). Such an allocation strategy ensures an equilibrium, in which employ-
ees do not engage in influence activities while at the same time an employee’s opportunity to 
free-ride on the peer’s effort is reduced. 
From a standard economic perspective organizations should not limit superiors’ extent of 
discretion as any reduction in the discretion extent in advance may harm superiors’ flexibility 
to adopt the optimal bonus allocation strategy.14 For example, allowing superiors to allocate 
only 25 percent of the bonus pool would preclude a weight of 50 percent on the performance 
signal. However, if superiors fail to account for influence activities in their bonus allocations 
and place too much weight on their personal observations and information, organizations may 
                                                 
14 In other analytical settings, limiting the discretion extent may be necessary from a standard economic perspec-
tive because superiors do not have sufficient incentives to mitigate influence activities of their subordinates 
(Fairburn and Malcomson 2001) or because superiors cannot credibly commit to ignore such attempts in their 
decisions (Milgrom and Roberts 1988). However, I investigate the effects of the discretion extent in a setting in 
which information is only used for bonus decisions and superiors’ interests are perfectly aligned with those of 
the organization. In such a setting, it is sequentially rational for superiors to use the information in a way to dis-
courage influence activities and to elicit high levels of effort in the long-run. 
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have to limit the discretion extent in order to mitigate incentives for influence activities in the 
first place.  
In this setting, I study the efficacy of superior discretion in bonus allocations by varying 
superiors’ extent of discretion. Under a low discretion extent, superiors allocate only 25 percent 
of the bonus pool at their discretion while the remainder is allocated equally among employees. 
Under a high discretion extent, superiors allocate 75 percent of the bonus pool with the remain-
der allocated equally. Given the standard economic solution, a low extent of discretion would 
thus preclude the optimal strategy of allocating one-half of the bonus pool based on the perfor-
mance signals and the other half equally. Accordingly, standard economic theory would predict 
higher team output under high than under low discretion as under low discretion, due to in-
creased free-riding opportunities, employees have lower incentives to exert effort.  
In addition to the discretion extent, I vary the degree of mutual monitoring between peers 
to test the effect of superiors’ discretion extent in two different work environments. The degree 
of mutual monitoring refers to the ability of employees to observe each other’s actions (Towry 
2003; Hannan et al. 2013), which varies across organizations due to, for example, differential 
levels of interactions between employees (Hannan et al. 2013). In work environments with high 
degrees of mutual monitoring employees can draw clear inferences about their peers’ workplace 
behavior while, with low degrees of mutual monitoring, employees may not have much infor-
mation about their peers’ activities and behavior. In this study, I vary the degree of mutual 
monitoring at two levels. Under a high degree of mutual monitoring employees are able to 
monitor their peers’ effort and influence activities perfectly. Under a low degree of mutual 
monitoring, however, observe the same signal about their peers’ performance as the superior, 




The Extent of Superior Discretion and Team Output 
By delegating bonus decision to lower organizational levels, organizations increase their 
reliance on superiors to adopt strategies that motivate employees to exert high effort. As de-
scribed above, when employees can engage in influence activities superiors have to find an 
optimal balance between incorporating and ignoring their personal information and observa-
tions in bonus decision in order to mitigate incentives for influence activities while at the same 
time strengthening the link between effort and reward. Superiors should thus be able to control 
the impact of information on their subsequent bonus decisions. 
Prior research, has shown that influence activities of employees strongly affect individual 
performance assessments of superiors (e.g., Ferris and Judge 1991; Ferris et al. 1994; Du et al. 
2012) and their allocation of discretionary rewards and bonuses (e.g., Higgins et al. 2003). 
Moreover, existing research indicates that decision makers tend to rely on their information 
even when it is in their interest not to do so (e.g., Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber 1989, 
Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001) and even when they know that their information may be dis-
torted (e.g., Chinander and Schweitzer 2003). It is therefore unlikely that superiors that are 
granted high discretion are able to optimally weigh their performance information in order to 
prevent employees from engaging in influence activities and to motivate them to exert high 
effort. Rather than having control over the impact of information on their subsequent decisions, 
superiors may unconsciously overweigh their personal observations and (potentially distorted) 
information when allocating bonus pools. Such unintended responses on information may occur 
because of unconscious mental processing of information (Wilson and Brekke 1994). The mere 
exposure to information about individual performances may lead superiors to create beliefs that 
have consequential effects on their bonus decisions regardless of whether the information is 
distorted or not (e.g., Wilson and Brekke 1994; Chinander and Schweitzer 2003). Thus, while 
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a high extent of discretion would allow superiors the flexibility to optimally use their perfor-
mance information in order to reduce incentives for free-riding and influence activities, from a 
behavioral perspective, it is likely that they will fail to do so. Instead, superiors likely overweigh 
their personal information and observations in bonus allocations. As a consequence, incentives 
for employees to engage influence activities increase in superiors’ discretion extent. 
Employees experiencing increased incentives for influence activities under a high extent 
of superior discretion likely increase their engagement in such activities with detrimental effects 
on team output. First, influence activities may detract employees from exerting productive ef-
fort and thereby from contributing to team output (e.g., Prendergast 1999; Corgnet and Rodri-
guez-Lara 2013). In other words, employees may devote time and energy trying to influence 
the superior’s bonus decision while neglecting more important and productive activities or 
tasks. Second, increases in influence activities reduce the accuracy of superiors’ performance 
information in reflecting employees’ effort and contributions to team output. This, in turn, in-
creases the likelihood of distorted bonus allocations. As a result, employees’ increases in effort 
may ultimately not be reflected in superiors’ allocation of the bonus pool. Influence activities 
may therefore reduce an employee’s perceived returns from productive effort as superiors are 
not able to adequately reward employees for increases in their effort. Consequently, team output 
may decrease due to the reduced effectiveness of incentives (Baker, Jensen and Murphy 1988).  
Finally, more distorted bonus allocations under a high extent of superior discretion may 
also affect employees’ perceptions of distributive fairness (e.g., Voußen et al. 2015). Specifi-
cally, misallocations of the bonus pool may undermine the fairness perceptions of employees 
that exert high effort when the allocation of the bonus pool fails to reflect their relative contri-
butions. The consequences are that employees may withhold effort in subsequent periods in 
order to restore perceived distributive justice (Cohen-Carash and Spector 2001; Colquitt et al. 
2004). On the other hand, employees whose influence activities are rewarded by higher bonuses 
may be further motivated to engage in such behavior in future periods.  
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Following the argumentation above, if superiors fail to account for influence activities in 
their bonus allocations, limiting the discretion extent likely lowers employees’ engagement in 
influence activities, which, in turn, positively affects team output. This prediction is formally 
stated as H1. 
H1: Limiting superiors’ extent of discretion in the allocation of bonus pools can increase team 
output when employees can engage in influence activities.  
 
Degree of Mutual Monitoring between Peers and the Extent of Superior Discretion 
Next, I argue that a high degree of mutual monitoring exacerbates the effect of superiors’ 
discretion extent on team output. As discussed above, I expect that increasing the extent of 
superior discretion boosts influence activities in teams and, ultimately, undermines team output. 
Such an increase in employees’ influence activities may now be particularly problematic in 
work environments with a high degree of mutual monitoring between employees.  
Under a high degree of mutual monitoring employees can draw clearer inferences about 
their peers’ workplace behavior and they may directly observe whether their peers exert effort 
or whether they spend more time engaging in influence activities as an attempt to increase their 
individual bonus shares. Employees’ responses to their peers’ workplace behavior may there-
fore be more pronounced under a high degree of mutual monitoring, for two main reasons. First, 
a high degree of mutual monitoring enables employees to directly compare their own contribu-
tions to team output to those of their peers, which may increase the effect of bonus distortions 
on employees’ fairness perceptions (e.g., Pfeffer and Langton 1993; Bol et al. 2016). That is, 
bonus distortions due to influence activities of peers become more salient under a high degree 
of mutual monitoring and may thus undermine perceptions of distributive fairness more 
strongly. This, in turn, may lead to larger reductions in employees’ effort if the degree of mutual 
monitoring is high. 
Second, the behavior of peers may be more contagious when employees directly observe 
each other’s behavior under a high degree of mutual monitoring (e.g., Robinson and O’Leary-
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Kelly 1998; Schroeder, Jensen, Reed, Sullivan and Schwab 1983). There is considerable evi-
dence that team members’ behavior within social dilemmas is influenced by observations of 
other members’ behavior (Kerr et al. 2009) and that, particularly, observing less cooperative or 
unethical behavior of peers may lead other team members to adjust their own behavior accord-
ingly (e.g., Croson and Shang 2008; Gino, Aval and Ariely 2009). Similarly, employees ob-
serving their peers engaging in influence activities may be encouraged more often to adopt such 
behavior in subsequent periods (e.g., Ferris et al. 1994). As a result, since high discretion likely 
leads employees to increase their engagement in influence activities, a high degree of mutual 
monitoring likely exacerbates such behavior over time. In contrast, when employees lower their 
engagement in influence activities under a low discretion extent, a high degree of mutual mon-
itoring may help to reinforce low levels of influence activities over time. 
These arguments suggest that the effects of a high extent of discretion are likely to be 
more pronounced in settings with a high degree of mutual monitoring between peers. Conse-
quently, limiting superiors’ discretion extent likely leads to larger increases in team output un-
der a high compared to a low degree of mutual monitoring. This prediction is formally stated 
as H2. 
H2: The positive effect of limiting the superiors’ discretion extent on team output will be 




This experiment uses a 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental design in which two factors 
are varied—the extent of superiors’ discretion in bonus allocations (high vs. low) and the degree 
of mutual monitoring in teams (high vs. low). Superiors’ discretion extent is varied so that 
superiors with high discretion allocate 75 percent of the bonus pool at their discretion, while 
superiors with low discretion allocate only 25 percent of the bonus pool, with the remainder 
allocated evenly among employees. The manipulation of the discretion extent is chosen in such 
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a way that the two extents of discretion (low and high) are symmetrically located around the 
standard economic optimal solution of 50 percent (see Appendix). Yet, while—from a standard 
economic perspective—a high discretion extent would allow superiors to incorporate the per-
formance signal to the optimal extent of 50 percent, a low discretion extent precludes such an 
allocation strategy. This design choice thus constitutes a challenging environment to find the 
predicted results. 
The degree of mutual monitoring is varied so that employees under a low degree of mutual 
monitoring do not monitor effort and influence activities of their coworkers directly, while em-
ployees under a high degree of mutual monitoring could directly monitor their peer’s effort and 
engagement in influence activities.  
Experimental Task 
Two employees (Employee A and Employee B) and a superior (denoted as team manager 
in the experiment) repeatedly interact in a team over eight periods in total. At the beginning of 
each period, the two employees decide about their levels of effort and influence activities.15 In 
both activities, employees choose a level of engagement between 0 and 20 in each of the two 
activities under the restriction that the sum of effort and influence activities does not exceed 20 
in total.16 Team output is determined by the two employees’ effort and a positive random term 
(uniformly distributed integer between 0 and 12) while influence activities do not contribute to 
team output: 
Team Output = Efforti + Effortj + ε      (1) 
where i,j ∈ {A, B} 
The random component (ε) is added, so that employees under a low degree of mutual 
monitoring cannot directly infer their peers’ level of effort and influence activities.  
                                                 
15 To use neutral labels the two activities were referred to as activity one (effort) and activity two (influence ac-
tivities) in the instructions and during the experiment. 
16 As the superior’s private signal equals the sum of an employee’s effort and influence activities, this restriction 
is to ensure that the performance signal cannot be larger than 20. A performance signal larger than 20 would di-
rectly reveal to superiors that the employee engaged in influence activities. 
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Employees incur private costs for both, effort and influence activities that are increasing 
in the level of engagement. Yet, an employee’s private cost of effort is higher compared to the 
private cost of influence activities. Specifically, an employee’s private cost function is given as 
follows: 
Private Costi = 0.25 × (Efforti + 0.37 × Influence Activitiesi)
2  (2) 
where i ∈ {A, B} 
The private cost function is common knowledge to both, employees and superiors. Em-
ployees compensation is linked to aggregate team output via a bonus pool. For each unit of 
team output the bonus pool for the two employees increases by 10 points. That is, the total 
bonus pool for the two employees is computed as follows: 
Bonus Pool = 10 × Team Output      (3) 
In each period, the points from the bonus pool are completely allocated between the two 
employees. The bonus pool is allocated in two steps. First, under a high (low) discretion extent 
a portion of 25 (75) percent is deducted from the total bonus pool and allocated evenly between 
the two employees (nondiscretionary bonus). Second, the remaining portion of 75 (25) percent 
of the bonus pool is allocated at the discretion of the superior (discretionary bonus). An em-
ployee’s bonus is thus computed as follows: 
Employee’s Bonus = Nondiscretionary Bonus + Discretionary bonus (4) 
Before allocating the bonus pool, superiors receive the private performance signal about 
each employee’s contribution to the aggregate team output. Superiors’ private performance sig-
nal equals the sum of an employee’s level of effort and influence activities. Therefore, superiors 
cannot distinguish between employees’ effort and influence activities. In line with prior litera-
ture, influence activities are unproductive from the organization’s perspective as they only af-




In each period, employees receive a fixed salary of 15 points in addition to their bonus. 
To determine the employees’ final earnings in a period, the private costs resulting from effort 
and influence activities (as defined in Equation (2)) are deducted from the employee’s bonus 
and fixed salary. In summary, an employee’s earnings for the period are computed as follows: 
Employee Earnings = 15 + Employee’s Bonus – Private Costs  (5) 
Each period superiors receive a bonus that increases in team output. For each unit team 
output produced superiors receive a bonus of 4 points. Superiors do not receive a fixed salary 
and they do not bear any private costs. Their earnings for the period are thus computed as fol-
lows: 
Superior Earnings = 4 × Team Output      (6) 
Participants’ earnings in a period were summed up over all eight periods and converted 
to cash at a rate of CHF 1 per 36 points. Additionally, each participant was paid out a show-up 
fee of CHF 5. On average, participants earned CHF 30 from the experiment. 
Participants and Procedures 
In total, 144 undergraduate students from a public European university participated in the 
experiment. Participants were randomly allocated among the four experimental conditions. 
Each participant was assigned to his/her role at the beginning of the experiment (Employee A, 
Employee B, or Team Manager). Participants repeatedly interacted in the same teams for eight 
experimental periods. 
The number of participants in each condition is included in Figure 1. Each student partic-
ipated in only one session. The mean age of the participants is 23.2 years and 48.6 percent of 
participants are female. 
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Figure 1: Experimental Design and Number of Participants 
 Low Degree of Mu-
tual Monitoring 
High Degree of Mu-
tual Monitoring Total 
Low Extent of Supe-
rior Discretion 
N = 36 (12) N = 36 (12) N = 72 (24) 
High Extent of Supe-
rior Discretion 
N = 36 (12) N = 36 (12) N = 72 (24) 
Total N = 72 (24) N = 72 (24) N = 144 (48) 
Note: N = number of participants (number of teams). 
 
At the start of each session, participants were provided with written instructions and were 
informed of their randomly assigned role of either an employee or superior. Instructions were 
read aloud by the experimenter. After the instructions, participants stood up behind their cubi-
cles and introduced themselves to the members of their team by telling their name, age, and 
hobby. Participants revealed their identities in order to reduce the social distance and to ensure 
that the members of a team have some minimal social familiarity with each other (Gächter and 
Fehr 1999). This likely increases social pressure among participants and is common in experi-
ments involving mutual monitoring (e.g., Towry 2003; Brüggen and Moers 2007; Maas and 
van Rinsum 2013). 
After the round of introductions, all participants were required to complete a pre-experi-
ment quiz to ensure that they understand the experimental procedures. Once all participants had 
answered all questions of the quiz correctly, the eight periods of the experiment started. Partici-
pants interacted through a computer network and could not communicate with each other. The 
experiment was programmed with z-tree experimental economics software (Fischbacher 2007).  
At the beginning of each period, employees chose their level of effort and influence ac-
tivities. They could enter any combination of effort and influence activities on the interval be-
tween [0, 1,…, 20] that did not exceed 20 in sum. Once employees entered a level of effort and 
influence activities, the program calculated and displayed the private costs such a combination 
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would incur (as defined in Equation (2)).17 Employees could then adjust their levels of effort 
and influence activities as often as they wished. After both employees confirmed their entries, 
the computer calculated team output by summing up the two employees’ productive effort and 
by adding a random integer uniformly distributed between 0 and 12.18 Next, superiors received 
the signal about the two employees’ individual performance (i.e. the sum of effort and influence 
activities). At the same time, employees received either the same signal as the superior about 
their peer’s performance (low degree of mutual monitoring) or they were informed about their 
peer’s effort and influence activities separately (high degree of mutual monitoring). On the 
same screen, which displayed the private performance signal, superiors were also informed 
about team output, the size of the total bonus pool and the size of the discretionary part of the 
bonus pool (i.e., either 25 or 75 percent of the total bonus pool). Superiors then had to determine 
individual bonuses by assigning points from the discretionary bonus pool to the two employees. 
Superiors were free in allocating discretionary bonuses as long as all points from the discre-
tionary bonus pool were distributed and as long as each employee’s discretionary bonus was 
not negative. The points from the non-discretionary part of the bonus pool were allocated 
equally between the two employees. At the end of each period, employees and superiors learned 
their period earnings as defined in Equation (5) and Equation (6). Then the next period started.  
At the conclusion of the eight periods, participants completed a post-experiment ques-
tionnaire. They received their cash payments and were dismissed. Experimental sessions lasted 
approximately 75 minutes.  
  
                                                 
17 In addition, all participants (employees and superiors) had a printed table available during the entire experi-
ment, which showed the private costs for any possible combination of effort and influence activities. 
18 Prior to the experimental sessions, I randomly generated sequences of eight random terms (one for each pe-




The primary dependent variable, used to test H1 and H2, is TEAM OUTPUT. TEAM 
OUTPUT is calculated as the sum of the two employees’ effort in a period. This measure thus 
represents the part of team output that employees can influence. Table 1 reports descriptive 
statistics for the primary dependent variables.  
Table 1 shows (as graphed in Figure 2) that TEAM OUTPUT increases when the extent 
of discretion decreases from high to low. Moreover, TEAM OUTPUT increases substantially 
from 22.66 to 29.34 under a high degree of mutual monitoring while it increases only margin-
ally under a low degree of mutual monitoring (20.77 vs. 20.90). This finding represents initial 
evidence in favor of H2 predicting that the positive effect of limiting the discretion extent is 
stronger when the degree of mutual monitoring is high rather than low. 
 













High Discretion Low Discretion
High Degree of Mutual Monitoring
Low Degree of Mutual Monitoring
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Table 1: Mean, Standard Deviation (Number of Observations) for Key Measures  
and Number of Observations by Treatment 
 
Low Degree of Mutual Moni-
toring (LMM) 
High Degree of Mutual Moni-
toring (HMM) 
 
High Extent of 
Discretion 
(HD) 
Low Extent of 
Discretion 
(LD) 
High Extent of 
Discretion 
(HD) 
Low Extent of 
Discretion 
(LD) 
EFFORT 10.3854 10.4479 11.3281 14.9219 
 4.4660 5.3483 5.1635 4.5899 
 (192) (192) (192) (192) 
INFLUENCE ACTIVITY 7.4479 7.4323 7.6771 2.5365 
 4.4625 5.3833 5.3211 3.3235 
 (192) (192) (192) (192) 
TEAM OUTPUT 20.7708 20.8958 22.6563 29.8438 
 6.3204 7.2453 8.7909 8.2886 
 (12) (12) (12) (12) 
TEAM INFLUENCE 14.8958 14.8646 15.3542 5.0729 
 6.2061 6.8235 8.9842 5.5899 
 (12) (12) (12) (12) 
Note: Every cell displays the mean, standard deviation and (number of observations) for the corresponding meas-
ure.  
EFFORT is the employees’ effort choice in a period (number between 0 and 20). 
INFLUENCE ACTIVITY equals an employee’s in influence activities in a period (number between 0 and 20). 
TEAM OUTPUT corresponds to the average sum of the two employees’ effort over all 8 periods. 
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I also calculate the level of influence activities in a team by summing up the two employ-
ees’ level of influence activities in a period (TEAM INFLUENCE). Turning to the level of 
influence activities, Table 1 shows that when the degree of mutual monitoring is high a decrease 
in the superiors’ discretion extent leads to reduced levels of influence activities in teams (15.35 
vs. 5.07). Again, however, the decrease in employees’ influence activities is negligible when 
the degree of mutual monitoring is low (14.90 vs. 14.86).  
Hypotheses Tests 
I test both hypotheses jointly in an ANOVA using TEAM OUTPUT as dependent varia-
ble. The extent of superior discretion (low vs. high) and the degree of mutual monitoring (low 
vs. high) are the between-subjects factors. To control for multiple observations per team, I use 
mean observations per team over all eight periods. This procedure yields 12 independent ob-
servations per condition. 
The ANOVA in Panel A of Table 2 presents the results for team output. H1 predicts that 
team output will be greater under a low discretion extent independent from the degree of mutual 
monitoring between peers and H2 predicts that a high degree of mutual monitoring amplifies 
the effect of reducing superiors’ discretion extent. The results from the ANOVA reported in 
Panel A of Table 2 are consistent with these predictions. The ANOVA indicates a statistically 
significant main effect for the discretion extent on TEAM OUTPUT (F = 4.04, p = 0.050, two-
tailed). Furthermore, the ANOVA finds a statistically significant two-way interaction between 
the degree of mutual monitoring and the extent of discretion (F = 3.77, p = 0.059, two-tailed). 
Panel A of Table 2 also reports results from the simple effects analyses conducted subsequent 
to the ANOVA. Results reveal that under a high degree of mutual monitoring TEAM OUTPUT 
is significantly greater under a low compared to a high discretion extent (29.34 vs. 22.66, F = 
7.80, p = 0.005, two-tailed). However, under a low degree of mutual monitoring reducing the 
extent of discretion does not have a significant effect on TEAM OUTPUT (20.90 vs. 20.77, F 
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< 0.01, p = 0.961, two-tailed). In summary, these results provide support for H2 while H1 is 
only partially supported. 
 
Table 2: Effects of the Extent of Superior Discretion and the Degree of Mutual Monitoring 
on Team Output and Team Influence 
Panel A:  
TEAM OUTPUTa df MS F p 
Discretion (High/Low) 1 160.42 4.04 .050** 
Monitoring (High/Low) 1 352.08 8.87 .005*** 
Discretion*Monitoring 1 149.64 3.77 .059* 
Error 44 39.71   
Simple effects for each degree of mutual monitoring 
Effect of high discretion: Low degree of monitoring 





     
Panel B:  
TEAM INFLUENCEb  df MS F p 
Discretion (High/Low) 1 319.04 11.63 .001*** 
Monitoring (High/Low) 1 261.33 9.53 .004*** 
Discretion*Monitoring 1 315.19 11.49 .002*** 
Error 44 27.42   
Simple effects for each degree of mutual monitoring 
Effect of high discretion: Low degree of monitoring 





The dependent variables of the ANOVAS are TEAM OUTPUT (Panel A), and TEAM INFLUENCE (Panel 
B). The independent variables are whether the extent of supervisor discretion was high or low and whether 
the degree of monitoring between peers was high or low. 
High discretion: Supervisors allocated 75 percent of the bonus pool. Low discretion: Supervisors allocated 25 
percent of the bonus pool. High degree of monitoring: Employees directly monitor effort and influence activ-
ities of their peers. Low degree of monitoring: Employees did not monitor effort and influence activities of 
their peers directly. 
The observations include 48 teams equally allocated across the 4 conditions. For every team, there is one ob-
servation. Thus, every ANOVA contains 48 observations. All p-values are two-tailed. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
aTEAM OUTPUT corresponds to the average sum of the two employees’ effort over all 8 periods. 




Employees’ Influence Activities 
In the theory development underlying H1 and H2, I argued that reductions in employees’ 
influence activities under a low discretion extent might in part explain observed differences in 
team output. Thus, to test how employees’ engagement in influence activities is affected by the 
discretion extent and the degree of mutual monitoring I test an ANOVA with TEAM INFLU-
ENCE as dependent variable. Again, to control for multiple observations per team, I use mean 
observations per team over all eight periods. 
The ANOVA reported in Panel B of Table 2 shows a significant main effect of the dis-
cretion extent on TEAM INFLUENCE (F = 11.63, p = 0.001, two-tailed) and a statistically 
significant two-way interaction between the degree of mutual monitoring and the extent of dis-
cretion (F = 11.49, p = 0.002, two-tailed). Furthermore, the simple effects test reveals that lim-
iting the discretion extent leads to significant decreases in TEAM INFLUENCE when the de-
gree of mutual monitoring between peers is high (15.35 vs. 5.07, F = 23.13, p < 0.001, two-
tailed). The effect of the discretion extent is, however, insignificant when the degree of mutual 
monitoring is low (14.90 vs. 14.86, F < 0.01, p = 0.988, two-tailed). The pattern of TEAM 
INFLUENCE across conditions thus reflects the reverse pattern of TEAM OUTPUT. The re-
sults, therefore, support the notion that among the main drivers of observed differences in team 
output is employees’ engagement in influence activities. 
Superiors’ Incorporation of the Performance Information in Bonus Allocations 
In the theory development, I argued that superiors likely overweigh their personal obser-
vations and information in allocating bonus pools. As a consequence, superiors likely fail to 
sufficiently reduce the weight on the performance signals in order to mitigate incentives for 
influence activities when the extent of discretion increases. Therefore, in this section, I explore 
whether the weight superiors place on the individual performance signals in allocating the bo-
nus pool changes with a varying extent of discretion.  
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To do so, I ran a regression with employees’ share in the discretionary portion of the 
bonus pool as dependent variable. The independent variables are an employee’s relative perfor-
mance signal in a period (Relative Performance Signal)19 and the interaction between the Rel-
ative Performance Signal and a dummy variable equaling 1 if the extent of discretion is high 
and zero otherwise (High Discretion). 20 If superiors do not account for influence activities with 
an increasing extent of discretion then I expect no difference between the conditions with high 
and low superior discretion in the weight superiors place on the performance signal when allo-
cating the discretionary portion of the bonus pool. That is, when considering employees’ share 
in the discretionary portion of the bonus pool only then I expect the coefficient of the interaction 
between the Relative Performance Signal and High Discretion to be insignificant.  
The first regression reported in Table 3, shows that employees’ discretionary bonus share 
significantly increases in their relative performance signal (β = 0.5765, p < 0.001, two-tailed). 
Moreover, as expected, the interaction between the relative performance signal and the discre-
tion extent is insignificant (β = 0.0046, p = 0.986, two-tailed), indicating that superiors do not 
reduce the weight placed on the relative performance signal when the extent of discretion in-
creases.  
  
                                                 
19 The relative performance signal equals the ratio between an employee’s individual performance signal and the 
sum of the two employees’ performance signals in a period. 
20 In the regressions, I exclude observations where the performance signal does not differ between the two em-
ployees as in such a case any differences in bonus shares cannot be explained by differences in the performance 
signal. Including these observations would thus simply increase the noise and make it more difficult to find sys-
tematic differences between conditions with a high and low discretion extent. Furthermore, to control for unob-
served differences between subjects the regressions include subject fixed effects. 
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Bonus Share  
Total Bonus 
Share  
Constant  0.2062 0.3550 
 (0.004)*** (0.000)*** 
   
Relative Performance Signal 0.5765 0.1441 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
   
Relative Performance Signal  
* High Discretion 
0.0046 0.2917 
(0.986) (0.098)* 
   







N 208 208 
Note: N indicates the number of observations. In both models, observations with zero difference in 
employees’ relative performance signal are excluded. The regressions use standard errors clustered 
at the team manager’s level to control for multiple observations within participant. The model also 
includes subject fixed effects (not reported). All p-values are two-tailed. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
Discretionary Bonus Share equals an employee’s discretionary bonus (total bonus net of nondis-
cretionary bonus) divided by the period’s discretionary part of the bonus pool (part allocated by 
the superior). 
Total Bonus Share equals an employee’s total bonus divided by the period’s total bonus pool. 
High Discretion is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the extent of discretion is high and equal to 
0 when the extent of discretion is low. 
Relative Performance Signal equals an employee’s performance signal divided by the sum of the 
two employees’ performance signal in a period. 
 
To further compare incentives for employees to engage in influence activities under high 
and low discretion, I ran a second regression with employees’ share in the total bonus pool as 
dependent variable. If superiors place the same weight on the performance signal independent 
from the discretion extent then the relative performance signal is expected to have a stronger 
impact on total bonus shares under a high compared to a low discretion extent because superiors 
allocate a larger portion of the bonus pool under high discretion. In fact, results reported in 
Table 3 show that the interaction between the relative performance signal and discretion extent 
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is now positive and significant (β = 0.2917, p < 0.098, two-tailed). In sum, the findings provide 
evidence that, consistent with the underlying theory, superiors fail to sufficiently account for 
influence activities in their bonus decisions. The consequences are that employees have in-
creased incentives to engage in unproductive influence activities under high superior discretion. 
Detrimental Effects of Influence Activities and the Degree of Mutual Monitoring 
In the theory development, I argued that the negative effect of influence activities on team 
output is likely to be stronger under a high compared to a low degree of mutual monitoring 
which is supported by the results. This is likely to be the case because employees’ reactions to 
influence activities of their peers may be more pronounced the better they can monitor their 
peers’ actions. That is, employees observing their peers engaging in influence activities under 
a high degree of monitoring may adopt such behavior more often in subsequent periods at the 
expense of productive effort.  
In order to analyze how employees’ reactions to their peers’ influence activities are af-
fected by the degree of mutual monitoring, I test two different models: First, I analyze the effect 
of peers’ influence activities in the current period on employees’ provision of effort in the sub-
sequent period. Therefore, I regress employees’ effort in the subsequent period (EFFORTt+1) 
on the influence activities of the other employee in the current period (Peer Influence Activity) 
and the interaction between Peer Influence Activity and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
degree of mutual monitoring is high and zero otherwise (High Degree of Monitoring).21 If 
peers’ influence activities are more detrimental to effort under a high degree of mutual moni-
toring, I expect the interaction to be negative. In fact, results reported in Table 4 show that the 
interaction between Peer Influence Activity and High Degree of Monitoring is significantly 
negative (β = -0.4346, p < 0.001, two-tailed). While the effect of Peer Influence Activity on 
EFFORTt+1 is insignificant under a low degree of mutual monitoring (β = 0.0815, p = 0.226, 
                                                 
21 To control for differences between subjects and periods the regression includes subject and period fixed ef-
fects. 
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two-tailed) it becomes significantly negative under a high degree of mutual monitoring (-0.4346 
+ 0.0815 = -0.3531, F = 16.67, p < 0.001, two-tailed). 
 
Table 4: Effects of Peers’ Current Influence Activities on Employees’ Effort and Influence 





Constant  12.5461 5.2270 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
   
Peer Influence Activity 0.0815 -0.0586 
 (0.226) (0.317) 
   
Peer Influence Activity 
* High Degree of Monitoring 
-0.4346 0.3880 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
   
Period fixed effects Included Included 







N 672 672 
Note: N indicates the number of observations. The regressions use standard errors clustered at the 
team level to control for multiple observations within teams. The model also includes period and 
subject fixed effects (not reported). All p-values are two-tailed. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
INFLUENCE ACTIVITYt+1 is the employees’ engagement in influence activities in the next pe-
riod (t+1). 
EFFORTt+1 is the employees’ effort choice in the next period (t+1)  
High Degree of Monitoring is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the degree of mutual monitoring 
between peers is high and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Peer Influence Activity corresponds to the other employee’s engagement in influence activities in 
the current period (number between 0 and 20). 
 
Second, I test the effect of peers’ influence activities in the current period on employees’ 
engagement in influence activities in the subsequent period. For that, I employ the same regres-
sion model as described above, yet, using an employee’s influence activities in the subsequent 
period (INFLUENCE ACTIVITYt+1) as dependent variable. If influence activities are more 
contagious under a high degree of monitoring, I expect the interaction between Peer Influence 
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Activity and High Degree of Monitoring to be positive. Results reported in Table 4 show that 
the interaction is positive and highly significant (β = 0.3880, p < 0.001, two-tailed). Again, 
while the effect of Peer Influence Activities is insignificant under a low degree of monitoring 
(β = -0.0586, p = 0.317, two-tailed), the effect becomes positive and significant under a high 
degree of mutual monitoring (0.3880 - 0.0586 = 0.3294, F = 16.71, p < 0.001, two-tailed). 
Overall, these results support the notion that employees react more strongly to their peers’ in-
fluence activities under a high compared to a low degree of mutual monitoring. 
Effect of the Discretion Extent under a Low Degree of Mutual Monitoring 
In the development of H1, I argued that implementing limitations on the discretion extent 
leads to lower levels of influence activities independent from the degree of mutual monitoring 
in teams. While this holds true under a high degree of mutual monitoring, the effect of the 
discretion extent, however, becomes insignificant under a low degree of monitoring. 
One explanation for this non-finding might be that under a low degree of monitoring 
employees may not only engage in influence activities to influence their superiors’ bonus deci-
sion but also to hide low levels of effort from their peers as employees, just like superiors, 
cannot distinguish between effort and influence activities of their peers. That is, under a low 
degree of monitoring employees may try to give their peers the impression of exerting high 
effort in order to prevent them from revising their productive effort downwards when observing 
low performance signals. This motivation to engage in influence activities may thus persist 
under a low degree of monitoring independent from superiors’ extent of discretion. Moreover, 
employees may have more motivation to hide low levels of effort from their peer if they per-
ceive their peer to exert high effort as in this case it may pay more to keep up the impression of 
exerting high effort. 
Therefore, I explore in more details how the perceived effort of peers affects employees’ 
engagement in influence activities and their reaction to the discretion extent under a low degree 
of mutual monitoring. To do so, I test a model, in which I regress average influence activities 
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of an employee in the last four periods on the perceived effort of the other employee in the first 
four periods, the discretion extent, and the interaction thereof. To measure the perceived effort 
of peers (Perceived Peer Effort) I deduct an employee’s own effort from team output (including 
the random noise term) as employees cannot monitor effort of their peers directly under a low 
degree of mutual monitoring. Next, I take the average over the first four periods. If employees 
under a low degree of mutual monitoring attempt to hide relatively low levels of effort from 
their peers by engaging in influence activities I expect the level of influence activities in the 
last periods to be positively associated with the perceived effort of peers in the first periods. 
This effect should, however, be reduced under a high extent of discretion as in this case influ-
ence activities may be primarily directed towards superiors rather than peers.  
Results from the regression reported in Table 5 reveal that employees’ levels of influence 
activities in the last periods are significantly higher when they perceive their peers to exert high 
effort in the first periods (β = 0.3752, p = 0.043, two-tailed). Furthermore, the positive and 
significant effect of the discretion extent (β = 7.5966, p = 0.084, two-tailed) indicates that em-
ployees increase their engagement in influence activities under high discretion independent 
from the perceived effort of their peers. Finally, the interaction between Perceived Peer Effort 
and High Discretion is negative and significant (β = -0.4340, p = 0.073, two-tailed). In fact, the 
effect of the perceived peer effort on influence activities becomes insignificant under a high 
extent of discretion (0.3752 – 0.4340 = -0.0588, F = 0.15, p = 0.700, two-tailed). 
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Table 5: Effects of Perceived Effort of Peers and the Extent of Discretion Under a Low De-





Constant  1.7434 
 (0.531) 
  
High Discretion (1/0) 7.5966 
 (0.084)* 
  
Perceived Peer Effort (First 4) 0.3752 
 (0.043)** 
  
Perceived Peer Effort (First 4) 






Note: N indicates the number of observations. The regressions use standard errors clustered at the 
team level to control for multiple observations within teams. All p-values are two-tailed. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
Average Influence (Last 4) is an employee’s average level of influence activities over the last 4 
periods. 
Perceived Peer Effort (First 4) is equal the average peer’s potential effort as observed by the em-
ployee (team output net of an employees’ own effort) over the first 4 periods. 
High Discretion is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the superior’s extent of discretion in allocat-
ing the bonus pool is high and equal to 0 otherwise. 
 
These results suggest that employees under a low degree of mutual monitoring may also 
be motivated to engage in influence activities that are directed towards peers rather than supe-
riors. This motivation may persist even when superiors’ extent of discretion is low and may 
explain why limiting the discretion extent is less effective in mitigating influence activities 
when the degree of mutual monitoring between peers is low rather than high. 
5 Conclusion  
This study experimentally investigates how the extent of superior discretion in the allo-
cation of a bonus pool affects the output of a team. Prior experimental research has examined 
the efficiency of discretionary bonus pools in settings where employees only decide about their 
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provision of productive effort (e.g., Fisher et al. 2005; Van der Heijden, Potters and Sefton 
2009). However, one pertinent problem of superior discretion – the danger of influence activi-
ties – has long been discussed in the economic literature (Milgrom and Roberts 1988; Prender-
gast 1999). In this study, the efficiency of superior discretion is thus tested under conditions in 
which employees can become engaged in activities that are directed to influence bonus decision 
rather than to contribute to team output. 
In the experimental setting, two employees work together in a team to produce a joint 
output. As compensation, employees receive a share of a bonus pool that is formally linked to 
team output. The team is managed by a superior whose compensation increases with the team 
output and who has some discretion to allocate the bonus pool between the two employees. 
Before allocating the bonus pool, the superior receives a non-verifiable signal about the indi-
vidual performances of each of the two employees. The performance signal, however, does not 
only reflect employees’ productive effort. Employees can also engage in unproductive influ-
ence activities to increase their performance signal as observed by the superior. Employees 
incur lower private costs for engaging in influence activities than for exerting productive effort. 
The superior thus has to take into account that increasing the weight on the performance signal 
when allocating the bonus pool might not only motivate employees to increase their effort but 
also to increase their engagement in influence activities. 
Using a between-subjects experimental design I vary two factors. First, I vary the discre-
tion extent of superiors in bonus allocations. Under a high discretion extent, superiors allocate 
75 percent of the bonus pool at their discretion while the remainder is allocated equally between 
the two employees. Under a low discretion extent, superiors only allocate 25 percent of the 
bonus pool with the remainder allocated equally. Second, I vary the degree of mutual monitor-
ing between employees. Under a high degree of mutual monitoring, employees can directly 
observe their peers’ engagement in influence activities and their provision of effort. Under a 
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low degree of mutual monitoring, however, employees observe the same noisy signal as the 
superior about their peers’ performance. 
Consistent with my theory I find that limiting superiors’ extent of discretion in bonus 
decisions helps to mitigate employees’ engagement in influence activities and, thereby, in-
creases team output under a high degree of mutual monitoring in teams. However, influence 
activities are more prevalent under a low degree of mutual monitoring as initially predicted. A 
possible explanation is that under a low degree of monitoring influence activities may not only 
be directed to influence the impression and decisions of superiors but also the one of peers. 
Additional analyses reveal that superiors fail to sufficiently account for influence activi-
ties when allocating the bonus pool. Limiting the discretion extent thus lowers the impact the 
superiors’ personal information and observations may have on bonus allocations and, therefore, 
reduces incentives for employees to engage in influence activities in the first place. Further 
analyses reveal that influence activities of peers are more contagious under a high degree of 
mutual monitoring. Limiting the extent of discretion therefore becomes more important with 
higher degrees of mutual monitoring between peers in order to limit the detrimental effects of 
influence activities on team output. 
My findings have important implications for both theory and practice. From a theoretical 
perspective, my study contributes to the recent stream of research investigating the efficiency 
of discretion in bonus allocations (e.g., Fisher et al. 2005; Bailey et al. 2011; Arnold and Tafkov 
2015) by informing about the costs and prevalence of employees’ influence activities under 
high superior discretion. Moreover, the study adds to research by providing evidence that in-
fluence activities are potentially more detrimental to team output when the degree of mutual 
monitoring in teams increases. 
From a practical perspective, the study provides evidence that organizations should not 
rely too strongly on their superiors to adopt an allocation strategy that motivates employees to 
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enhance productive effort and not to engage in influence activities. Rather than granting supe-
riors full discretion in bonus decisions, organizations may therefore limit the discretion extent. 
Such a course of action mitigates incentives for influence activities in the first place and, as a 
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Model of Influence Activities and Effort 
In this appendix, I introduce a model of employees’ effort and influence activities and 
derive the optimal bonus allocation strategy under standard economic assumptions. Consider 
two risk-neutral and homogenous agents that produce a joint team output. Each agent i ∈ {1, 
2} selects a level of effort (ei) and a level of influence activities (bi). Employees bear private 
costs from both, effort and influence activities, where ci(ei, bi) is a function converting any 
combination of effort and influence activities to costs. The private cost of effort is higher com-
pared to the cost of influence activities in the sense that the marginal cost of influence activities 
is only a fraction k of the marginal costs of effort. Moreover, there are spillover costs between 
the two activities such that the marginal cost of effort is increasing in the level of influence 




(ei + k ∙ bi)
2 
where: 
  k ∈ ]0, 1[ 
  i ∈ {1, 2} 
Team output q is a function of the two employees’ effort and a uniformly distributed 
random term ε ∈ [0, 12] representing the uncertainty in the production process. Specifically, 
q(e1, e2, ε) = e1+ e2 + ε 
Employees are compensated by the means of a bonus pool that is completely allocated 
between the two employees at the end of a period. The size of bonus pool P is linearly increasing 
in team output by factor t: 
                                                 
22 Spillover costs are often implemented when modelling multi-task environments (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991). They likely exist in practice because time constraints may limit employees’ ability to engage in both ac-
tivities or because excessive engagement in one activity may exhaust employees and, thereby affect the costs to 
engage in other activities. 
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P(q) = t ∙ q(e1, e2, ε) = t ∙ (e1 + e2 + ε) 
Before allocating the bonus pool the superior gets a non-verifiable signal about the indi-
vidual performance of each of the two employees. The performance signal (Si) is a function of 
an employees’ effort and influence activities: 
  Si(ei,bi) = ei + bi 
The superiors then have to place an optimal weight on the performance signal when allo-
cating the bonus pool so as to motivate high efforts. Specifically, superiors can do so by allo-
cating a portion α of the bonus pool based on the performance signal while allocating the re-
maining portion of the bonus pool (1 − α) equally between the two employees. Thus, an em-
ployee’s share in the bonus pool (Bi) is represented by the following function: 
Bi = α ∙ P(q) ∙ 
Si
S1 + S2
 + (1 − α) ∙ P(q) ∙ 
1
2






)  ∙ P(q) 
where: 
  α ∈ [0, 1] 
Self-interested employees maximize their expected utility EUi, which is increasing in 
their share in the bonus pool Bi and decreasing in their private cost of effort and influence ac-
tivities ci(ei, bi). The utility function is additively separable in its two operands. Furthermore, 
as common in experimental studies, I assume that utility can be measured in monetary terms 
(e.g, Towry 2003). Hence, the utility function may be represented as, 






)  ∙ E(P(q)) − ci(ei,bi) 
where: 
E(P(q)) =  t ∙ (e1+ e2 + E(ε)) 
  
91 
Self-Interested Equilibrium in Absence of Influence Activities 
As a benchmark, I first derive employees’ effort as a function of the weight α when em-
ployees do not engage in influence activities. In this case, the superiors’ non-verifiable perfor-
mance signal Si perfectly reflects individual effort (i.e., Si = ei). In absence of influence activi-
ties, self-interested employees thus maximizes the following objective function: 
max
ei
EUi = (𝛼 ∙  
𝑒𝑖
𝑒1 + 𝑒2
 +  
(1 − 𝛼)
2




2              (A.1) 
s. t.  ei ≥ 0 
The effort function can be derived by rearranging the first order condition under the as-




(t ∙ (1 + α) + √t2∙(1 + α)2 + 2t ∙ E(ε) ∙ α)                                 (A.2) 
Equation A.2 reveals that in absence of influence activities individual effort is strictly 
increasing in the weight α. That is, increasing the weight α reduces opportunities for employees 
to free-ride on the effort of the other employee by strengthening the link between individual 
effort and reward. 
Self-Interested Equilibrium in Presence of Influence Activities 
Next, I derive employees’ effort as a function of the weight α when employees do engage 
in influence activities. In this case, the superiors non-verifiable performance signal Si reflects 
an employee’s effort and his engagement in influence activities (i.e., Si = ei + bi). In presence 










)  ∙ E(P(q)) −
1
4
(ei + k ∙ bi)
2    (B.1) 
  s. t.  ei ≥ 0 
   bi ≥ 0 
Again, the effort function can be derived by rearranging the two first order conditions 















(1 − k)2∙(1 + α)
+
E(ε) ∙ α
2 ∙ (1 + α)
)                          (B.3) 
Equation (B.2) reveals that an employee’s effort is strictly decreasing in his level of in-
fluence activities (for all bi ≥ 0). Furthermore, equation (B.3) implies that employees’ engage-
ment in influence activities is positive and strictly increasing in the weight α whenever α ex-
ceeds the following threshold:  
α̅ = 
2tk
(1 − k) ∙ (2t + E(ε) ∙ (1 − k))
 
If, however, the weight α is set below this threshold equation B.3 would imply a negative 
level of influence activities, which is not feasible. Consequently, below the threshold ?̅? em-
ployees do not become engaged in influence activities (i.e., bi = 0). 
Importantly, this threshold also constitutes the weight α on the private performance sig-
nal, which maximizes individual effort. That is, as long as the weight α is set below the thresh-
old ?̅?, employees do not engage in influence activities, and hence, an increase in the weight α 
would imply higher effort as indicated by equation A.2. In contrast, when the weight α is set 
above the threshold ?̅?, employees engage in influence activities (i.e., bi > 0) and any increase 
in the weight α leads them to increase the level of influence activities and to reduce effort as 
indicated by equations B.2 and B.3. Employees’ effort is thus highest if setting the weight on 
the private performance signal exactly equal to ?̅?. 
Benchmark Solutions 
In this study, the following specific parameters are used: 
t = 10 
k = 0.37 
E(ε) = 6 
The optimal weight α, given the above parameters, is therefore calculated as follows: 
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α* = 
2 ∙ 10 ∙ 0.37
(1 − 0.37) ∙ (2 ∙ 10 + 6 ∙ (1 − 0.37))
 ≈ 0.5 
In the resulting Nash Equilibrium employees would not engage in influence activities (see 
discussion above) and they would choose their level of effort as implied by equation B.2 (or by 





 ≈ 15.87 
Under a low discretion extent (LD) superiors can allocate only 25 percent of the bonus 
pool at their discretion. Assuming that superiors allocate the discretionary part of the bonus 
pool based on their performance signals, this would imply a weight α equal to 0.25. In the 
resulting Nash Equilibrium employees would then again not engage in influence activities and 
they would choose a level of effort as implied by equation A.2: 
bi





(10 ∙ (1 + 0.25) + √100 ∙ (1 + 0.25)2 + 120 ∙ 0.25)  ≈ 13.07 
Under a high discretion extent (HD) superiors can allocate 75 percent of the bonus pool 
at their discretion. A high discretion extent would thus enable superiors to adopt an optimal 
bonus allocation strategy and to elicit the effort level of ei
*. If superiors, however, fail to account 
for influence activities and assuming that they fully allocate the discretionary part of the bonus 
pool based on the performance signal, this would imply a weight α equal to 0.75. In the resulting 
equilibrium employees would then choose their level of effort and influence activities as im-










(1 − 0.37)2∙(1 + 0.75)
+
(6 ∙ 0.75)
2 ∙ (1 + 0.75)





− 0.37 ∙ bi
HD






Thank you for participating in this experiment. 
 
This experiment investigates decision making in an organizational setting. Please read the 
instructions carefully. Your earnings will depend on the decision that you and other 
participants make during this experiment. 
 
After reading the instructions, you will take a short quiz to test your comprehension of the in-
structions. No one will be able to continue until everyone has passed the quiz. 
 
We promise to carry out this study in the manner described in the instructions, with no decep-
tion of any form. 
 
If you have any questions while we are going over the instructions, or during the study, please 
raise your hand and we will answer your question in private. 
 
This experiment will approximately take 90 minutes. 
 
General Instructions 
This experiment consists of several „rounds". In each round, you are part of a three-person 
team. Assume that you and the two other participants in your team work for the same 
organization. In each team, one participant will act as the team manager and the two other 
participants will act as an employee (employee A or employee B).  
 
You are assigned to the role of a (team manager/ Employee A/B). All participants will keep 
their role throughout the entire experiment.  
 
This experiment consists of eight rounds in total. Throughout the eight rounds of the 
experiment, your team will remain the same.  
 
You can earn points in each round of the experiment. How many points you will earn in a 
round depends on the decisions that you and the two other participants in your team make. 
Your experimental payout will be calculated based on the total amount of points that you have 
earned during the experiment. Earned points will be converted into actual cash at the rate of 
36 points = CHF 1 and will be added to your CHF 5 participation fee. 
 
In the event that you have a negative amount of points at the end of the experiment, the points 
(converted into cash) will be deducted from your participation fee. A potential deduction, 
however, cannot be higher than the participation fee. 
 
Each participant has already been assigned to a cubicle that is marked with a number from 1 
to 15. The numbers enable all participants to identify the members of their team: With the 
help of the numbers, you can identify the two other members of your team during the 
experiment and you can also identify for each team member whether he/she acts as the team 
manager or as an employee.  
                                                 
23 The experimental instruments are directly translated from German to be as close as possible to the original in-





At the beginning of the experiment each participant will stand up behind his/her cubicle – 
team-by-team – and each participant will briefly introduce himself/herself personally to the 
members of his/her team (name, age, hobby).   
 
The experiment will start after the round of introductions. From this point, all interactions will 
take place over the computer network until the end of the experiment. 
 
Employees’ task 
The task of the employees – A and B – is it to decide in each round about their levels of effort 
in two activities. The choice of the effort levels influences the output that the team produces, 
and determines the cost of effort that an employee has to bear. The task is identical for all 
employees.  
 
Choice of effort levels 
Employees choose their levels of effort in two different activities – Activity 1 and Activity 2. 
Each employees chooses his/her effort levels by determining a number between 0 and 20 for 
each of the two activities.  
 
Effort costs and team output 
Just as there are different activities in reality that are more or less exhausting and that contrib-
ute more or less to team output, the two activities in this experiment also differ in the effort 
costs incurred and in their contribution to team output.  
 
Effort costs:  
Each employee bears individual costs for his/her levels of effort in activity 1 and 2. 
Table 1 (see at the end of these instructions) shows the effort costs contingent on the 
level of effort in activities 1 and 2. 
 
Activity 1 incurs higher effort cost than Activitiy 2: An increase in the effort level in 
Activity 1 leads to additional effort costs more than twice as high as an equal increase 
in the effort level in Activity 2. 
 
 Team output: 
Each employee can contribute to team output by increasing his/her effort level in Ac-
tivity 1. An increase in the effort level in Activity 1 by one unit increases team output 
by one unit.  
In contrast, an increase in the effort level in Activity 2 does not increase team output. 
 
Hence, an increase in the effort level in Activity 1 leads to high effort costs for an employee. 
However it also contributes much to team output. In contrast, an increase in the effort level in 




The effort levels of an employee in Activity 1 and Activity 2 together add up to total effort of 
an employee. Assume that – just like in the real world – your total effort requires work time 





Team output and bonus pool 
Team output in each round is determined by two components: 
 
 
Effort Levels: Employees can increase team output by increasing their level of effort in 
Activity 1. The effort levels of the two employees in Activity 1 are 
summed up and are added to team output at the end of each round.  
 
Random component:  In reality, it can happen that employees work hard but - because 
of bad luck – only realize a low team output. Or, it can happen 
that employees don’t really work hard but they may be lucky 
and still realize a high team output. This can also happen in this 
experiment. That is, in each period the computer randomly de-
termines a positive integer between 0 and 12 {0, +1, +2, …, 
+12}, which is added to team output at the end of a round. 
(Each integer has in each round the same probability to be 
drawn independent of previous or future draws.) 
 
To summarize, team output of the organization in each round is equal the sum of the two em-
ployees‘ effort level in Activity 1 + the random component (which is a randomly determined 
integer between 0 and 12).  
 
The organization makes a profit of 20 points for each unit of team output that the two employ-
ees produce. In each round, 50 percent of the organization’s profit are going into a bonus pool 
for the two employees. At the end of each round, this bonus pool will be completely allocated 
between the two employees:  
 
Bonus pool for the employees:  
Each unit of team output increases the organization’s profit by 20 points. 50 percent of 
the organization’s profit are going into a bonus pool at the end of a round. Therefore, 
each unit of team output increases the bonus pool by 10 points. 
 
 
The information of the team manager and allocation of the bonus pool 
In each round, the team manager will be informed about the team output and about the total 
effort of each of the two employees. The team manager, however, is not informed about the 
efforts of the two employees in activity 1 and 2 separately. That is, the team manager will 
know the total level of effort of each employee, however, he/she won’t know how much of 
the total effort was contributed to either Activity 1 or Activity 2.  
 
The allocation of the bonus pool between the two employees is conducted in two steps: 
 
Team bonus 
In a first step, the team bonus is allocated. The team bonus corresponds to the portion of the 
bonus pool that is in any case allocated equally between the two employees. That is, each of 
the two employees receives one-half of the team bonus. The portion of the bonus pool that is 
allocated as team bonus – equally between employees – is equal to 25% [75%] of the bonus 
pool. This portion is fixed and cannot be changed by the team manager. 
 
Individual bonus 
In a second step, the team manager allocates the remaining portion of 75% [25%] of the 
bonus pool that is not allocated as team bonus. The team manager allocates this portion of 
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75% [25%] of the bonus pool between the two employees after being informed about the total 
effort of each of his/her two employees. The team manager is free in his/her decision about 
how to allocate the bonus pool between the two employees as long as the sum of the 
individual bonus payments amounts to 75% [25%] of the bonus pool and as long as none of 
the two employees receives less than 0 as an individual bonus.  
 
Information of the employees 
At the end of each round, employees receive information about efforts and bonus payments of 
the other employee in their team.  
 
[Conditions with a high degree of mutual monitoring: Before the team manager allocates the 
bonus pool employees are informed about the total effort of the other employee in their team. 
In contrast to the team manager, employees are additionally informed about the levels of 
effort of the other employee in activities 1 and 2. That means each employee knows exactly 
how much effort the other employee in his/her team has contributed to Activity 1 and Activity 
2.] 
 
[Conditions with a low degree of mutual monitoring: Before the team manager allocates the 
bonus pool, employees are informed about the total effort of the other employee in their team. 
Just like the team manager, however, employees are not informed about the levels of effort of 
the other employee in activities 1 and 2 separately. That means each employee knows total 
effort of the other employee in his/her team, however, he/she does not know how much effort 
the other employee in his/her team has contributed to Activity 1 and Activity 2.] 
 
At the end of each round, after the team manager allocated the bonus pool, each employee is 
informed about his/her total bonus and the total bonus of the other employee in his/her team. 
  
Net income of an employee 
Besides the bonus payment, each employee receives a fixed income of 15 points in each 
round. The fixed income is added to an employee’s total points from the bonus pool. The net 
income of an employee in a round is therefore equal to the fixed income plus his/her total bo-
nus minus his/her costs of effort. 
 
 Net income of an employee: 
 Fixed income + total bonus – costs of effort = Net income in points 
 
 
Net income of the team manager 
In each round, the team manager receives a bonus as his/her net income. The bonus of the 
team manager is directly linked to the profit of the organization. The team manager receives 
20% of the organization’s profit payed out as bonus at the end of each round.  
 
Bonus of the team managers:  
Each unit of team output increases the profit of the organization by 20 points. The 
team manager receives 20% of the organization’s profit payed out as bonus. Hence, 
each additional unit of team output increases the manager’s bonus by 4 points. 
 
 
Information at end of each round 
At the end of each round, each employee and the team manager is informed about their 




Assume that you and the other employee in your team have chosen the following effort levels 
independent from each other:  
 
 Employee A Employee B 
Effort in Activity 1 16 8 
Effort in Activity 2 0 8 
Total effort 16 16 
 
The choice of the above levels of effort are leading – according to Table 1 (see at the end of 
these instructions) – to the following costs of effort for the two employees:  
 
 Employee A Employee B 
Effort Costs 64.0 30.0 
 
The efforts of the two employees in Activity 1 together with the random component determine 
team output. Assume that the random component is equal to 8. Each unit of effort in Activity 1 
increases team output by one unit:  
 
 
Effort in Activity 1  
 Employee A:   16 units 
 Employee B:     8 units 
  
 Random component    8 units 
 
 Team output   32 units 
 
Due to the chosen levels of effort in Activity 1 the team has produced in this example round 
32 units of team output in total. Each unit of team output increases the bonus pool by 10 
points. Hence, at the end of the round the bonus pool is calculated as follows: 
 
 Bonus pool:    10 points x 32 units = 320 points 
 
At the end of the round and before the allocation of the bonus pool, employees and the team 
manager are informed about the efforts of each employee. The team manager [as well as the 
two employees], however, only observes [observe] total effort of the two employees. The 
team manager [They], however, does not [do not] observe how much effort employees have 
contributed to Activity 1 and Activity 2 separately.  
 
Information of the team manager about the efforts of the two employees 
 
 Employee A Employee B 
Total effort 16 16 
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[Conditions with a high degree of mutual monitoring: The two employees, however, can ob-
serve total effort as well as how much effort the other employee has contributed to each of the 
two activities.] 
 
At the end of the round, the team manager allocates the portion of bonus pool between the 
two employees, which is not allocated as team bonus. That means, 25% [75%] of the bonus 
pool are allocated as team bonus equally between employees. The remaining 75% [25%] of 
the bonus pool are allocated by the team manager at his/her discretion.  
 
Hence, in this example round, the team bonus is equal to 25% [75%] * 320 = 80 [240] points. 
Each employees receives one-half of the team bonus, which is equal to 80 / 2 = 40 [240/2 = 
120] points. The team manager is free to allocate the remaining 240 [80] points from the bo-
nus pool at his/her discretion as long as he/she allocates the total amount of 240 [80] points 
between the two employees and as long as none of the two employees receives less than 0. 
 
Superior’s allocation of the bonus pool 
 
 Employee A Employee B Total 
Team bonus 40 [120] 40 [120] 80 [240]  
Individual bonus a  b  240 [80] 
Total bonus of an 
Employee 




After the team manager has allocated the bonus pool, each employee is informed about 
his/her total bonus and about the total bonus of the other employee. The total bonus of an em-
ployee is calculated by the sum of the team bonus and the employee’s individual bonus as de-
termined by the team manager. 
 
The net income of an employee at the end of each round is calculated as follows: 
 
 Fix income + total bonus – effort costs =  Net income in points  
 (rounded up to the next whole number) 
 
Net income of an employee 
 Employee A Employee B 
Fix income 15 15 
Total bonus 40 [120]+ a 40 [120]+ b 
Effort costs 64.0 30.0 
Net income in points 
15 + (40 [120] + a) – 
64.0 






The net income of the team manager at the end of each round is calculated as follows:  
 
 Units of team output x 4 bonus points per unit  = Net income in points 
  
 Net income of the team manager 
 Team manager:  32 x 4 = 128 points 
 
 
Experimental payout and completion of the experiment 
The points that you have earned in each round will be summed up over all eight rounds of the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment, these points will determine your experimental pay-
out. 
 
Your points will be converted into to cash at a rate of 36 points = CHF 1. This amount will 
be added to your participation fee of CHF 5 and it will paid out at the end of the experiment. 
 
In the event that you have a negative amount of points at the end of the experiments, the 
points converted into cash will be deducted from your participation fee. However, a cash de-
duction in CHF will never be higher than the participation fee. 
 
As soon as you received your payout, you have successfully completed the experiment. Please 
help us to remain control over the results of this experiment by not talking to anybody about 




Table 1: Effort costs (in points) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.8 3.4 4.1 4.9 5.8 6.7 7.7 8.8 9.9 11.1 12.4 13.7
1 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.6 3.2 3.9 4.7 5.5 6.4 7.4 8.4 9.5 10.7 12.0 13.3 14.7 16.1 -
2 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.4 3.0 3.7 4.5 5.3 6.2 7.1 8.1 9.2 10.4 11.6 12.9 14.3 15.7 17.2 18.7 - -
3 2.3 2.8 3.5 4.2 5.0 5.9 6.8 7.8 8.9 10.0 11.2 12.5 13.8 15.2 16.7 18.3 19.9 21.6 - - -
4 4.0 4.8 5.6 6.5 7.5 8.6 9.7 10.9 12.1 13.4 14.8 16.3 17.8 19.4 21.1 22.8 24.6 - - - -
5 6.3 7.2 8.2 9.3 10.5 11.7 13.0 14.4 15.8 17.3 18.9 20.6 22.3 24.1 25.9 27.8 - - - - -
6 9.0 10.1 11.4 12.6 14.0 15.4 16.9 18.4 20.1 21.8 23.5 25.4 27.2 29.2 31.2 - - - - - -
7 12.3 13.6 15.0 16.4 18.0 19.6 21.3 23.0 24.8 26.7 28.6 30.6 32.7 34.9 - - - - - - -
8 16.0 17.5 19.1 20.7 22.5 24.3 26.1 28.0 30.0 32.1 34.2 36.4 38.7 - - - - - - - -
9 20.3 21.9 23.7 25.6 27.5 29.4 31.5 33.6 35.8 38.0 40.3 42.7 - - - - - - - - -
10 25.0 26.9 28.8 30.9 32.9 35.1 37.3 39.6 42.0 44.4 46.9 - - - - - - - - - -
11 30.3 32.3 34.5 36.7 38.9 41.3 43.7 46.2 48.7 51.3 - - - - - - - - - - -
12 36.0 38.3 40.6 43.0 45.4 48.0 50.6 53.2 56.0 - - - - - - - - - - - -
13 42.3 44.7 47.2 49.8 52.4 55.1 57.9 60.8 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14 49.0 51.6 54.3 57.1 59.9 62.8 65.8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
15 56.3 59.1 61.9 64.9 67.9 71.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16 64.0 67.0 70.1 73.2 76.4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
17 72.3 75.4 78.7 82.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
18 81.0 84.4 87.8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
19 90.3 93.8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
20 100.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Effort in 
Activity 1




Note: This will be administered via the computer. Participants have to answer each 
question correctly before they can continue to the next question. 
All answers will be accompanied by an explanation why the answer was right or wrong 
(to emphasize the corresponding instructions again). In case an answer was wrong, par-
ticipants will have to answer the question again. 
 
 




2. My role will remain constant throughout the experiment session.  That is, if I am a team 
manager in the first round, I will be a team manager in all subsequent rounds. Likewise, if I 




3.1 If an employee chooses a level of effort in Activity 1 of 15 and a level of effort in Activity 
2 of 5, then team output will increase by: 
a) 20 units 
b) 15 units 
c) 10 units 
d) 5 units 
 
3.2 If an employee chooses a level of effort in Activity 1 of 5 and a level of effort in Activity 2 
of 15, then team output will increase by: 
a) 20 units 
b) 15 units 
c) 10 units 
d) 5 units 
 
4.1 If an employee chooses a level of effort in Activity 1 of 15 and a level of effort in Activity 
2 of 5, then his/her effort costs are equal to: 
a) 15 points 
b) 27.8 points 
c) 71 points 
d) 100 points 
 
4.1 If an employee chooses a level of effort in Activity 1 of 5 and a level of effort in Activity 2 
of 15 then his/her effort costs are equal to: 
a) 15 points 
b) 27.8 points 
c) 71 points 
d) 100 points 
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5. If both employees choose a level of effort in Activity 1 of 10 and a level of effort in Activity 
2 of 10 and the random component equals to 5, then team output is equal to: 
a) 15 units 
b) 25 units 
c) 45 units 
d) 60 units 
 
6. If team output is equal to 30 units, then the bonus pool for the employees is equal to: 
a) 60 points 
b) 150 points 
c) 300 points 
d) 600 points 
 
7. If team output is equal to 30 units, then the bonus for the team manager is equal to: 
a) 30 points 
b) 90 points 
c) 120 points 
d) 300 points 
 
8. The team manager allocates the portion of the bonus pool, that is not allocated as team bo-




9. Employees will not only be informed about total effort of the other employee, but also 




10. The team manager will not only be informed about total effort of the two employees, but 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine experimentally how the ability of superiors to determine 
and announce the extent of discretion over bonus allocations affects team output in a setting 
where employees can become engaged in unproductive influence activities. Prior research 
demonstrates that limiting superiors’ extent of discretion can increase team output by mitigat-
ing influence activities in teams. In prior settings, the extent of discretion is determined by the 
organization while superiors are not involved in the decision. In this study, superiors determine 
the discretion extent themselves. Between subjects, I manipulate whether superiors have to an-
nounce the discretion extent to their employees or not and whether the degree of mutual moni-
toring in teams is high or low. I argue that in a setting with influence activities, a policy that 
requires superiors to announce the discretion extent in advance is important because it helps 
them to manage and control employees’ behavior more effectively. Furthermore, I suggest that 
the effect of such a policy is more pronounced when the degree of mutual monitoring in teams 
is high. This is because social influences under a high degree of mutual monitoring likely rein-
force the effect of superiors’ announcements. The study finds that a policy, which requires su-
periors to announce the discretion extent, improves the link between individual effort and re-
wards and leads to increased team output when the degree of mutual monitoring in teams is 
high. Announcement, however, does not significantly affect team output when the degree of 
mutual monitoring is low. Further analyses indicate that the usefulness of announcement de-
pends on how evident the relation between the announced discretion extent and team output is 
to superiors. This study contributes to theory and practice by showing how the efficacy of su-
perior discretion can be improved when employees can engage in unproductive activities to 
distort superiors’ personal observations and information in their favor. 
 




Organizations frequently delegate bonus decisions to their team managers. Specifically, 
superiors of a team are often granted some discretion to allocate a bonus pool among their 
subordinates according to their subjective assessments (Baiman and Rajan 1995; Murphy and 
Oyer 2003; Bailey, Hecht and Towry 2011; Kampkötter and Sliwka 2018). When objective 
performance measures are available only on an aggregate level (e.g., branch or division profits), 
discretion over bonus decisions enables superiors to use their non-verifiable observations and 
information in order to better reward individual performances and mitigate free-riding incen-
tives in teams (Fisher, Maines, Peffer and Sprinkle 2005; Van der Heijden, Potters and Sefton 
2009). Hence, by delegating bonus decisions to lower levels of management organizations rely 
on superiors of a team to allocate bonus pools in a way that elicits high performances and ulti-
mately enhances firm value. Prior research, however, has shown that superiors are often prone 
to judgmental biases that may reduce the efficacy of discretionary bonus pools in motivating 
employee effort (e.g., Prendergast and Topel 1993; Bol 2008; Bol 2011). 
Moreover, the introduction of superior discretion in organizations may give rise to un-
productive influence activities of employees. That is, discretion may induce employees to focus 
their attention on activities that are not necessarily contributing to the output of the organization 
but that are aimed to influence the bonus decision of superiors (Bol 2008; Prendergast 1999; 
Inderst, Müller and Wärneryd 2007). For example, employees may distort their efforts towards 
activities that are more visible for superiors while neglecting other, potentially more productive, 
activities (e.g., Bol 2008). Consequently, influence activities may reduce the efficacy of supe-
rior discretion due to distorted bonus allocations and because they detract employees from ex-
erting effort that is more productive. Prior analytical and experimental research therefore 
stresses that implementing limitations on the extent of superior discretion may be necessary to 
mitigate costs of influence activities in organizations (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1988; 
Milgrom and Roberts 1992 Corgnet and Rodriguez Lara 2013; Elsinger 2017). 
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Organizations may embed limitations on superiors’ discretion extent in the design of bo-
nus plans. That is, by design, bonus plans often allow discretion only over some portion of the 
bonus pool with the remainder allocated based on predefined rules (e.g., Murphy and Oyer 
2003; Bailey et al. 2011). Organizations, however, often also let their team managers implement 
and communicate important specifics of a bonus plan (e.g., Jensen, McMullen and Stark 2007). 
For example, superiors have to specify and announce relevant assessment criteria and the 
weights placed on subjective and objective performance measures in the end-of-year assess-
ments of their subordinates’ performances (e.g., Bol 2011; Moers 2005). Similarly, organiza-
tions can establish guidelines that require superiors to determine and announce to what extent 
they allocate bonus pools based on predefined rules without ex post discretion (e.g., equally 
among employees) and to what extent they retain ex post discretion over bonus allocation de-
cisions. Such a policy ensures that employees learn from the very beginning to what extent their 
end-year bonus may depend on the discretionary assessment of their superior. 
In a setting where employees can engage in influence activities, this study investigates 
whether a policy that requires superiors to specify and announce the extent of discretion over 
bonus allocations increases team output compared to when superiors do not announce the dis-
cretion extent in advance. Furthermore, the study also investigates whether the effect of supe-
riors’ announcement is more pronounced when the degree of mutual monitoring in teams is 
high rather than low (i.e., when employees can more directly monitor the workplace behavior 
and activities of their peers). From a standard economic perspective, whether superiors an-
nounce the discretion extent or not is irrelevant and should not affect team output. That is, under 
both policies, superiors can allocate bonus pools in whatever way would best induce employees 
to exert productive effort ex ante (Baiman and Rajan 1995). Furthermore, given standard eco-
nomic rationality assumptions, employees would anticipate such a bonus allocation strategy 
and choose their effort accordingly, independent of whether superiors announce the discretion 
extent or not.  
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However, I develop theory to predict that announcement increases team output by miti-
gating influence activities in teams. Announcement provides superiors with a tool to manage 
their employees’ expectations more effectively. That is, superiors can announce to limit their 
discretion by allocating some portion of the bonus pool equally among employees independent 
form their personal information and observations. This likely reduces employees’ expected re-
turns from engaging in unproductive influence activities in the first place and may encourage 
them to focus on productive effort instead. Consequently, if superiors recognize announcement 
as a tool to effectively influence employees’ expectations and behavior then they likely use it 
to motivate high effort and team output over time. Moreover, I predict that the effect of superi-
ors’ announcements is stronger when the degree of mutual monitoring in teams is high rather 
than when it is low. The reason is that under a high degree of mutual monitoring in teams the 
behavior of employees may be more strongly influenced by their expectations and observations 
of other team members’ behavior (e.g., Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly 1998, Croson 2001). Con-
sequently, if announcement induces employees to reduce their engagement in influence activi-
ties and to focus on productive effort, a high degree of mutual monitoring may additionally help 
to reinforce this effect over time. 
I test the effects of announcement via an experiment. In the experimental setting three 
employees repeatedly work together in a team to produce a joint output. Employees are re-
warded from a bonus pool that linearly increases in team output. Teams are managed by a su-
perior who has discretion to allocate the bonus pool among the employees at the end of a period. 
Before allocating the bonus pool, the superior receives a personal signal about the individual 
performances of each of the three employees. The personal performance signal, however, does 
not only reflect employees’ productive effort. Employees can also engage in influence activities 
that do not contribute to team output but that increase an employee’s performance signal as 
observed by the superior. Employees incur lower private costs for engaging in influence activ-
ities than for exerting effort. The superior thus has to take into account that placing more weight 
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on the personal performance signal in bonus allocations might not only motivate employees to 
increase their effort but also their engagement in influence activities. Superiors are compensated 
based on team output, and are thus incented to allocate bonus pools so as to elicit high levels of 
effort over all periods.  
The experiment uses a 2 x 2, between subjects, design in which teams interact over eight 
periods in total. I manipulate announcement at two levels (present vs. absent). In the announce-
ment present conditions, superiors announce at the beginning of each period the portion of the 
bonus pool that will be allocated equally among employees (i.e., without ex post discretion) 
and the portion that they allocate at discretion ex post. In the conditions without announcement, 
superiors do not announce the discretion extent to their employees. Further, I vary the degree 
of mutual monitoring in teams (low vs. high). Under a high degree of mutual monitoring em-
ployees can directly observe their peers’ level of effort and influence activities, while, under a 
low degree of mutual monitoring, just like the superior, employees cannot distinguish between 
productive effort and influence activities of their peers. 
The results of the experiment show that announcement enhances the link between indi-
vidual effort and reward. Yet, the efficacy of superiors’ announcements in promoting team out-
put depends on the degree of mutual monitoring in teams. Specifically, announcement signifi-
cantly increases team output when the degree of mutual monitoring is high. The effect of supe-
riors’ announcements, however, becomes insignificant under a low degree of mutual monitor-
ing. Additional analyses indicate that the efficacy of announcement in general crucially depends 
on the discretion extent announced by superiors. That is, in the announcement conditions, em-
ployees respond to their superiors’ announcements by increasing their effort and decreasing 
influence activities more strongly, the lower the extent of discretion announced. The results 
thus suggest that announcement becomes more effective in inducing effort and team output 
when superiors announce to limit their discretion to a high extent. Again, the relation between 
the announced discretion extent and employees’ effort is more pronounced under a high degree 
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of mutual monitoring. Moreover, because the connection between the announced discretion 
extent and team output is less evident under a low degree of mutual monitoring it likely also 
becomes more challenging for superiors to determine and announce an optimal extent of dis-
cretion. This may additionally help to explain why announcement becomes ineffective in im-
proving team output when the degree of mutual monitoring in teams decreases. 
The findings of the study have important implications for theory and practice. From a 
theoretical perspective, the study contributes to prior research testing efficacy of superior dis-
cretion under varying conditions (e.g. Arnold and Tafkov 2015; Elsinger 2017). The findings 
are in line with the results from a previous study showing that high superior discretion can be 
detrimental to team output in presence of influence activities, particularly in work environments 
with a high degree of mutual monitoring between peers (Elsinger 2017). The study contributes 
to the existing knowledge base by providing evidence that superiors recognize the importance 
of limiting their ex post discretion when they have to announce it to their subordinates. They 
can thus use announcements to better motivate productive effort in teams. 
Whereas prior studies emphasize the importance of limiting superior discretion by design 
in order to reduce the cost of influence activities (e.g., Milgrom 1988; Milgrom and Roberts 
1988; Corgnet and Rodriguez Lara 2013; Elsinger 2017) this study test the efficacy of an alter-
native policy. Specifically, the study informs organizations that the efficacy of superior discre-
tion in teamwork environments can be improved by letting superiors specify and announce the 
extent of discretion at the beginning of a year. First, such a policy enables superiors to manage 
and control employees’ expectations and behavior more effectively. And second, it helps to 
enhance the link between individual effort and reward by mitigating influence activities in 
teams. Therefore, announcement provides a simple and practical tool for organizations to im-
prove the efficiency of discretionary bonus pools. Announcement may be particularly useful, 
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when organizations lack sufficient information to optimally define the extent of superior dis-
cretion over bonus allocations or when they want to abstain from implementing general limita-
tions on the discretion extent. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting and 
presents the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 presents the 
results of the experiment. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Hypotheses 
Setting 
Prior analytical and experimental research emphasizes the benefits of using discretionary 
bonus pools in teamwork environments, where it is often difficult to measure individual perfor-
mances objectively (e.g., Baiman and Rajan 1995; Fisher et al. 2005; Maas, Van Rinsum and 
Towry 2012). The idea is that organizations commit to pay out a bonus pool, which is tied to 
objective and verifiable measures of aggregate performance. The bonus pool is then allocated 
among eligible employees at the discretion of a superior. Baiman and Rajan (1995) show ana-
lytically that discretionary bonus pool arrangements optimally enable organizations to exploit 
non-contractible sources of information without facing a commitment problem. Furthermore, 
Fisher et al. (2005) confirm these findings empirically by showing in an experiment that high 
discretion over bonus allocations increases team output in a setting where superiors have non-
verifiable information about individual performances.  
These prior findings, however, may depend on crucial assumptions. For example, prior 
research makes specific assumptions about the characteristic of the team production function 
(e.g., Fisher et al. 2005; Van der Heijden et al. 2009; Maas et al. 2012). Arnold and Tafkov 
(2015), however, show that the efficacy of superior discretion depends on the nature of a task. 
More specifically, they show that discretion may be detrimental to team output when tasks of 
employees are interdependent. Moreover, prior research assumes that superiors can observe 
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individual performances in an unbiased manner (Baiman and Rajan 1995; Rajan and Reichel-
stein 2009; Fisher et al. 2005). That is, even though superiors may not observe employees’ 
efforts perfectly, a crucial assumption is that employees cannot distort the information and ob-
servations of superiors in their favor (i.e., the superior’s personal information on average re-
flects an employee’s actual effort choice). This assumption may be too strong because it implies 
that there is no other and potentially easier way for employees to influence the superiors’ deci-
sion than exerting productive effort. However, employees need to be viewed as actively in-
volved in adopting the most effective tactics to manage the information they convey (Ferris, 
Judge, Rowland and Fitzgibbons 1990). For example, discretion may encourage employees to 
focus on activities that are more visible for superiors and not necessarily the most productive 
ones (Prendergast 1999, Bol 2011, Corgnet and Rodriguez-Lara 2013). Hence, superiors may 
get a biased impression about individual contributions and performances if some employees 
excessively focus on activities that increase their visibility. Similar as in Elsinger (2017), in this 
study I relax the assumption that superiors get unbiased information about individual perfor-
mances.  
Specifically, I explore how the ability of superiors to announce the extent of discretion 
over bonus allocations affects the output of teams in a setting, in which employees can engage 
in costly influence activities. In the basic setting, three employees repeatedly work together in 
a team that is managed by a superior. In each working period, employees choose about their 
engagement in two activities—productive effort and unproductive influence activities. By ex-
erting effort, employees contribute to team output and increase their individual performance as 
observed by the superior. Yet, employees also bear high personal costs from exerting effort, as 
effort is exhausting and time-consuming. In contrast, influence activities incur lower personal 
costs but are also less productive in the sense that they do not contribute much to team output. 
Nevertheless, they increase an employee’s performance as observed by the superior. Employees 
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engaging in influence activities thus attempt to give their superior the impression of exerting 
high effort without actually having to bear high personal costs of effort.  
Employees are compensated from a bonus pool that is formally linked to objectively 
measurable team output. Superiors are then granted discretion to allocate the bonus pool after 
team output is realized and after observing a non-verifiable signal about the individual perfor-
mance of each employee. Superiors, however, cannot distinguish between productive effort and 
mere influence attempts of their employees. Therefore, both activities increase the individual 
performance signal as observed by the superior. An important feature of the setting is that su-
periors are aware that their private information may be distorted by employees’ influence ac-
tivities. 
Due to the presence of influence activities, superiors face a trade-off when deciding about 
how strongly to incorporate their private information in bonus allocations. On the one hand, 
when superiors reduce the weight on their personal information and allocate bonus pools more 
equally among employees, this increases opportunities for employees to free-ride on the efforts 
of their peers and thereby harm team output. On the other hand, when superiors increase the 
weight on their personal information in bonus allocation decision, this may induce employees 
to focus on activities that are easy and effective in distorting the superiors’ information in their 
favor while neglecting more productive activities, which again may harm team output.  
Because superiors’ compensation is tied to team output, they have an incentive to allocate 
the bonus pool in whatever way best motivates employees to exert effort. Relying on standard 
economic rationality assumptions and given the parameters from the actual experiment, the 
setting has a unique bonus allocation strategy that maximizes team output. Optimally superiors 
allocate half of the bonus pool based on the observed performance signal while they allocate 
the remaining part of the bonus pool equally among employees (The derivation of the unique 
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Nash equilibrium is presented in the Appendix). Such an allocation strategy ensures an equilib-
rium, in which employees do not engage in influence activities while at the same time an em-
ployee’s opportunity to free-ride on their peers’ effort is reduced. 
From a standard economic perspective, employees’ provision of effort and engagement 
in influence activities should not depend on whether superiors make an announcement about 
the discretion extent or not. That is, given standard economic assumptions, employees should 
anticipate that superiors allocate the bonus pool so as to motivate high effort and to reduce 
incentives for influence activities even if superiors make no announcement. However, from a 
behavioral perspective, announcement likely matters. Superiors can mitigate incentives for in-
fluence activities more effectively by announcing to limit their discretion in the first place. That 
is, announcement likely affects the beliefs employees hold about how strongly superiors rely 
on their personal observations and information in bonus allocations. Therefore, announcement 
likely also influences employees’ choice of effort and influence activities. 
To test the effects of announcement, I manipulate in this study whether or not superiors 
announce the extent of discretion over bonus allocations at the beginning of a period. In all 
conditions, superiors determine at the beginning of a period a binding portion of the bonus pool 
between 0 and 100 percent that is in any case allocated equally among employees (i.e., without 
ex post discretion) with the remainder allocated at discretion ex post. In the conditions with 
announcement, the portions of the bonus pool allocated with and without ex post discretion are 
announced before employees choose their level of effort and influence activities. In the condi-
tions without announcement, employees are not informed about the discretionary and nondis-
cretionary portions of the bonus pool. 
Furthermore, I vary degree of mutual monitoring between peers to test the effect of an-
nouncement in two different work environments. Under a high degree of mutual monitoring 
employees are able to monitor their peers’ effort and influence activities perfectly. Under a low 
degree of mutual monitoring, employees, just like the superior, cannot distinguish their peers’ 
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influence activities from productive effort. They thus observe the same signal about their peers’ 
performances as the superior, which equals the sum of their peers’ effort and influence activi-
ties. 
Hypotheses 
The Effects of Superior’s Announcement on Team Output 
Discretion over bonus allocations allows superiors to incorporate their personal observa-
tions about individual performances in order to mitigate opportunism and free-riding in teams 
(e.g., Fisher et al. 2005, Baiman and Rajan 1995). Superior discretion therefore intends to better 
motivate individual performances and promote team output when formal information systems 
provide objective performance measures only on an aggregate level.  
Yet, when superiors have ex post discretion over bonus allocations, employees may start 
to engage in activities that are directed to influence the superior’s bonus decision but that do 
not necessarily contribute to team output (e.g., Prendergast 1999; Bol 2008). Such influence 
attempts are costly for organizations because they likely divert employees’ attention and effort 
away from more productive activities (Milgrom 1988; Prendergast 1999, Woods 2012). More-
over, influence activities distort the superiors’ information about individual contributions to 
team output, which likely also leads to more distortions in bonus allocations of superiors. In-
fluence activities of peers thereby reduce an employee’s benefit from exerting effort. Addition-
ally, due to distorted bonus allocations, influence activities may also negatively affect employ-
ees’ perceptions of distributive fairness. This is problematic because prior research demon-
strates that perceived distributive fairness is an important driver of employees’ satisfaction and 
their willingness to contribute to team output (e.g., Cohen-Carash and Spector 2001). 
In order to prevent influence activities in the first place it may thus be important to limit 
and communicate the extent of discretion over bonus allocations at the beginning of a year 
(Elsinger 2017). Specifically, when delegating bonus allocation decisions to superiors, organi-
zations can establish guidelines that require superiors to specify and announce the discretion 
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extent in advance.24 Compared to a setting where superiors do not announce the discretion ex-
tent, employees under announcement learn at the beginning of a year to what extent superiors 
retain ex post discretion over bonus allocations and to what extent they limit their discretion by 
allocating bonus pools based on aggregate team performance (e.g., equally among employees). 
Announcements of superiors can have a strong impact on employees’ decisions and be-
havior as prior experimental research on leadership demonstrates (e.g. Gürerk, Irlendbusch and 
Rockenbach 2009). For example, announcements of superiors about the use of incentives (re-
ward or punishment) shape the team’s culture and affect individual contributions to team output 
(Gürerk et al. 2009). Or announcements of superiors about suggested contributions are closely 
followed by subordinates (Houser, Levy, Padgitt, Peart and Xiao 2007). Announcements thus 
support superiors in inducing desired behaviors (e.g., Gürerk et al. 2009). Consequently, when 
superiors announce the discretion extent to their employees they likely take into account how 
employees respond to the announcement. Superiors can use announcements as a tool to control 
and manage employees’ expectations and workplace behavior more effectively. Specifically, 
superiors can announce to limit their ex post discretion in order to mitigate employees’ incen-
tives to engage influence activities and to induce them to focus on more productive effort from 
the very beginning. Announcement therefore likely helps to promote team output by alleviating 
employees’ expected returns from engaging in unproductive influence activities in the first 
place. 
Moreover, when superiors limit their ex post discretion under announcement they commit 
themselves to allocate smaller portions of the bonus pool based on their personal observations 
and information. Superiors that do not announce to limit their discretion in advance could still 
                                                 
24 Announcing the discretion extent is similar to settings in which superiors have to specify and announce their 
employees in advance the weights placed on subjective and objective measures in performance assessments as, 
for example, described in Moers 2005. That is, by placing more weight on objective performance measures supe-
riors limit the impact of their subjective (discretionary) assessments on bonus allocations. 
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mimic such a bonus allocation strategy ex post by reducing the weight on their personal infor-
mation when allocating bonus pools. However, they likely fail to do so. Prior research demon-
strates that individuals often unconsciously overweigh personal information in their decisions. 
For example, individuals tend to overweigh redundant information when making decisions 
(e.g., Joe 2003), and they tend to rely on information even if aware that the information may be 
distorted or irrelevant (e.g., Chinander and Schweitzer 2003). Announcement may therefore 
prevent superiors from relying too strongly on their personal observations once they have to 
allocate the bonus pool at the end of a year. As a result, announcement ultimately reduces re-
turns on influence activities which leads to fewer influence activities and, consequently, also to 
less distortions in bonus allocations of superiors. These arguments lead to my first hypothesis: 
H1: Team output is higher when superiors announce the discretion extent to their subordinates 
than when the discretion extent is not announced. 
 
Announcement and the Degree of Mutual Monitoring between Peers 
Next, I argue that a high degree of mutual of mutual monitoring amplifies the effect of 
announcement. The degree of mutual monitoring in teams refers to the ability of employees to 
observe their peers’ activities and workplace behavior (e.g., Towry 2003; Hannan, Towry and 
Zhang 2013). That is, a high degree of mutual monitoring enables employees to draw clearer 
inferences about their peers’ effort as well as their engagement in influence activities. A high 
degree of mutual monitoring thus increases the salience of peers’ behavior in the work place 
and facilitates comparison among employees (Hannan et al. 2013). 
I therefore expect that employees’ response to superiors’ announcements of the discretion 
extent may be more pronounced when the degree of mutual monitoring in teams increases. The 
reason is that superiors’ announcements under a high degree of mutual monitoring may not only 
affect employees’ behavior through altering their expectations of how strongly superiors will 
rely on their personal information in bonus allocations but, additionally, through increased so-
cial influences. Prior research shows that the behavior of the members of a team is influenced 
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by both expectations and observations of others’ behavior (Kerr, Park, Ouwerkerk, Parks, Gal-
lucci and van Lange 2009; Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly 1998), and more so, the better individ-
uals can monitor the behavior of each other (e.g., Schroeder, Jensen, Reed, Sullivan and Schwab 
1982; Croson 2001; Carpenter 2004). Such social influences occur because of team members’ 
preferences to conform to the behavior of those around them (e.g., Carpenter 2004; Tayler and 
Bloomfield 2011; Aronson, Wilson and Akert 2008; Cardinaels and Yin 2015) or because they 
reciprocate cooperative and uncooperative actions of their peers (e.g., Fehr and Falk 2002; 
Bradsley and Sausgruber 2005; Croson 2007). The effect of announcement may thus be rein-
forced under a high degree of mutual monitoring when employees expect a certain behavior to 
be more prevalent given the superior’s announcement (e.g., Cardinaels and Yin 2015; Sliwka 
2007) or when employees’ observations of their peers’ behavior lead them to react and behave 
more similarly over time. 
Specifically, when superiors announce to limit their ex post discretion over bonus alloca-
tions, employees may not only expect influence activities to be less effective in influencing 
bonus allocation decisions of superiors but, additionally, employees may also expect such ac-
tivities to be less prevalent. Consequently, the announcement of the discretion extent may re-
duce the attractiveness of influence activities even more under high degrees of mutual monitor-
ing when employees are also concerned to conform to the behavior of their peers. This, in turn, 
may induce employees to focus on productive effort and may help to reinforce higher contribu-
tions to team output over time. This prediction is formally stated as H2. 
H2: The effect of the superiors’ announcements on team output is more pronounced when the 




This experiment uses a 2 x 2 between-subjects design in which two factors are varied. 
The first factor is whether superiors announce the discretion extent at the beginning of a period 
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or whether no such announcement is made (announcement present vs. announcement absent). 
Second, the degree of mutual monitoring is varied at two levels. Employees under a low de-
gree of mutual monitoring do not monitor effort and influence activities of their coworkers 
directly. Employees under a high degree of mutual monitoring directly observe their peer’s 
effort and engagement in influence activities at the end of each period. 
Task Overview and Experimental Design 
Three employees (Employee A, Employee B and Employee C) and a superior (Team 
Manager) repeatedly interact in a team. In each period, the employees’ task is it to choose their 
level of effort and influence activities. At the beginning of each period, the three employees 
choose their levels by assigning a number between 0 and 20 to each of the two activities under 
the restriction that the sum of effort and influence activities does not exceed 20 in total.25 The 
output of the team is the summation of each of the three employee’s effort level: 
Team Output = Σi Efforti       (1) 
where i ∈ {A, B, C} 
Employees incur private costs for both—effort and influence activities. The private costs 
are increasing in the level of engagement. Yet, an employee’s private cost of effort is higher 
compared to the private cost of influence activities. Specifically, an employee’s private cost 
function is given as follows: 
Private Costi = 0.25 × (Efforti + 0.5 × Influence Activitiesi)
2  (2) 
where i ∈ {A, B, C} 
The private cost function is common knowledge to all—employees and superiors. Em-
ployees are compensated from a bonus pool that is linked to aggregate team output. For each 
unit of team output the bonus pool for the three employees increases by 10 points: 
Bonus Pool = 10 × Team Output      (3) 
                                                 
25 As the superior’s private signal equals the sum of an employee’s effort and influence activities, this restriction 
is to ensure that the performance signal cannot be larger than 20. A performance signal larger than 20 would di-
rectly reveal to superiors that the employee engaged in influence activities. 
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In each period, the points from the bonus pool are completely allocated between the three 
employees. At the beginning of each period, superiors define a portion between 0 and 100 per-
cent of the bonus pool (in increments of 10 percentage points) that it is in any case allocated 
equally among employees (nondiscretionary portion of the bonus pool). At the end of each 
period, the bonus pools is therefore allocated in two steps. First, the nondiscretionary portion is 
deducted from the total bonus pool and each of the three employees receives one third of the 
nondiscretionary portion of the bonus pool (nondiscretionary bonus). Second, the remaining 
portion of the bonus pool is allocated at superiors’ discretion ex post (discretionary bonus). An 
employee’s bonus is thus computed as follows: 
Employee’s Bonus = Nondiscretionary Bonus + Discretionary bonus (4) 
To isolate the effect of announcement I decided to keep the bonus allocation procedure 
constant across all conditions. That is, superiors in all conditions define the discretion extent at 
the beginning of each period in order to avoid potential framing or demand effects that may 
drive differences between conditions. However, while in the announcement conditions superi-
ors announce the discretionary and nondiscretionary portion of the bonus pool at the beginning 
of each period, in the conditions without announcement employees never learn the portion of 
the bonus pool allocated at discretion and the portion allocated without ex post discretion. This 
design choice also allows me to draw conclusions about the superiors’ motivation to limit the 
discretion extent. While under both conditions—with and without announcements—superiors 
may limit the discretion extent due to their allocation preferences, systematic differences in the 
discretion extent between the conditions are likely driven by strategic considerations of superi-
ors regarding the impact on employees’ behavior. 
Before allocating the bonus pool, superiors observe a performance signal of each em-
ployee’s contribution to the aggregate team output. The performance signal is the summation 
of an employee’s level of effort and influence activities. Therefore, superiors cannot distinguish 
between effort and influence activities. Furthermore, influence activities are unproductive from 
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the organization’s perspective as they only affect the superior’s performance signal but do not 
contribute to team output. 
Earnings 
In each period, employees receive a fixed salary of 40 points in addition to their bonus. 
To determine the employees’ final earnings in a period, the private costs resulting from effort 
and influence activities (as defined in Equation (2)) are deducted from the employee’s bonus 
and fixed salary. In summary, an employee’s earnings for the period are computed as follows: 
Employee Earnings = 40 + Employee’s Bonus – Private Costs  (5) 
Each period superiors receive a bonus that increases in team output. For each unit team 
output produced, superiors receive a bonus of 4 points. Superiors do not receive a fixed salary 
and they do not bear any private costs. Their earnings for the period are thus computed as fol-
lows: 
Superior Earnings = 4 × Team Output      (6) 
Participants’ earnings in a period were summed up over all eight periods and converted 
to cash at a rate of CHF 1 per 34 points. Additionally, each participant was paid out a show-up 
fee of CHF 5. On average, participants earned CHF 26 from the experiment. 
Participants and Procedures 
A total of 128 undergraduate students from a public European university participated in 
the experiment. Participants were randomly allocated among the four experimental conditions. 
Each participant was assigned to a four-person team and his/her role (Employee A, Employee 
B, Employee C or Team Manager) at the beginning of the experiment.  
The number of participants in each condition is included in Figure 1. Each student partic-
ipated in only one session. The mean age of the participants is 23.7 years and 46.9 percent of 
participants are female. 
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Figure 1: Experimental Design and Number of Participants 
 Low Degree of Mu-
tual Monitoring 
High Degree of Mu-
tual Monitoring Total 
Announcement 
Present 
N = 32 (8) N = 32 (8) N = 64 (16) 
Announcement 
Absent 
N = 32 (8) N = 32 (8) N = 64 (16) 
Total N = 64 (16) N = 64 (16) N = 128 (32) 
Note: N = number of participants (number of teams). 
 
At the start of each session, participants were provided with written instructions and were 
informed of their randomly assigned role of an employee or superior (team manager). Instruc-
tions were read aloud by the experimenter. After the instructions, participants stood up behind 
their cubicles and introduced themselves to the members of their team by telling their name, 
age, and hobby. Participants revealed their identities in order to reduce the social distance and 
to ensure that the members of a team have some minimal social familiarity with each other 
(Gächter and Fehr 1999) which is common in experiments involving mutual monitoring (e.g., 
Towry 2003; Brüggen and Moers 2007; Maas and van Rinsum 2013). 
After the round of introductions, all participants were required to complete a pre-experi-
ment quiz to ensure that they understand the experiment. After all the participants had answered 
all questions of the quiz correctly, the eight periods of the experiment started. Participants inter-
acted through a computer network and could not communicate with each other. The experiment 
was programmed with z-tree experimental economics software (Fischbacher 2007).  
At the beginning of each period, in all conditions, superiors first determined a portion of 
the bonus pool between 0 and 100 percent in increments of 10 percentage points that was in 
any case allocated as team bonus equally among employees after team output had been realized 
(nondiscretionary portion of the bonus pool). The remainder of the bonus pool superiors allo-
cated at their discretion at the end of a period (discretionary portion). In the announcement 
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conditions, the nondiscretionary and discretionary portion of the bonus pool were announced 
before employees chose about their level of effort. Subsequent to the determination of the non-
discretionary and discretionary portion of the bonus pool, employees chose their level of effort 
and influence activities. They could enter any combination of effort and influence activities on 
the interval between [0, 1,…, 20] that did not exceed 20 in sum. Once employees entered a level 
of effort and influence activities, the program calculated and displayed the private costs such a 
combination would incur (as defined in Equation (2)).26 Employees could then adjust their lev-
els of effort and influence activities as often as they wished. After each of the three employees 
confirmed his/her entry, the computer calculated team output by summing up the three employ-
ees’ productive effort. Next, superiors received the signal about each of the three employees’ 
individual performance (i.e. the sum of effort and influence activities). At the same time, em-
ployees received either the same signal as the superior about their peers’ performances (low 
degree of mutual monitoring) or they were informed about each of their peers’ effort and influ-
ence activities separately (high degree of mutual monitoring). On the same screen, which 
showed the private performance signal, superiors in all conditions were also informed about 
team output, the size of the total bonus pool and the size of the discretionary part of the bonus 
pool (i.e., the portion not allocated equally among employees). Superiors then had to determine 
individual bonuses by assigning points from the discretionary bonus pool to the three employ-
ees. Superiors were free in allocating bonuses as long as all points from the discretionary bonus 
pool were distributed and as long as each employee’s share in the discretionary bonus pool was 
larger or equal to zero. The remaining points from the nondiscretionary portion of the bonus 
pool were then allocated equally between the three employees. At the end of each period em-
ployees and superiors were displayed their period earnings as defined in Equation (5) and Equa-
tion (6). Then the next period started.  
                                                 
26 In addition, all participants (employees and superiors) had a printed table available during the entire experi-
ment, which showed the private costs for any possible combination of effort and influence activities. 
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At the conclusion of the eight periods, participants completed a post-experiment ques-
tionnaire. They received their cash payments and were dismissed. Experimental sessions lasted 
approximately 80 minutes.  
4 Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The primary dependent variable, used to test H1 and H2, is TEAM OUTPUT. TEAM 
OUTPUT is computed as the sum of the three employees’ effort in a period. Table 1 reports 
descriptive statistics for the primary dependent variables. As reported in Table 1 and graphed 
in Figure 2, under a high degree of mutual monitoring, TEAM OUTPUT increases from 24.13 
in absence of announcement to 34.80 when announcement is present. In contrast, under a low 
degree of mutual monitoring TEAM OUTPUT slightly decreases from 29.28 in absence of an-
nouncement to 27.09 when announcement is present. This finding represents first evidence for 
H2, which predicts that the effect of superiors’ announcement on team output is more pro-
nounced when degree of mutual monitoring is high than when it is low. However, directionally 
inconsistent with H1, team output does not increase but slightly decreases when announcement 
is present under a low degree of mutual monitoring. 
Further, I also calculate TEAM INFLUENCE as the sum of the three employees’ influ-
ence activities in a period. As reported in Table 1 and graphed in Figure 3, under a high degree 
of mutual monitoring, TEAM INFLUENCE considerably decreases from 19.72 without an-
nouncement to 13.91 when announcement present. Under a low degree of mutual monitoring 
TEAM INFLUENCE only slightly decreases from 21.02 without announcement to 19.72 in the 
condition with announcement. The data thus provide evidence that superiors’ announcement of 
the discretion extent helps to mitigate influence activities in teams, which likely also drives the 
observed results on team output. However, again, the efficacy of announcement in mitigating 
influence activities seems to depend on the degree of mutual monitoring in teams. 
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Table 1: Mean, Standard Deviation (Number of Observations) for Key Measures  
and Number of Observations by Treatment 
 
Low Degree of Mutual Monitor-
ing 











TEAM OUTPUT 29.2813 27.0938 24.1250 34.7969 
 12.9168 11.8532 10.8255 17.5944 
 (64) (64) (64) (64) 
TEAM INFLUENCE 21.0156 19.7188 24.7500 13.9063 
 13.1601 10.9658 11.6114 14.3833 
 (64) (64) (64) (64) 
DISCRETION EXTENT 55.6250a 35.6250 65.3125a 28.9062 
 30.9570 27.6529 28.3945 28.1784 
 (64) (64) (64) (64) 
RETURN ON EFFORT 3.4114 4.6273 2.8447 6.7215 
 5.0604 1.8208 2.4453 4.6372 
 (24) (24) (24) (24) 
 
Note: Every cell displays the mean, standard deviation and (number of observations) for the corresponding meas-
ure.  
TEAM OUTPUT corresponds to the sum of the three employees’ effort in a period. 
TEAM INFLUENCE corresponds to the sum of the three employees’ influence activities in a period. 
DISCRETION EXTENT corresponds to the portion of the bonus pool that is allocated at ex post discretion in a 
period as defined by the team manager at the beginning of a period. 
RETURN ON EFFORT corresponds to the estimated increase of an employee’s total bonus for an increase in 
effort by one unit (estimated for each employee individually over all eight periods).  
a In the conditions without announcement, the discretion extent is not announced and employees never learn 











Figure 3: Effects of Announcement on TEAM INFLUENCE under a Low and High Degree 




Table 1 also reports, for each condition, the average extent of ex post discretion as deter-
mined by the team managers in the beginning of a period (DISCRETION EXTENT). The dis-
cretion extent ranges between 0 and 100 percent (in increments of 10 percentage points) 
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among employees (without ex post discretion) and 100 percent means that team managers retain 
discretion to allocate the entire bonus pool ex post. As reported, team managers determine on 
average considerably lower discretion extents and, hence, give up more discretion when the 
discretion extent is announced (high degree of mutual monitoring: 28.91; low degree of mutual 
monitoring: 35.63) as compared to when the discretion extent is not announced (high degree of 
mutual monitoring: 65.63; low degree of mutual monitoring: 55.25). The difference in the av-
erage discretion extent between the conditions with and without announcement is significant 
(32.27 vs. 60.47, t = 7.777, p < 0.001, two-tailed). This result supports the notion that, in the 
announcement conditions, superiors recognize and use announcements as a tool to influence 
employees’ behavior. That is, under announcement, superiors likely limit their discretion to a 
higher extent in order to reduce employees’ expected benefits from engaging in influence ac-
tivities in the first place. 
Finally, Table 1 also reports employees’ average returns on effort for each condition (RE-
TURN ON EFFORT). It is measured at the employee level, by regressing, for each employee 
separately, the total bonus (that is paid out to the employee at the end of a period) on the em-
ployee’s level of effort in a given period. The estimated coefficient of effort thus reflects the 
average increase of an employee’s total bonus for an increase in effort by one unit. For a one 
unit increase in effort the bonus pool for the entire team increases by 10 points. Employees in 
the announcement conditions can on average capture higher shares from their contribution to 
the bonus pool. That is, under a low degree of mutual monitoring, RETURN ON EFFORT 
increases from 3.41 points without announcement to 4.63 points when announcement is present. 
Under a high degree of mutual monitoring, RETURN ON EFFORT increases even more from 
2.84 points in absence of announcement to 6.72 points when announcement is present. The data 





Hypothesis 1 predicts that team output increases when superiors announce the discretion 
extent. Moreover, hypothesis 2 predicts that the positive effect of announcement is more pro-
nounced when the degree of mutual monitoring is high than when it is low. To test the two 
hypotheses I use OLS regressions with TEAM OUTPUT as dependent variable. As independent 
variables, I use a dummy variable equal to 1 when announcement is present (Announcement), 
a dummy variable equal to 1 when the degree of mutual monitoring in teams is high (High 
Degree of Mutual Monitoring) and the interaction of the two variables. The model also includes 
period fixed effects. To control for multiple observations per team, I use standard errors clus-
tered at the team level. In order to find support for H1 and H2, the coefficient of Announcement 
and the coefficient of the interaction term should be both significantly positive.  
Results of the regression reported in Table 2 reveal a negative but insignificant coefficient 
of Announcement (β = -2.19, p = 0.673, two-tailed)27 indicating that team output does not differ 
between the conditions with and without announcement when the degree of mutual monitoring 
in teams is low. However, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant (β = 
12.86, p = 0.054, one-tailed) as predicted in H2. Furthermore, under a high degree of mutual 
monitoring, the effect of announcement becomes positive and significant (-2.19 + 12.86 = 
10.67, F = 3.19, p = 0.084, two-tailed). Together, these results thus support the prediction that 
the effect of announcement is more pronounced under a high degree of mutual monitoring. 
Under a low degree of mutual monitoring, however, announcement does not significantly affect 
team output. Hypothesis 1, therefore, is not supported by the results. 
 
  
                                                 
27 Even though I make a directional prediction about the effect of announcement under a low degree of mutual 
monitoring, I report p-values from a two-tailed test, as the coefficient is directionally inconsistent with the pre-
diction. 
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Constant  28.895 
 (0.000)*** 
  












Period fixed effects Included 
R2 0.0862 
N 256 
Note: N indicates the number of observations. The regressions use standard errors 
clustered at the team level to control for multiple observations within teams. The mod-
els also include period fixed effects (not reported). P-values are one-tailed for direc-
tional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
TEAM OUTPUTt is equal the sum of the three employees’ effort in period t.  
Announcement is a dummy variable equal to 1 when superiors announce the discre-
tion extent at the beginning of a period and zero otherwise. 
High Degree of Mutual Monitoring is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the degree of 
mutual monitoring between peers is high and equal to 0 otherwise. 
a Even though a directional prediction is made for Announcement, the reported p-
value for the coefficient of Announcement is two-tailed, since the coefficient is direc-
tionally inconsistent with the prediction. 
 
Supplemental Analyses 
Effects of Superiors’ Announcement on the Level of Influence Activities in Teams 
In the theory development, I argue that announcement likely reduces employees’ ex-
pected returns from engaging in influence activities, which leads to lower levels of influence 
activities in teams and, in turn, helps to improve team output. To test how announcement affects 
the level of influence activities in teams I conduct the same OLS regression that I use to test H1 
and H2 but with TEAM INFLUENCE as dependent variable. The results reported in Table 3 
reveal that the coefficient of Announcement is negative but insignificant (β = -1.30, p = 0.391, 
130 
one-tailed). Hence, under a low degree of mutual monitoring, the level of influence activities 
in teams does not significantly differ across conditions with and without announcement. How-
ever, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant (β = -9.55, p = 0.079, 
one-tailed). In fact, under a high degree of mutual monitoring, announcement significantly re-
duces the level of influence activities in teams (-1.30 - 9.55 = -10.85, F = 5.26, p = 0.029, two-
tailed). These results provide evidence that announcement is more effective in mitigating influ-
ence activities when the degree of mutual monitoring in teams is high.  
 
Table 3: Effects of Announcement and the Degree of Mutual Monitoring on the Level of 




Constant  20.980 
 (0.000)*** 
  
Announcement  -1.297 
(0.391) 
  








Period fixed effects Included 
R2 0.1003 
N 256 
Note: N indicates the number of observations. The regressions use standard errors 
clustered at the team level to control for multiple observations within teams. The mod-
els also include period fixed effects (not reported). P-values are one-tailed for direc-
tional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
TEAM INFLUENCEt is equal the sum of the three employees’ level of influence ac-
tivities in period t.  
Announcement is a dummy variable equal to 1 when superiors announce the discre-
tion extent at the beginning of a period and zero otherwise. 
High Degree of Mutual Monitoring is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the degree of 
mutual monitoring between peers is high and equal to 0 otherwise. 
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Employees’ Response to the Announced Discretion Extent  
In the theory section, I argue that superiors can use announcements to influence and con-
trol employees’ behavior more effectively. Hence, in the following, I investigate in more details 
how employees in the announcement conditions react to different extents of discretion an-
nounced by their team managers.  
To do so, I ran two separate regressions including observations from the announcement 
conditions only. First, I regress employees’ effort in a period (EFFORTt) on the discretion ex-
tent announced by the superior (Announced Discretion Extent), a dummy variable indicating 
whether the degree of mutual monitoring is high (High Degree of Mutual Monitoring) and the 
interaction between the two variables. Second, I run the same regression with employees’ level 
of influence activities as dependent variable (INFLUENCE ACTIVITYt). The two models in-
clude period fixed-effects.  
As reported in the first column of Table 4, the coefficient of the announced discretion 
extent is negative and significant (β = -0.06, p = 0.037, two-tailed), indicating that employees’ 
effort is lower when team managers announce to retain high discretion over bonus allocation 
decisions. Furthermore, results indicate that the effect of the announced discretion extent is 
more pronounced when the degree of mutual monitoring increases because the interaction term 
is significantly negative (β = -0.06, p = 0.100, two-tailed). Reversed effects of the announced 
discretion extent are observed when running the same regression with employees’ influence 
activities as dependent variable. Table 4 (column 2) reports a significantly positive effect of the 
Announced Discretion Extent on the level of influence activities (β = 0.06, p = 0.001, two-
tailed). Furthermore, the positive and significant interaction term (β = 0.08, p = 0.010, two-
tailed) indicates that this effect is again more pronounced when the degree of mutual monitoring 
in teams is high. Overall, these results provide evidence that superiors can use announcements 
to influence employees’ behavior and even more so under a high degree of mutual monitoring.  
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Table 4: Effects of the Announced Discretion Extent on Employee’s Level of Effort and In-







Constant  11.932 3.790 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
   
Announced Discretion Extent -0.059 0.064 
(0.037)** (0.001)*** 
   
High Degree of Mutual Monitoring 4.006 -3.663 
(0.143) (0.010)*** 
   
Announced Discretion Extent 
* High Degree of Mutual Monitoring 
-0.063 0.075 
(0.100)* (0.010)*** 
   
Period fixed effects Included Included 
R2 0.2148 0.3103 
N 384 384 
Note: N indicates the number of observations. The regressions include observations from the announce-
ment conditions only. The regressions use standard errors clustered at the team level to control for multi-
ple observations within teams and subjects. The models also include period fixed effects (not reported). 
All p-values are two-tailed.  
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
EFFORTt corresponds to an employee’s effort in period t.  
INFLUENCE ACTIVITYt corresponds to an employee’s level of influence activities in period t. 
Announced Discretion Extent is a variable reflecting the discretion extent announced by superiors and 
ranges between 0 (no ex post discretion) and 100 percent (full ex post discretion). 
High Degree of Mutual Monitoring is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the degree of mutual monitoring 
between peers is high and equal to 0 otherwise. 
 
Moreover, in a setting with influence activities, discretion over bonus allocation seems to 
be even less efficient than standard economic theory predicts. That is, the results ultimately 
suggest that superiors are most successful in inducing high effort (and team output) by com-
pletely giving up their discretion over bonus allocations. The problem is that the announcement 
of retaining high discretion encourages employees to increase their engagement in influence 
activities, which ultimately likely leads to more distorted bonus allocations. This, in turn, may 
negatively affect employees’ perceptions of distributive fairness and additionally demotivate 
them to contribute to team output. To measure perceptions of distributive fairness, participants 
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in the role of an employee were asked in the post-experiment questionnaire to indicate how fair 
the superior’s allocation of the bonus pool was on a 7-point Likert-scale from 1 (very unfair) to 
7 (very fair). Results (untabulated) from an ordered probit regression, in which I regress per-
ceptions of distributive fairness on the mean discretion extent announced by the team manager 
(over all eight periods), reveal that in the announcement conditions perceptions of distributive 
fairness decrease in the mean discretion extent (β = -0.03, p = 0.034, two-tailed). This finding 
thus suggests that—in a setting with influence activities—employees perceive bonus alloca-
tions as fairer when superiors on average announce to retain low discretion and, ultimately, 
allocate larger portions of the bonus pool equally among employees. 
Superiors’ Ability to Use Announcements 
Results from the previous section suggest that superiors that announce to limit their dis-
cretion to a high extent are more successful in inducing employees to exert effort. It is therefore 
crucial that superiors in the announcement conditions quickly learn how employees respond to 
the announced discretion extent. However, since the link between effort and the announced 
discretion extent is weaker when the degree of mutual monitoring in teams is low, it may also 
become more challenging for superiors to quickly learn and use announcements so as to opti-
mally motivate individual effort. In fact, when calculating the correlation between the an-
nounced discretion extent and team output for each team in the announcement conditions sep-
arately, the correlation coefficient is significantly negative (at the 5% significance level) in five 
out of eight teams under a high degree of mutual monitoring and in two out of eight teams only 
under a low degree of mutual monitoring. This indicates that superiors may have more difficul-
ties to recognize the relation between the announced discretion extent and team output when 
the degree of mutual monitoring in teams is low, which may also help to explain why in such 
an environment, team output may not increase when announcement is present.  
To gain insights into whether superiors are better able to use announcements when the 
correlation between the announced discretion extent and team output is more evident, I re-run 
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the OLS regression used to test H1 and H2 excluding observations from the announcement 
conditions, in which the correlation is insignificant. Results (untabulated) reveal that the effect 
of Announcement on team output is now positive although still not significant at conventional 
levels (β = 6.84, p = 0.123, one-tailed). The coefficient of the interaction between Announce-
ment and a High Degree of Mutual Monitoring is still significantly positive (β = 13.41, p = 
0.041, one-tailed). Overall, these findings provide some evidence that announcement becomes 
more effective in promoting team output when superiors are better able to recognize the relation 
between the announced discretion extent and team output. 
Superiors’ Incorporation of Personal Information in Bonus Allocation Decisions 
In the theory development, I argue that the announcement of the discretion extent likely 
prevents superiors from relying too strongly on their personal information in bonus allocations. 
Under announcement, superiors announce their subordinates a portion of the bonus pool that is 
in any case allocated equally among employees (i.e., without ex post discretion), while the re-
mainder is allocated at discretion. Superiors in the announcement conditions on average an-
nounce to allocate 67.73% of the bonus pool without ex post discretion and to retain discretion 
over 32.27% of the bonus pool. In the conditions without announcement superiors allocate on 
average substantially larger portions of the bonus pool at their discretion (60.47%). However, 
even though superiors retain higher discretion over bonus allocation when announcement is 
absent, they could ex post still place a low weight on their personal information and allocate 
large portions of the bonus pool equally among employees. 
Hence, to test whether announcement in fact reduces the impact of superiors’ personal 
information on bonus allocations, I run a regression with an employee’s total bonus share in a 
given period (Total Bonus Share)28 as dependent variable. The independent variables are an 
                                                 
28 Total Bonus Share equals an employee’s total bonus (sum of discretionary and nondiscretionary bonus) in a 
period divided by the overall bonus pool in a period. 
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employee’s relative performance signal in a period (Relative Performance Signal)29, a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if announcement is present (and zero otherwise) and the interaction between 
the two variables. A significantly negative interaction term would indicate that bonus alloca-
tions in the announcement conditions are less affected by the personal information of superiors. 
 






Constant  0.1074 
 (0.185) 
  











Period Fixed Effects Included 
R2 0.1841 
N 765a 
Note: N indicates the number of observations. The regressions use standard errors 
clustered at the team level to control for multiple observations within groups. The 
model also includes period fixed effects (not reported). All p-values are two-tailed. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
Total Bonus Share equals an employee’s total bonus divided by the period’s total 
bonus pool. 
Announcement is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the extent of discretion is an-
nounced and equal to 0 when the extent of discretion is not announced. 
Relative Performance Signal equals an employee’s performance signal divided by 
the sum of the three employees’ performance signal in a period. 
a Overall there are 768 employee observations (32 teams, 3 employees per team, 8 
periods). Three employee observations (same team and period) are excluded from 
the analysis because team output and, hence, the bonus pool was equal to zero. 
  
                                                 
29 Relative Performance Signal equals the ratio between an employee’s individual performance signal and the 
sum of all three employees’ performance signals in a period. 
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As reported in Table 5, the coefficient of the Relative Performance Signal is positive and 
highly significant (β = 0.68, p = 0.008, two-tailed), indicating that in the conditions without 
announcement superiors strongly rely on the signal about employees’ performances when allo-
cating the bonus pool. Furthermore, the positive and significant coefficient of Announcement 
(β = 0.16, p = 0.064, two-tailed) reflects that under announcement larger portions of the bonus 
pool are allocated equally among employees (i.e., without ex post discretion). Finally, the in-
teraction term is significantly negative (β = -0.47, p = 0.064, two-tailed). This implies that the 
link between the relative performance signal and an employee’s bonus share is weaker when 
announcement is present, which is consistent with the notion that announcement prevents su-
periors from relying too strongly on their personal information in bonus allocations. 
These results suggest that when superiors are required to announce the discretion extent 
to their subordinates, superiors not only use announcements to directly influence the behavior 
of their subordinates but, in addition, influence activities also become less effective in distorting 
bonus allocation decisions of superiors as superiors incorporate their personal information to a 
lower degree. Consequently, announcement ultimately decreases employees’ potential benefits 
from engaging in unproductive influence activities. 
Informativeness of Superiors’ Personal Information and Employees’ Returns on Effort 
The analyses in the prior section show that superiors in the announcement conditions less 
strongly rely on their personal information in bonus allocations, which leads employees to re-
duce their engagement in influence activities. This, in turn, likely also increases the informa-
tiveness of superiors’ personal information about individual performances and enables them to 
reward employees more accurately for increases in their effort. In the following I thus analyze 
in more details, how announcement affects the informativeness of the performance signal and 
the superior’s ability to reward effort. 
First, to measure how informative the superior’s performance signal is about individual 
effort, I calculate the correlation between an employee’s relative performance signal and an 
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employee’s relative effort for the conditions with and without announcement separately.30 The 
more accurately the relative performance signal reflects employees’ relative effort—and 
thereby their contribution to team output—the more positively the correlation between the two 
variables should be. The correlation between the relative performance signal and relative effort 
is equal to 0.17 (p = 0.001, two-tailed) when announcement is absent and equal to 0.44 (p < 
0.001, two-tailed) when announcement is present. Hence, the correlation between the relative 
performance signal and relative effort is higher when announcement is present and this differ-
ence is significant (z = 4.181, p < 0.001, two-tailed). This indicates that the performance signal 
becomes more informative about individual effort and relative contributions to team output in 
the announcement conditions. 
Second, I investigate in more details whether the enhanced informativeness of the perfor-
mance signal also increases superiors’ ability to reward individual effort. To do so, I estimate 
for each employee individually the relation between individual effort and the total bonus that is 
paid out to the employee at the end of a period (RETURN ON EFFORT). Employees’ average 
return on effort is higher in both announcement conditions than in the conditions without an-
nouncement (as reported in Table 1). For a one unit increase in effort the total bonus pool for 
the entire team increases by 10 points. While, without announcement employees on average 
only get 3.13 points from increasing their effort by one unit, with announcement employees get 
on average 5.67 points. This difference in the returns on effort between the conditions with and 
without announcement is significant (t = 3.287, p = 0.001, two-tailed), indicating that under 
announcement superiors are better able to use their information to reward individual effort. 
5 Conclusion 
Prior research emphasizes the importance of implementing limitations on superiors’ dis-
cretion extent in order to mitigate the cost of influence activities in organizations (e.g., Milgrom 
                                                 
30 Relative effort equals the ratio between an employee’s individual effort and the sum of all three employees’ 
effort in a period. 
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and Roberts 1988; Elsinger 2017). This study contributes to prior literature by testing the effi-
cacy of letting superiors announce the discretion extent and by examining their ability to use 
announcements as a tool to promote high team output over time. 
The effects of superiors’ announcements are tested in an experimental setting. In the set-
ting, three employees work together in a team to produce a joint output. Employees are com-
pensated by the means of a bonus pool that is formally linked to team output. The team is 
managed by a superior that has some discretion to allocate the bonus pool among the three 
employees. Before allocating the bonus pool, the superior receives a personal signal about the 
individual performances of each of the three employees. The personal performance signal, how-
ever, does not only reflect employees’ productive effort. Employees can also engage in unpro-
ductive influence activities to increase their performance signal as observed by the superior. 
Employees incur lower private costs for engaging in influence activities than for exerting effort. 
The superior thus has to take into account that placing more weight on the personal performance 
signal in bonus allocations might not only motivate employees to increase their effort but also 
to increase their engagement in influence activities. 
Using a between-subjects experimental design I manipulate whether superiors announce 
the extent of discretion to their subordinates at the beginning of each period or not. Furthermore, 
I test the effects of announcement in two different work environments by varying the degree of 
mutual monitoring in teams at two levels. Under a high degree of mutual monitoring, employees 
can directly observe their peers’ engagement in influence activities and their provision of effort. 
Under a low degree of mutual monitoring, however, employees observe the same signal as the 
superior about their peers’ performance. 
The results of the study provide evidence that a policy that requires superiors to announce 
the extent of discretion over bonus allocations in advance can help to improve team output in a 
setting with influence activities. Consistent with my prediction, I find that the effect of an-
nouncement is more pronounced in work environments with a high degree of mutual monitoring 
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between peers. Specifically, under a high degree of mutual monitoring, announcement increases 
team output and reduces influence activities in teams. Under a low degree of mutual monitoring, 
however, announcement does not lead to increased team output. The problem is that superiors 
under a low degree of mutual monitoring may have more difficulties to determine and announce 
an optimal extent of discretion as the connection between team output and the announced dis-
cretion extent is less apparent.  
Nevertheless, the findings suggest that announcement enables superiors to better reward 
individual effort of employees, which is an important driver of employees’ motivation to con-
tribute to team output and their perceptions of distributive fairness. A policy that requires su-
periors to announce the extent of discretion over bonus allocations therefore provides a useful 
tool for organizations to mitigate the costs of influence activities and, ultimately, to improve 
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Model of Influence Activities and Effort 
In this appendix, I introduce a model of employees’ effort and influence activities and 
derive the optimal bonus allocation strategy under standard economic assumptions. Consider 
three risk-neutral and homogenous agents that produce a joint team output. Each agent i ∈ {1, 
2, 3} selects a level of effort (ei) and a level of influence activities (bi). Employees bear private 
costs from both, effort and influence activities, where ci(ei, bi) is a function converting any 
combination of effort and influence activities to costs. The private cost of effort is higher com-
pared to the cost of influence activities in the sense that the marginal cost of influence activities 
is only a fraction k of the marginal costs of effort. Moreover, there are spillover costs between 
the two activities such that the marginal cost of effort is increasing in the level of influence 




(ei + k ∙ bi)
2 
where: 
  k ∈ ]0, 1[ 
  i ∈ {1, 2, 3} 
Team output q is a function of the three employees’ effort. Specifically, 
q(e1, e2, e3) = e1+ e2 + e3 
Employees are compensated by the means of a bonus pool that is completely allocated 
between the two employees at the end of a period. The size of bonus pool P is linearly increasing 
in team output by factor t: 
P(q) = t ∙ q(e1, e2, e3) = t ∙ (e1 + e2 + e3) 
                                                 
31 Spillover costs are often implemented when modelling multi-task environments (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991). They likely exist in practice because time constraints may limit employees’ ability to engage in both ac-
tivities or because excessive engagement in one activity may exhaust employees and, thereby affect the costs to 
engage in other activities. 
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Before allocating the bonus pool, the superior gets a private signal about the individual 
performance of each of the three employees. The private performance signal (Si) is a function 
of an employees’ effort and influence activities: 
  Si(ei,bi) = ei + bi 
The superiors then have to place an optimal weight on the private performance signal 
when allocating the bonus pool so as to motivate high efforts. Specifically, superiors can do so 
by allocating a portion α of the bonus pool based on the private performance signal while allo-
cating the remaining portion of the bonus pool (1 − α) equally among the three employees. 
Thus, an employee’s share in the bonus pool (Bi) is represented by the following function: 
Bi = α ∙ P(q) ∙ 
Si
S1 + S2 + S3





  α ∈ [0, 1] 
Self-interested employees maximize their expected utility EUi, which is increasing in 
their share in the bonus pool Bi and decreasing in their private cost of effort and influence ac-
tivities ci(ei, bi). The utility function is additively separable in its two operands. Furthermore, 
as common in experimental studies, I assume that utility can be measured in monetary terms 
(e.g, Towry 2003). Hence, the utility function may be represented as, 
EUi = (α ∙ 
Si




)  ∙ P(q) − ci(ei,bi) 
Self-Interested Equilibrium in Absence of Influence Activities 
As a benchmark, I first derive employees’ effort as a function of the weight α when em-
ployees do not engage in influence activities. In this case, the superiors’ private performance 
signal Si perfectly reflects individual effort (i.e., Si = ei). In absence of influence activities, self-
interested employees thus maximizes the following objective function: 
max
ei
EUi = (𝛼 ∙  
𝑒𝑖
𝑒1 + 𝑒2 + 𝑒3
 +  
(1 − 𝛼)
3




2             (A.1) 
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s. t.  ei ≥ 0 
The effort function can be derived by rearranging the first order condition under the as-
sumption of homogenous employees (i.e., e1 = e2 = e3): 






)                                                                                      (A.2) 
Equation A.2 reveals that in absence of influence activities individual effort is strictly 
increasing in the weight α. That is, increasing the weight α reduces opportunities for employees 
to free-ride on the effort of the other employee by strengthening the link between individual 
effort and reward. 
Self-Interested Equilibrium in Presence of Influence Activities 
Next, I derive employees’ effort as a function of the weight α when employees do engage 
in influence activities. In this case, the superiors private performance signal Si reflects an em-
ployee’s effort and his engagement in influence activities (i.e., Si = ei + bi). In presence of 
influence activities, self-interested employees thus maximize the following objective function: 
max
ei,bi
EUi = (α ∙ 
Si




)  ∙ P(q) −
1
4
(ei + k ∙ bi)
2    (B.1) 
  s. t.  ei ≥ 0 
   bi ≥ 0 
Again, the effort function can be derived by rearranging the two first order conditions 
under the assumption of homogenous employees (i.e., e1 = e2 = e3 and b1 = b2 = b3): 
ei = 
2∙ t
3 ∙ (1 − k)







(1 + 2∙α) ∙ (1 − k)
∙ (2 ∙ 𝛼 −
k
(1 − k)
)                             (B.3) 
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Equation (B.2) reveals that an employee’s effort is strictly decreasing in his level of in-
fluence activities (for all bi ≥ 0). Furthermore, equation (B.3) implies that employees’ engage-
ment in influence activities is positive and strictly increasing in the weight α whenever α ex-
ceeds the following threshold:  
α̅ = 
k
2 ∙ (1 − k)
 
If, however, the weight α is set below this threshold equation B.3 would imply a negative 
level of influence activities, which is not feasible. Consequently, below the threshold ?̅? em-
ployees do not become engaged in influence activities (i.e., bi = 0). 
Importantly, this threshold also constitutes the weight α on the private performance sig-
nal, which maximizes individual effort. That is, as long as the weight α is set below the thresh-
old ?̅?, employees do not engage in influence activities, and so an increase in the weight α would 
imply higher effort as indicated by equation A.2. In contrast, when the weight α is set above the 
threshold ?̅?, employees engage in influence activities (i.e., bi > 0) and any increase in the weight 
α leads them to increase the level of influence activities and to reduce effort as indicated by 
equations B.2 and B.3. Employees’ effort is thus highest if setting the weight on the private 
performance signal exactly equal to ?̅?. 
Benchmark Solution 
In this study, the following specific parameters are used: 
t = 10 
k = 0.5 
The optimal weight α, given the above parameters, is therefore calculated as follows: 
α* = 
0.5
2 ∙( 1 − 0.5)
 = 0.5 
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In the resulting Nash Equilibrium employees would not engage in influence activities (see 
discussion above) and they would choose their level of effort as implied by equation B.2 (or by 
equation A.1, which yields the same result): 
ei
* = 20 ∙ 
2 ∙ 0.5 + 1
3






Thank you for participating in this experiment. 
 
This experiment investigates decision making in an organizational setting. Please read the 
instructions carefully. Your earnings will depend on the decision that you and other 
participants make during this experiment. 
 
After reading the instructions, you will take a short quiz to test your comprehension of the in-
structions. No one will be able to continue until everyone has passed the quiz. 
 
We promise to carry out this study in the manner described in the instructions, with no decep-
tion of any form. 
 
If you have any questions while we are going over the instructions, or during the study, please 
raise your hand and we will answer your question in private. 
 
This experiment will approximately take 90 minutes. 
 
General Instructions 
This experiment consists of several „rounds". In each round, you are part of a four-person 
team. Assume that you and the three other participants in your team work for the same 
organization. In each team, one participant will act as the team manager and the three other 
participants will act as an employee (employee A, employee B or employee C).  
 
You are assigned to the role of a (team manager/ Employee A/B/C). All participants will 
keep their role throughout the entire experiment.  
 
This experiment consists of eight rounds in total. Throughout the eight rounds of the 
experiment, your team will remain the same.  
 
You can earn points in each round of the experiment. How many points you will earn in a 
round depends on the decisions that you and the three other participants in your team make. 
Your experimental payout will be calculated based on the total amount of points that you have 
earned during the experiment. Earned points will be converted into actual cash at the rate of 
34 points = CHF 1 and will be added to your CHF 5 participation fee. 
 
In the event that you have a negative amount of points at the end of the experiment, the points 
(converted into cash) will be deducted from your participation fee. A potential deduction, 
however, cannot be higher than the participation fee. 
 
Each participant has already been assigned to a cubicle that is marked with a number from 1 
to 16. The numbers enable all participants to identify the members of their team: With the 
help of the numbers, you can identify the members of your team during the experiment and 
you can also identify for each team member whether he/she acts as the team manager or as an 
employee.  
                                                 
32 The experimental instruments are directly translated from German to be as close as possible to the original in-





At the beginning of the experiment each participant will stand up behind his/her cubicle – 
team-by-team – and each participant will briefly introduce himself/herself personally to the 
members of his/her team (name, age, hobby).   
 
The experiment will start after the round of introductions. From this point, all interactions will 
take place over the computer network until the end of the experiment. 
 
Employees’ task 
The task of the employees – A, B and C – is it to decide in each round about their levels of 
effort in two activities. The choice of the effort levels influences the output that the team 
produces, and determines the cost of effort that an employee has to bear. The task is identical 
for all employees.  
 
Choice of effort levels 
Employees choose their levels of effort in two different activities – Activity 1 and Activity 2. 
Each employees chooses his/her effort levels by determining a number between 0 and 20 for 
each of the two activities.  
 
Effort costs and team output 
Just as there are different activities in reality that are more or less exhausting and that contrib-
ute more or less to team output, the two activities in this experiment also differ in the effort 
costs incurred and in their contribution to team output.  
 
Effort costs:  
Each employee bears individual costs for his/her levels of effort in activity 1 and 2. 
Table 1 (see at the end of these instructions) shows the effort costs contingent on the 
level of effort in activities 1 and 2. 
 
Activity 1 incurs higher effort cost than Activity 2: An increase in the effort level in Ac-
tivity 1 leads to additional effort costs more than twice as high as an equal increase in 
the effort level in Activity 2. 
 
 Team output: 
Each employee can contribute to team output by increasing his/her effort level in Ac-
tivity 1. An increase in the effort level in Activity 1 by one unit increases team output 
by one unit.  
In contrast, an increase in the effort level in Activity 2 does not increase team output. 
 
Hence, an increase in the effort level in Activity 1 leads to high effort costs for an employee. 
However, it also contributes much to team output. In contrast, an increase in the effort level in 




The effort levels of an employee in Activity 1 and Activity 2 together add up to total effort of 
an employee. Assume that – just like in the real world – your total effort requires work time 





Team output and bonus pool 
In each round, effort levels in Activity 1 of the three employees are summed up. The sum of 
the three employees’ levels of effort in Activity 1 is equal to team output in a round. 
 
 
The organization makes a profit of 20 points for each unit of team output that the three em-
ployees produce. In each round, 50 percent of the organization’s profit are going into a bonus 
pool for the three employees. At the end of each round, this bonus pool will be completely al-
located between the three employees:  
 
Bonus pool for the employees:  
Each unit of team output increases the organization’s profit by 20 points. 50 percent of 
the organization’s profit are going into a bonus pool at the end of a round. Therefore, 
each unit of team output increases the bonus pool by 10 points. 
 
 
The allocation of the bonus pool and information of the team manager  
The allocation of the bonus pool among the three employees is determined by the team man-
ager at his/her sole discretion. The team manager is free in his/her decision how to allocate the 
bonus pool as long as the sum of the individual bonus payments amounts to the total bonus 
pool and as long as none of the three employees receives less than 0. 
 
In each round, the team manager will be informed about the team output and about the total 
effort of each of the three employees. The team manager, however, is not informed about the 
efforts of the three employees in activity 1 and 2 separately. That is, the team manager will 
know the total level of effort of each employee. However, he/she will not know how much of 
the total effort was contributed to either Activity 1 or Activity 2.  
 
The allocation of the bonus pool between the two employees is conducted in two steps: 
 
At the beginning of each round – before employees choose their levels of effort in the two 
activities – the team manager determines a portion of the bonus pool that is allocated at the 
end of the round as team bonus. The portion of the bonus pool that is allocated as team bonus 
can be determined in steps of 10 percentage points and can range from 0% to 100%. 
 
The team bonus is allocated in any case equally among the three employees at the end of a 
round. That means each employee receives one third of the team bonus. 
 
[Conditions with announcement: At the beginning of each round, before employees choose 
their levels of effort in the two activities, employees are informed about the portion of the 
bonus pool that is allocated as team bonus. The announcement of the team manager about the 
team bonus is binding. That is, each of the three employees will in any case receive one third 
of the team bonus. The team manager cannot change the portion of the bonus pool that is 
allocated as team bonus at the end of a round]. 
 
[Conditions without announcement: Employees are not informed about the portion of the 
bonus pool that is allocated as team bonus.] 
 
At the end of each round – after being informed about the total effort of each of his/her 
employee – the team manager allocates the remaining portion of the bonus pool that is not 
allocated as team bonus at his/her sole discretion. The team manager, however, cannot assign 
a negative individual bonus to any of the employees. 
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Information of the employees 
At the end of each round, employees receive information about efforts and bonus payments of 
the other employee in their team.  
 
[Conditions with a high degree of mutual monitoring: Before the team manager allocates the 
bonus pool, employees are informed about the total effort of the other employees in their 
team. In contrast to the team manager, employees are additionally informed about the levels 
of effort of the other employees in activities 1 and 2. That means, each employee knows 
exactly how much effort the other employees in his/her team has contributed to Activity 1 and 
Activity 2.] 
 
[Conditions with a low degree of mutual monitoring: Before the team manager allocates the 
bonus pool, employees are informed about the total effort of the other employees in their 
team. Just like the team manager, however, employees are not informed about the levels of 
effort of the other employees in activities 1 and 2 separately. That means, each employee 
knows total effort of the other employee in his/her team, however, he/she does not know how 
much effort the other employee in his/her team has contributed to Activity 1 and Activity 2.] 
 
At the end of each round, after the team manager allocated the bonus pool, each employee is 
informed about his/her total bonus and the total bonus of the other employee in his/her team. 
 
Net income of an employee 
Besides the bonus payment, each employee receives a fixed income of 40 points in each 
round. The fixed income is added to an employee’s total points from the bonus pool. The net 
income of an employee in a round is therefore equal to the fixed income plus his/her total bo-
nus minus his/her costs of effort. 
 
 Net income of an employee: 
 Fixed income + total bonus – costs of effort = Net income in points 
 
 
Net income of the team manager 
In each round, the team manager receives a bonus as his/her net income. The bonus of the 
team manager is directly linked to the profit of the organization. The team manager receives 
15% of the organization’s profit payed out as bonus at the end of each round.  
 
Bonus of the team managers:  
Each unit of team output increases the profit of the organization by 20 points. The 
team manager receives 15% of the organization’s profit payed out as bonus. Hence, 
each additional unit of team output increases the manager’s bonus by 3 points. 
 
 
Information at end of each round 
At the end of each round, each employee and the team manager is informed about their 





Assume that you and the other two employees in your team have chosen the following effort 
levels independent from each other:  
 
 
 Employee A Employee B Employee C 
Effort in Activity 1 14 6 6 
Effort in Activity 2 0 8 13 
Total effort 14 14 19 
 
 
The choice of the above levels of effort are leading – according to Table 1 (see at the end of 
these instructions) – to the following costs of effort for the three employees:  
 
 
 Employee A Employee B Employee C 
Effort Costs 49.0 25.0 39.1 
 
 
The efforts of the three employees in Activity 1 determine team output. Each unit of effort in 
Activity 1 increases team output by one unit:  
 
 Contribution to Team Output  
 Employee A:   14 units 
 Employee B:     6 units 
 Employee C:     6 units 




Due to the chosen levels of effort in Activity 1 the team has produced in this example round 
26 units of team output in total. Each unit of team output increases the bonus pool by 10 
points. Hence, at the end of the round the bonus pool is calculated as follows: 
 
 Bonus pool:    10 points x 26 units = 260 points 
 
At the end of the round and before the allocation of the bonus pool, employees and the team 
manager are informed about the efforts of each employee. The team manager [as well as the 
three employees], however, only observes [observe] total effort of the three employees. The 
team manager [They], however, does not [do not] observe how much effort employees have 




Information of the team manager about the efforts of the two employees 
 
 Employee A Employee B Employee C 
Total effort 14 14 19 
 
[The three employees, however, can observe total effort as well as how much effort each of 
the other employees has contributed to each of the two activities.] 
 
At the end of the round, the team manager allocates the bonus pool among the three employ-
ees. Assume that the team manager determines at the beginning of the round a team bonus of 
30% of the bonus pool. The team bonus in this round is therefore equal to 30% * 260 = 78. 
Each of the three employees receives one third of the team bonus, which is equal to 78 / 3 = 
26. The remaining 182 points from bonus pool are allocated by the team manager at his/her 
discretion at the end of the round as long as he/she allocates the total amount of 182 points 
among the three employees and as long as none of the three employees receives less than 0. 
 
[Conditions with announcement:  
 
Superior’s allocation of the bonus pool 
 
 Employee A Employee B Employee C Total 
Team bonus 26  26  26  78  
Individual bonus a  b  c  182  
Total bonus of an 
Employee 




After the team manager has allocated the bonus pool, each employee is informed about his/her 
total bonus and about the total bonus of the other employee. The total bonus of an employee is 
calculated by the sum of the team bonus and the employee’s individual bonus as determined 
by the team manager.] 
 
[Conditions without announcement: 
 
Superior’s allocation of the bonus pool 
 
 Employee A Employee B Employee C Total 
Total bonus of an 
Employee 




After the team manager has allocated the bonus pool, each employee is informed about his/her 
total bonus and about the total bonus of the other employee.] 
 
The net income of an employee at the end of each round is calculated as follows: 
 
 Fix income + total bonus – effort costs =  Net income in points  
 (rounded up to the next whole number) 
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[Conditions with announcement:  
 
Net income of an employee 
 Employee A Employee B Employee C 
Fix income 40 40 40 
Total bonus 26 + a 26 + b 26 + c 
Effort costs 49.0 25.0 39.1 
Net income in points 40 + (26 + a) – 49.0 40 + (26 + b) – 25.0 40 + (26 + c) – 39.1 
] 
 
[Conditions without announcement: 
 
Net income of an employee 
 Employee A Employee B Employee C 
Fix income 40 40 40 
Total bonus A B C 
Effort costs 49.0 25.0 39.1 
Net income in points 40 + A – 49.0 40 + B – 25.0 40 + C – 39.1 
] 
 
The net income of the team manager at the end of each round is calculated as follows:  
 
 Units of team output x 3 bonus points per unit  = Net income in points 
  
 Net income of the team manager 
 Team manager:  26 x 3 = 78 points 
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Experimental payout and completion of the experiment 
The points that you have earned in each round will be summed up over all eight rounds of the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment, these points will determine your experimental pay-
out. 
 
Your points will be converted into to cash at a rate of 34 points = CHF 1. This amount will 
be added to your participation fee of CHF 5 and it will paid out at the end of the experiment. 
 
In the event that you have a negative amount of points at the end of the experiments, the 
points converted into cash will be deducted from your participation fee. However, a cash de-
duction in CHF will never be higher than the participation fee. 
 
As soon as you received your payout, you have successfully completed the experiment. Please 
help us to remain control over the results of this experiment by not talking to anybody about 
this experiment who could still participate. Thank you. 
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Table 1: Effort costs (in points) 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.6 2.3 3.1 4.0 5.1 6.3 7.6 9.0 10.6 12.3 14.1 16.0 18.1 20.3 22.6 25.0
1 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.6 2.3 3.1 4.0 5.1 6.3 7.6 9.0 10.6 12.3 14.1 16.0 18.1 20.3 22.6 25.0 27.6 -
2 1.0 1.6 2.3 3.1 4.0 5.1 6.3 7.6 9.0 10.6 12.3 14.1 16.0 18.1 20.3 22.6 25.0 27.6 30.3 - -
3 2.3 3.1 4.0 5.1 6.3 7.6 9.0 10.6 12.3 14.1 16.0 18.1 20.3 22.6 25.0 27.6 30.3 33.1 - - -
4 4.0 5.1 6.3 7.6 9.0 10.6 12.3 14.1 16.0 18.1 20.3 22.6 25.0 27.6 30.3 33.1 36.0 - - - -
5 6.3 7.6 9.0 10.6 12.3 14.1 16.0 18.1 20.3 22.6 25.0 27.6 30.3 33.1 36.0 39.1 - - - - -
6 9.0 10.6 12.3 14.1 16.0 18.1 20.3 22.6 25.0 27.6 30.3 33.1 36.0 39.1 42.3 - - - - - -
7 12.3 14.1 16.0 18.1 20.3 22.6 25.0 27.6 30.3 33.1 36.0 39.1 42.3 45.6 - - - - - - -
8 16.0 18.1 20.3 22.6 25.0 27.6 30.3 33.1 36.0 39.1 42.3 45.6 49.0 - - - - - - - -
9 20.3 22.6 25.0 27.6 30.3 33.1 36.0 39.1 42.3 45.6 49.0 52.6 - - - - - - - - -
10 25.0 27.6 30.3 33.1 36.0 39.1 42.3 45.6 49.0 52.6 56.3 - - - - - - - - - -
11 30.3 33.1 36.0 39.1 42.3 45.6 49.0 52.6 56.3 60.1 - - - - - - - - - - -
12 36.0 39.1 42.3 45.6 49.0 52.6 56.3 60.1 64.0 - - - - - - - - - - - -
13 42.3 45.6 49.0 52.6 56.3 60.1 64.0 68.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14 49.0 52.6 56.3 60.1 64.0 68.1 72.3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
15 56.3 60.1 64.0 68.1 72.3 76.6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16 64.0 68.1 72.3 76.6 81.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
17 72.3 76.6 81.0 85.6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
18 81.0 85.6 90.3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
19 90.3 95.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
20 100.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Effort in 
Activity 1




Note: This will be administered via the computer. Participants have to answer each 
question correctly before they can continue to the next question. 
All answers will be accompanied by an explanation why the answer was right or wrong 
(to emphasize the corresponding instructions again). In case an answer was wrong, par-
ticipants will have to answer the question again. 
 
 




2. My role will remain constant throughout the experiment session.  That is, if I am a team 
manager in the first round, I will be a team manager in all subsequent rounds. Likewise, if I 




3.1 If an employee chooses a level of effort in Activity 1 of 15 and a level of effort in Activity 
2 of 5, then team output will increase by: 
a) 20 units 
b) 15 units 
c) 10 units 
d) 5 units 
 
3.2 If an employee chooses a level of effort in Activity 1 of 5 and a level of effort in Activity 2 
of 15, then team output will increase by: 
a) 20 units 
b) 15 units 
c) 10 units 
d) 5 units 
 
4.1 If an employee chooses a level of effort in Activity 1 of 15 and a level of effort in Activity 
2 of 5, then his/her effort costs are equal to: 
a) 25 points 
b) 39.1 points 
c) 76.6 points 
d) 100 points 
 
4.1 If an employee chooses a level of effort in Activity 1 of 5 and a level of effort in Activity 2 
of 15 then his/her effort costs are equal to: 
a) 15 points 
b) 39.1 points 
c) 76.6 points 




5. If all three employees choose a level of effort in Activity 1 of 10 and a level of effort in Ac-
tivity 2 of 10, then team output is equal to: 
a) 15 units 
b) 30 units 
c) 45 units 
d) 60 units 
 
6. If team output is equal to 30 units, then the bonus pool for the employees is equal to: 
a) 60 points 
b) 150 points 
c) 300 points 
d) 600 points 
 
7. If team output is equal to 30 units, then the bonus for the team manager is equal to: 
a) 30 points 
b) 90 points 
c) 120 points 
d) 300 points 
 
8. Who decides about the allocation of the bonus pool? 
a) The bonus pool will always be allocated equally among employees. 
b) The employees decide together about the allocation of the bonus pool. 
c) The team manager allocates the bonus pool at his/her discretion. 
 
9. Employees will not only be informed about total effort of the other employees, but also 




10. The team manager will not only be informed about total effort of the two employees, but 




[Only announcement conditions:] 
11. If the team manager announces at the beginning of the round a portion of the bonus pool 
that is allocated as team bonus equally among employees, then this portion of the bonus pool  
a) … will be allocated in any case equally among employees at the end of the round. 
b) … will still be allocated at the discretion of the team manager. 
 
[Only announcement conditions:] 
12. Assume that the team manager announced a portion of 50% of the bonus pool that is allo-
cated as team bonus equally among employees. The bonus pool for the employees at the end 
of the round is equal to 300. How many points of the bonus pool will be allocated equally 
among employees in this round? 
a) 0 points 
b) 150 points 







Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich diese Arbeit selbständig verfasst und keine anderen als die ange-
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sinngemäss aus Quellen entnommen wurden, habe ich als solche gekennzeichnet. Mir ist be-
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